

# EXCERPTA CYPRIA FOR TODAY

*a source book on the Cyprus problem*

Edited by Andrew Faulds MP

Published by K. Rustem and Brother,  
Lefkosa - Istanbul - London  
for

THE FRIENDS OF NORTH CYPRUS PARLIAMENTARY GROUP  
the House of Commons, London SW1



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*"Of mouths unbridled and of lawless  
folly the end is misery"*  
Euripides, *Bacchae*, 386.

In his book *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem) the Greek diplomat Angelos Vlachos, who had official responsibility for Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s, uses this quotation to epitomise the disastrous folly of Greek Cypriot and Greek leaders in attempting to overthrow by force the Zurich/London settlement and the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus established in 1960.

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## Foreword

In 1971 Arnold Toynbee wrote -

'Right and wrong are the same in Palestine as anywhere else. What is peculiar about the Palestine conflict is that the world has listened to the party that has committed the offence and has turned a deaf ear to the victims'.

Although, thanks to the intervention of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots are no longer subject to victimisation in their own land at the hands of their Greek compatriots, Toynbee's condemnation of double standards of right and wrong and of the injustice of listening to the offending party and turning a deaf ear to the victims is apposite to the Cyprus as well as to the Palestine conflict.

We hope this collection of material will help towards getting a fairer hearing for the Turkish Cypriots than they have yet had in Britain and Europe and at the United Nations. We see no hope of an end to the Cyprus dispute unless the international community recognises - as the then British government did in 1956 - that 'the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community', should 'be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status.'

We have called this compilation *Excerpta Cypria* after the title of a book, well known to students of Cyprus affairs, by C. D. Cobham containing material for a history of Cyprus. It was published in 1908.

ANDREW FAULDS

## **Part I**

### **One Island, Two Peoples**

- 1 The Demand for Enosis
- 2 The Turkish Connection

# 1 The Demand for Enosis

## (A) *The 'Megali Idea' (the Great Idea or Grand Concept)*

I,1 KOLETTIS, John (then, 1844, Prime Minister of Greece)

The kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest, of Greece. A Greek is not only he who lives in the Kingdom but also he who lives in Yannina, or Thessaloniki, or Serres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizond, or Crete, or Samos, or in whatever country is historically Greek, or whoever is of the Greek race. . . . The Heroes of the independence do not belong solely to the Kingdom, to the small Kingdom of Greece. They belong to all the provinces of the Greek world from the Haimos to the Tainaron, from Trebizond to Cilicia. . . . There are also two great centers of Hellenism: Athens and Constantinople. Athens is only the capital of the kingdom. Constantinople is the great capital, the City, the joy and hope of all Hellenes.

Excerpt from a speech delivered in January 1844 (quoted by Pierre Oberling in *The Road to Bella Pais*, p 11)

### *Editorial Note*

Oberling comments: In other words, the Megali Idea aimed at nothing less than the recreation of the Byzantine Empire at its apogee. It was, of course, an unrealistic goal. In order to achieve it, Greece would have had to conquer the Ottoman Empire, which was both stronger and more populous than the new Hellenic kingdom. It would also have had to overcome British opposition, for one of the principal objectives of England's foreign policy during the nineteenth century was to prevent Russian access to the Mediterranean by shoring up the Ottoman Empire. Finally, it would have had to compete with Balkan nationalities, such as the Serbs, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians, which were beginning to entertain their own dreams of grandeur and to stake claims to various parts of the Ottoman Empire. Like the *élan vital* of the French Third Republic, or Victor Hugo's 'idea with a sword', the Megali Idea involved considerable wishful thinking and more than a little hubris. It was also a potentially dangerous idea: mixing nationalism with the heady wine of religious fanaticism can lead to extremes of savagery and even collective suicide.

I,2 KOHN, Hans

. . . the champions of the Megali Idea displayed a tendency to create 'out of myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present,

and expected to become sometime a political reality’.

Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A study in its Origins and Background*, p 330

I,3 SKIOTIS, Dennis (Professor of History, Harvard University)

The millenarian expectation that a day would surely dawn when God would lift the infidel yoke from his chosen people and would restore to them the Christian Roman Empire [Byzantium] in all its majesty and splendour is of fundamental importance in understanding how the Greeks perceived their historical identity and destiny.

*Byzantina kai Metabyzantina* Vol. I, p 158

I,4 STAVRINIDES, Zenon (Greek Cypriot writer and historian)

During the heyday of the Great Idea the Greeks developed a conception of their national identity which included the following features:

(a) The Greek nation are a people who lived for millenia in their Mediterranean territory. Present-day Greeks are the descendants of the Hellenic heroes, Plato, Sophocles, Alexander and the Greek-speaking Christians of Byzantium. They are to be identified not by reference to citizenship of the existing Greek State, but by reference to a distinguished civilisation and language to which they are all the rightful heirs.

(b) The Greek nation is much larger than the modern Greek State. The latter is that part of the Hellenic and Christian Orthodox world which has been liberated from (mostly Ottoman) domination by the sacrifice and heroism of Greek people.

(c) It is the patriotic duty of all ‘true’ Greeks to work for the liberation of all historically Greek lands, now inhabited by Greeks under foreign rule. And it is a ‘prescription of history’ (a meaningless phrase which has enjoyed wide currency among history-conscious Greeks) that all foreign-dominated Greek territory will eventually become united with the free Greek State.

Thus, to be a ‘true’ Greek, one would have to conceive of oneself as a member of a great nation only a part of which having, as yet, been redeemed and organized as a free national State; and further, to believe that this national State must grow steadily until it encompasses the whole of the ancient and Byzantine Hellenic world. Greek children at school were taught extensively their history (or an official version of it), ancient, medieval and modern; and modern history was taught as a record of the gradual fulfilment of national aspirations, mainly by fighting against Ottoman Turkish conquerors. So, by a combination of various historical factors, state-controlled education, propaganda and political demagogy, Greek nationalism and patriotism came to mean by the 1860’s: pride in being a member of a superior nation, belief in the necessity of extending the boundaries of the Greek State to include all historical Greek lands, and consequently the assertion of the duty to support a just struggle against the Turkish conquerors who have for long held by force sacred national territory.

*The Cyprus Conflict*, pp 19-20

(B) *Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis*

## I,5 KYPRIANOS, Bishop of Kitium

We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected.

Address of welcome to the new British High Commissioner on his arrival in Cyprus in July 1878 (quoted by R. Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, p 70)

## I,6 LIMASSOL RESOLUTION ON ENOSIS, 1895

The Hellenic people of the District of Limassol, in concord with the rest of the Hellenic people of the Island, who form the great majority of the whole population, has always desired, desires and will desire one and only one solution, and today solemnly demands that Union with Hellas, to which it belongs by race and blood, be effected with the least possible delay. Until that moment the Hellenic people of the Island, while putting up patiently with the liberal and equitable English Government, as favourable to this desirable solution, rejects and will always reject with indignation any plan for its transfer to any other Government whatsoever.

Quoted by Sir George Hill, *The History of Cyprus*, Vol IV, p 500

## I,7 GREEK CYPRIOT MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1911

Forming, as we do, Your Excellency, an inseparable part of the Greek race, it is natural that we should feel, in a strong and irresistible manner, the desire that our fatherland should be annexed to the Hellenic Kingdom. The fulfilment of these, our aspirations, we base on the strength of our rights and the magnanimity of the English nation.

Quoted by R Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, p 108

## I,8 NICODEMOS, Bishop of Kitium, 1931

'Our only salvation from all points of view is our national liberation . . . by getting united with Mother Greece.' The foreign ruler 'to whom and to whose illegal laws we owe no obedience' must be made to 'clear out from our country, for the sake of his own purification, this abomination which is called English Occupation and Administration of Cyprus'.

Manifesto dated 17 October 1931, at the beginning of the Enosist riots.

'Union with Mother Greece and disobedience and insubordination towards the illegal laws of the immoral, vile and reproachful regime which is called "English regime"'. . . . The time has come to show to the foreign rulers

that we are a people with national sentiments and educated and that we must live free under the Hellenic flag. Down with the vile and reproachful regime! Long live Union!

In a speech on 20 October 1931 delivered at the Limassol Sports Ground and 'Enosis' Club (quoted in Sir George Hill, *The History of Cyprus*, Vol IV, pp 546-7

I,9 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of uniting Cyprus with Mother Greece.

On the occasion of his enthronement as Archbishop, 20 October 1950

We are entitled to, and demand, such support because what the Cypriots want is not self-government, or autonomy, or independence, but Union with Greece.

In a letter to Field Marshal Papagos, Prime Minister of Greece, seeking the support of the Government of Greece for the struggle against British rule, 9 September 1953

For the first time in eight centuries the government of the island passes into Greek hands.

On the announcement of his election as President elect of the (bi-communal!) Republic of Cyprus, 13 December 1959

The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an inspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic.

In a statement to *The Times*, 9 April 1963

Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece.

In a speech at Yialousa village, 14 March 1971

*Editorial Note*

These quotations are intended as a representative sample of Enosis demands from the British Occupation onwards. There are countless more, a few of which are given in later Parts of this collection of source material.

I,10 VLACHOS, Angelos

*Editorial Note*

The following comment by a Greek diplomat who served as Consul-General in Nicosia during the EOKA period and was later in charge of Cyprus affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens puts the British administration of Cyprus in rather different light from that in which it was customarily portrayed in Enosis propaganda.

Cyprus, under British rule from 1878, was a prospering Greek island and the British administration was anything but harsh even after the disturbances of 1931. The peace-loving Cypriots were thriving and making progress and felt that, so long as they belonged to the Commonwealth, a wide world was opened to them. Within its very broad boundaries they were able to move with great ease and with important advantages. The cry of 'Enosis' was far more the expression of an undefined desire than the demonstration of a real, immediate political objective.

It is not hope but despair that provokes revolutions and the Cypriots were anything but in despair. Cyprus was 'both happy and in no way ready to go to war'.

Fear of 'dehellenisation' of Cyprus – a favourite cry which the fanatics of the Cyprus Question employed – had no substance. Cyprus had preserved its Greekness for thousands of years and for three hundred years of Ottoman occupation. How was it possible for it to be 'dehellenised' in a few tens of years under the British administration which was tolerant in the highest degree? Greek education was excellent in Cyprus and immeasurably superior to that of Greece. The Administration (90% of the public officials were Greeks) was excellent, very prompt and efficient and quite unlike that of Greece. The cultural activity of the Cypriots was intense and economic life was pulsating and progressing. The activity of the Church of Cyprus was varied and vigorous. Communication with Greece was very close and continuous. Where, then, the danger of 'dehellenisation'? And especially in the second half of the 20th century when colonialism was in final decline and the signs were clear of the dissolution of the British Empire?

*Deka Chronia Kypriakou,*  
(Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem) pp  
10-11

(C) *British reactions to Enosis*

I,11 HILL, Sir George

Of the three factors, race, language and religion, which contribute to the sense of Cypriote nationality, the first, paradoxical as it may seem, is the least important. From ancient times there was extensive colonization of the island from Greece proper - - -

But at no time has the island been a constituent part of Hellenic Greece. It was absorbed, along with, but not as an integral part of, Greece proper and

the Aegean area, by the Byzantine Empire. Its Church was an autocephalous member of the Holy Eastern Orthodox Church, and thus religion combined with language to foster the idea that the Cypriotes were Greek in origin. That there was real racial affinity with the Hellenic stock there is nothing to prove; the anthropological evidence, so far as it goes, seems on the whole to favour the contrary view. And the only evidence from the literature of ancient Hellas is conclusively to the effect that there, in the fifth century, the Cypriote type was regarded as alien. But all this is of little more than academic importance. 'A nation', it has been well said, 'when considered from its earliest to its latest days, is much more a body of ideas than a race of men.' No amount of argument will convince a people who speak the language and hold the faith of a particular race that they do not belong to that race.

*The History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV pp 488-9

I,12 STORRS, Sir Ronald (Governor of Cyprus 1926-32)

The Greekness of Cypriots is, in my opinion, indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentations or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French.

*Orientalisms*, pp 469-70

*Editorial Note*

Sir George Hill appends this revealing comment on Storrs' governorship:

In spite of the pronounced sympathy of Sir Ronald Storrs for Hellenism – perhaps largely because of it, since every friendly gesture is apt to be taken by agitators for a confession of weakness – it was during his governorship that the most serious crisis in the history of the British Occupation occurred. And when it became apparent that he had been riding the colony on too loose a rein, and the necessary measures of control were adopted, he was treated both in the island and in Greece to such a storm of invective as had never fallen to the lot of any of the High Commissioners who preceded him.

*The History of Cyprus*, Vol IV, p 542

I,13 GLADSTONE, William

the bulk of the people of Cyprus are Greeks; and rely upon it that if matters continue as they are, Greek sympathies, with the opening and extending emancipation of the East of Europe – Greek sympathies will prevail in the island; and instead of earning, even by the benefits you may confer upon them, far less earning by ordinances such as I have described, gratitude and attachment in the form of a disposition to continue in political connection with you, the more you improve their condition the quicker will be the development of this strong sentiment of nationality, and the more

earnest the desire of the Greeks of Cyprus to be united with the free Greeks of the rest of the world.

In a speech at Penicuik, 20 March 1880  
(quoted in Hill, op cit, p 497)

I subjoin the satisfaction I should feel, were it granted to me, before the close of my long life, to see the population of that Hellenic island placed by friendly arrangement in organic union with their brethren of the Kingdom and of Crete.

In a letter to the Duke of Westminster, 13  
March 1897 (quoted in Hill, op cit, p 503)

I,14 BULWER, Sir Henry (High Commissioner of Cyprus, 1886-92)

There are certain persons in Cyprus, especially at Larnaca and Limasol, who like to pose as 'patriots', professing what they call 'patriotic' or 'national' views, by which they mean pure Hellenic views. This has been the case from the beginning of the British Occupation, and the freedom of the press and the great liberty enjoyed under the British Government have enabled these persons to say very much what they like and to promulgate with impunity ideas and opinions designedly hostile or unfriendly to British rule.

In a letter to the Colonial Office, 29 April  
1892 (quoted in Hill, op cit, p 494)

#### *Editorial Note*

*The Times* on 5 April 1904 maintained that the Greeks who expressed grievances were those who pose as mouth-pieces of the majority, including the clubs, the Press, the members of the Legislative Council and the political busybodies, whose lead is largely followed by their fellow townspeople. The rural population was indeed fully sensible of the benefits already secured.

I,15 SENDALL, Sir Walter (High Commissioner of Cyprus, 1892-8)

Union with Greece is a genuine object of desire, but thoughtful Cypriots know well that such a measure is beset with difficulties, that it would be violently opposed by the Ottoman portion of the population, and would probably be found to be incapable of realization, at least for the present, even if it were to be regarded with favour by those who control the destinies of Cyprus. Their attitude towards the future may therefore be described as a balance of conflicting fears rather than an attitude of hopefulness; the chief apprehension being lest, should England hold loosely by her acquisition of Cyprus, the Island might fall into the hands of another European Power, which would be less scrupulously careful of their religious liberty. But so long as nothing occurs to throw doubt upon the continuance of the British occupation, the political tranquillity of the Island is absolutely assured.

In a letter to the Colonial Office, 18  
November 1895 (quoted in Hill, op cit, pp  
502-3)

- I,16 HAYNES SMITH, Sir W F (then, 1902, High Commissioner of Cyprus)  
I am authorized by the Secretary of State to inform the Council that H M Government hold Cyprus in trust for the purposes stated in the Treaty of 1878. If the territories taken by Russia are ever restored to Turkey the reversion of Cyprus under the Treaty belongs to Turkey under His Majesty's Treaty obligations. H M Government have no intention whatever of handing over Cyprus to any country.

Statement to the Legislative Council on 6  
July 1902 (quoted in Hill, op cit, p 513)

- I,17 CHURCHILL, Winston (then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies)  
I think it only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished. Such a feeling is an example of the patriotic devotion which so nobly characterises the Greek nation: and while I trust that those who feel so earnestly themselves will not forget that they must show respect for the similar feelings of others, I say that the views which have been put forward are opinions which His Majesty's Government do not refuse to regard with respect. On the other hand the opinion held by the Moslem population of the island, that the British Occupation of Cyprus should not lead to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and that the mission of Great Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan, is one which His Majesty's Government are equally bound to regard with respect.

During a visit to Cyprus from 9 to 13  
October, 1907 (Cmd 3996, 1908)

*Editorial Note*

The qualifying remarks about showing respect for the similar feelings of others and about Britain being bound to respect the opinions of the Moslem Cypriots are often omitted by those who quote the first sentence in support of Enosis).

- I,18 HILL, Sir George (concerning the Annexation of Cyprus by Britain on 5 November 1914)

The annexation of the island on 5 November 1914 provoked a protest, which was handed to the High Commissioner on the occasion of the ceremony. It was urged that if Cyprus were handed over to Greece, the Turkish minority could be protected by a Convention, the observance of which Britain would guarantee by her own power. On the other hand, the Moslem leaders (who had, as we have already seen (p 413), expressed their loyal acceptance of the situation) prayed the High Commissioner to see that assurance might be given that the island would not be handed to Greece but be permanently united with the British Empire.

With the annexation, the argument of the British Government, that it could not dispose of the island because it belonged to Turkey, lost its validity. Therefore it was generally, by the Greeks, assumed that the final stage in the progress towards cession to Greece had been reached.

Elevtheria, on 14 November, announced that Venizelos had actually said that 'the annexation of Cyprus must be characterized as the last stage towards the national restoration of this great Greek Island.'

*The History of Cyprus, Vol IV p 521*

- I,19 HILL, Sir George (concerning the declaration of Cyprus as a Crown Colony on 1 May 1925)

The occasion of the official pronouncement declaring Cyprus a Crown Colony (1 May 1925) was taken by Archbishop Cyril to present a solemn protest. 'We express', he said, 'in the name of the clergy and people their very deep grief and lay an emphatic protest against the renewed ignoring, by this political action, of the indefeasible historic national rights of the Hellenic people of the Island to their national restoration, which it was expecting soon to receive from the liberal English nation, and we declare that the burning and unalterable desire of the Hellenic people of the Island was, is, and will always be its union with its mother Hellas'. The Archbishop was told by the Chief Secretary, C D Fenn, that the Memorial was duly transmitted to the Secretary of State, who desired that the Archbishop should be informed that the question of the Union of Cyprus with Greece had been finally closed and could not be reopened.

*The History of Cyprus, Vol IV p 5481*

- I,20 LUKE, Sir Harry (who served in the District Administration and the Secretariat in Cyprus as a young man and ended his career in the Colonial Service as Governor of Malta and is the author of a number of books about Cyprus)

Even twenty-nine years after the Occupation [1907], when I first began to know the island, I would say that the feelings of the great majority of them for Hellas, particularly in the villages, were based primarily on a cultural, social, sentimental, emotional urge of kinship born of a common language, a common faith (though not a common ecclesiastical authority) and, above all, of common customs and a common way of life, which include (an important item) the same habits in eating and drinking. They were based far less, except in the minds of some of the lawyer-politicians, on a conscious wish to become the inhabitants of a new nomos (province) of the Greek State, accepting the officials, laws, taxation, conscription and other circumstances and obligations of that political entity.

*Cyprus, A Portrait and an Appreciation,*  
p 172

- I,21 MACMILLAN, Harold (then British Prime Minister)

Were Cyprus located west of Greece we would have conceded it to you as we did with the Ionian islands. But we have to face reality. The existence of

the interests of the two governments (sc. Greece and Turkey) is a fact.

In a discussion of the Macmillan Plan in Athens with the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis on 8 August 1958 (quoted by S G Xydis, *Cyprus Reluctant Republic* p 200)

## 2 The Turkish Connection

I,22 OBERLING, Pierre (professor of History, Hunter College, Cuny, USA)

In February 1570, as he was preparing to go to war with Venice for the purpose of annexing Cyprus, Sultan Selim II sent a firman (edict) to the governor of Mersin (the seaport from which the invasion force was to embark) ordering him 'to do his utmost to win the hearts of the masses' on Venetian-held Cyprus and to carry out the old Ottoman policy of *istimâlet*, or leniency, towards the Cypriots in the course of the conquest to come. On May 6, 1572, after he had routed the Venetians, he dispatched a similar firman to the new governor-general of Cyprus and his chief aides urging them to bestow on the Cypriots, 'who are a trust from God to us, as much protection and mercy as you can, abstaining from such actions as may lead to their dispersion', and stressing that it was his desire 'to ensure that everybody may attend to his daily work and concerns with a mind free from discomfort and anxiety, and that the island may be restored to its former flourishing condition'.

As the Turks established their suzerainty over Cyprus, they confiscated most of the estates belonging to the Cypriots' erstwhile Latin overlords, although a few of the latter were able to keep some of their lands by paying a ransom, and a handful of them were even allowed to enrol in the Ottoman cavalry. As for the Greek population, it greeted the incoming Turks as liberators and was treated with consideration in return. The Ottomans abolished serfdom and gave the Cypriots permission to acquire houses and land. They recognized the supremacy of the Orthodox community over all other Christian denominations and restored the Orthodox archbishopric. Above all, the Cypriots were integrated into that remarkable institution known as the Millet System, which for centuries provided members of religious minorities within the Ottoman Empire with more freedom than was enjoyed by such groups anywhere in Europe.

But Cyprus was too sparsely inhabited to be an economic asset to the Ottoman Empire. One of the cardinal principles of Ottoman rule was that inasmuch as the income of the state depended upon the prosperity of the country, every province had to be rendered as productive as possible. Accordingly, when the productive capacities of a given province were found to be wanting, additional farmers or workers were recruited from other provinces by means of a procedure called *sürgün*, or population transplant.

Lala Mustafa Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman army which had conquered Cyprus, was instructed to allow those among his men who wanted to settle down on the island to do so. Apparently some 20,000 of them chose to remain and were given appropriate grants of land. However, these settlers did not prove numerous enough to make the island prosper. Therefore, in 1572, Sinan Pasa, the governor-general of Cyprus, wrote a letter to Selim II in which he requested that more settlers be sent. In answer, the Sultan, on September 21, 1572, issued a firman to the kadis (judges) of Anatolia (at that time the region to the east of the Kizil Irmak), Karaman (the region around Konya) and Dulgadir (the region around Maras and the headwaters of the Euphrates river). In this edict, he ordered the deportation to Cyprus of thousands of persons and their families.

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As a result of these population transfers, Turks from a wide variety of professional backgrounds made their way to the island. In this respect, the process of colonization carried out by the Turks in Cyprus was similar to that of the British in North America. But an important difference was that the Turks made a wholehearted effort to integrate the local inhabitants into the economic and political life of the Ottoman Empire (while allowing them to retain their own social institutions and cultural identity), whereas in the New World the Indians were simply pushed aside as impediments to the fulfilment of white man's dreams. It should also be pointed out that the sürgün system, though largely compulsory, was far more humane than the British system of forcibly shipping over young men and women to America as indentured servants.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Ottoman government never attempted to establish a Turkish majority on Cyprus. Nor did it seek to set up an economically dominant upper class, as did the English in Ireland at the time of Cromwell.

*The Road to Bella Pais, pp 3-7*

I,23 REDDAWAY, John (who served as Administrative Secretary in Cyprus under Field Marshal Sir John Harding and later under Sir Hugh Foot)

To the British the Turkish interest seemed clear and undeniable. It is broadly, though not wholly, true that Cyprus has always had a predominantly Greek character; but the Turkish connection with Cyprus had lasted for some four centuries and reached back nearly as far as the beginning of European colonisation of the Americas and far longer than the whole history of the United States. Other alien regimes - Lusignan, Genoese, Venetian - had come and gone without impinging deeply on the Greek character of the Island; no doubt the British occupation in its turn would go the same way. But the Turkish occupation was different; it lasted longer and had an abiding effect on the demographic and ethnic character of Cyprus. No British Government could concede Enosis at the price of subjecting the Turkish Cypriots against their will to Greek rule and of thus alienating Turkey and precipitating civil war in Cyprus and a conflict between Greece and Turkey. Eden, as Prime Minister, was convinced that -

The Cyprus problem could never be settled until the importance of the Turkish position was understood and accepted. This means that Enosis must be ruled out as a solution.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British connection,*  
pp 17–18

I,24 PANTELI, Stavros (Greek Cypriot historian)

On 19 March [1921] a memorandum from the archbishop, as President of the National Council, demanded the union of the island with Greece.

On 20 May the National Council passed further resolutions for union which expressed dissatisfaction in refusing justice to their national aspirations. A petition from the Moslems followed on 11 December. The organizer was Dr Eyioub Mussa Nejm-Ed-Din, elected to the legislative council in 1921. . . .

The ostensible objectives of the petition were three:

- 1 The restoration of the island to the Ottoman empire or, in default of such a cession, the return to the *status ante bellum* in which Cyprus was administered by Britain while remaining part of the Ottoman empire.
- 2 The establishment of a Moslem council or central board to exercise control over certain Turkish affairs such as education.
- 3 Opposition to the grant of self-government to the native inhabitants of Cyprus.

*A New History of Cyprus,* pp 104–5

*Editorial Note*

On nearly every occasion that the Greek Cypriots submitted a petition or passed a resolution calling for Enosis, the Turkish Cypriots responded with a demand that there should be no change in the status of the Island or that, if Britain were to give up sovereignty, it should be returned to Turkey. There is no truth in the allegation, often advanced by Greek Cypriots and their more partisan supporters, that the Turkish Cypriots did not feel strongly about the issue of the Island's future and could, without much difficulty, have been made to acquiesce in Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot petition quoted above is of particular interest in its demand for a separate Moslem Council to control Turkish communal affairs. This anticipated by thirty five years the provision for this purpose contained in Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals of 1956.

I,25 DENKTASH, Rauf (then Turkish Cypriot interlocutor in the inter-communal talks)

We are part of Cyprus. You can't throw us out. So accommodate us. Let us accommodate ourselves. We don't want much. But we don't want to be 'not wanted'. That is the difficulty. For years we have been told by words and by action that we are not wanted in Cyprus, that Cyprus is not ours. And

that makes any community very angry, and makes any community entitled, at least in their own conscience, to take all steps in order to prove that a land where they have lived for centuries is theirs and they intend to keep it as such.

In an address at the Nicosia Rotary Club on 21 January 1974, (quoted in Rauf Denktash, *The Cyprus Problem*, p 61 and in Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict* p 63)

*Editorial Note*

After all the sufferings that had been inflicted on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots' resort to violence in 1955-58 and, even more, in 1963-4, such remarks by a leading Turkish Cypriot are surely striking evidence of a conciliatory attitude and a wish to co-exist at peace with the Greek Cypriot community. They were made *before* the 1974 crisis and the Turkish intervention.

## **Part II**

### **Enosis By Any Other Name**

#### **The switch to self-determination and independence**

- 1 Plus ça change . . .
- 2 Resort to Violence, 1955-58
- 3 'Conversion' to independence, 1958
- 4 Zurich and London, 1959-1960

## 1 Plus ça change . . .

II,1 MAKARIOS, Bishop of Kitium and later Archbishop of Cyprus

### *Editorial Note*

Soon after assuming the office of Ethnarch on his election as Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios began importuning the Greek Government to 'internationalise' the dispute by appealing to the United Nations for the application of self-determination to Cyprus. After fending off his demands for three years the Government in Athens at last gave way and on 22 August 1954 lodged its first appeal at the UN. (Five more were to follow before Greece and Turkey reached agreement over Cyprus at Zurich in February 1959). The following quotations – there are many more in the same vein – indicate that his true aim was always Enosis and remained so even though he found it tactically advantageous to pursue it in the guise of self-determination and even after his 'conversion' to independence.

We do not believe, as some traitors and friends of England do, that Enosis will be realised within the framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship, Enosis is not granted; it can only be won by continuous struggle.

Makarios, Bishop of Kitium, 4 December 1949

I take the Holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of uniting Cyprus with Mother Greece.

Makarios, on the occasion of his enthronement as Archbishop, 20 October 1950

I swear in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity to keep secret, sacrificing even my life, suffering even the harshest tortures, all that I know or will hear regarding the question of the Union of Cyprus. And I shall obey blindly the relevant orders given to me from time to time.

Oath of the Members of the Fighting Committee in Athens for the Union of Cyprus (the twelve members included Makarios and Grivas). 7 March 1953

We are entitled to, and demand, such support because what the Cypriots want is not self-government, or autonomy, or independence, but union with Greece.

Archbishop Makarios in a letter to Field Marshall Papagos, Prime Minister of Greece, seeking the support of the Greek Government. 9 September 1953

Beneath these sacred domes, let us in faith take the oath: We shall remain faithful unto death to the national demand. Without any retreats, without any concessions, without any compromises, we shall show our contempt for force and tyranny. With daring we shall raise high our morale, pursuing one sole aim, looking to one sole goal: Enosis and only Enosis.

Speaking in Phaneromeni Cathedral, Nicosia, at the end of divine service on 28 August 1954 (only six days after he had at last prevailed on Greece to appeal to the UN for self-determination). (Quoted by Vlachos, *Deka Chronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem), p 77

The struggle of the Cypriots will be united and stable and will follow only one course - that which leads to the Union of Cyprus with Greece.

Archbishop Makarios preaching in Athens Cathedral 13 November 1955

The struggle of the people of Cyprus will go on. The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this struggle, but at the same time are a starting point and bastion for further struggles, with the object of capitalising on what has been achieved for further conquests.

President Markarios in a speech delivered on 5 January 1962

Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA Heroes . . . The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal.

Archbishop Makarios in a sermon at Kykko Monastery 15 January 1962

The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic.

Archbishop Makarios, statement to *The Times*, 9 April 1963

It is true that the goal of our struggle is to unite Cyprus with Greece.

Archbishop Makarios in a statement published in *Uusi Suomi* of Stockholm 5 September 1963

- II,2 ANTHIMOS, Bishop of Kitium  
Independent Cyprus will be a little Greece, which will be able to prepare for its union with the Motherland.

Anthimos, Bishop of Kitium, answering criticism by Grivas of the Archbishop's switch to independence, September, 1958.

- II,3 AVEROFF, Evangelos (then Foreign Minister of Greece)

Anyone who, in order to realise Enosis, is not willing to accept independence as a transitional stage deserves to be criticised.

Evangelos Averoff, Foreign Minister of Greece, speaking in a debate in the Greek Parliament. 11 March 1959

- II,4 ANE (Alkimos Neolaia tis EOKA (Valiant Youth of EOKA)

His Beatitude has most certainly acted very correctly in accepting the settlement of our question by Independence. This is what present-day conditions give us. It does not follow that things will remain thus forever. Our country will in other historical circumstances achieve step by step union with the rest of Hellenism now that it has rid itself of slavery and embarked on the path to freedom. Whoever thinks that, because we began the campaign with the slogan of Enosis, we should carry on with it until death, does not know history, nor does he know that the people possess the sense of existence and self-preservation and that in order that they should unite with the rest of Hellenism it is imperative that the people should first exist.

ANE (Valiant Youth of EOKA) leaflet 5 March 1959

- II,5 AKRITAS PLAN (for the overthrow of the Cyprus Republic – see Part III below)

As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective . . .

. . . We stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-determination . . .

In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be prepared to proceed immediately . . . including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS . . .

The Akritas Plan prepared in 1963, disclosed in *Patris* newspaper on 24 April 1966

#### *Editorial Note*

In the face of such clear evidence (and much more in the same vein is available) it should not be necessary to labour the point that the purpose of the resort to political violence in Cyprus was not independence, but union with Greece; nor that this purpose continued after the settlement in 1960 and even after that settlement had

been overthrown in 1964. It was probably not until 1967 that at last it dawned on the Greek Cypriot leaders that Turkey really meant what it said about invading Cyprus if they persisted in the pursuit of Enosis and that America might not always be able or willing to restrain Turkey.

II,6 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed.

In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper, *Dagbladet*, 12 March 1977

II,7 EDEN, Anthony

EOKA was acting not in the name of independence, which is common form in colonial agitations, but in the name of Enosis.

*Full Circle*, p 395

II,8 THE CYPRUS MAIL

EOKA recognition

The House of Representatives yesterday passed a Bill giving formal recognition to the national liberation struggle of 1955/59 and to the EOKA underground organisation as the organisation which was active during the period.

The recognition is made on the eve of the anniversary of the launching of the EOKA campaign on April 1, 1955.

27 March 1987

## 2 Resort to Violence

II,9 REDDAWAY, John (who served as Administrative Secretary in the Government of Cyprus under Field Marshal Sir John Harding and Sir Hugh Foot)

The proposition that the Greek Cypriots had no choice but to resort to violence implies, first, that they had already exhausted all peaceful means of settling the dispute and, second, that the injustice and suffering inflicted on them was so extreme as to render their lives intolerable. Neither condition was satisfied in the case of EOKA's resort to terrorism. The Greek Cypriot leadership had repeatedly rejected opportunities of peaceful progress towards a settlement by way of constitutional government. Nor could anyone honestly maintain that the possibilities of diplomacy had then been exhausted. For years past the Greek Cypriots has chosen to deny themselves (and by consequence their Turkish compatriots) the exercise of their democratic right to representative government because they regarded the degree of self-government offered to them as inadequate and insisted that it should envisage self-determination. They may have had a just cause of

complaint against Britain on those grounds and that might well justify an intense political struggle, including perhaps passive resistance; but it surely did not by itself justify shedding blood. Only if the denial of their political aspirations had been accompanied by severe moral and material oppression, could a justifiable case have been made out for resorting to the kind of political violence adopted by EOKA. The degree of oppression being inflicted at the present time on the black population of South Africa or on the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza is accepted by a substantial body of opinion, probably by a majority, throughout the world as sufficient justification for a resort to arms by the oppressed against their oppressors. But no such state of affairs existed in Cyprus in 1955 to justify launching EOKA's campaign of violence and terror. The impasse over the future status of the Island did not impinge on the daily lives of the Cypriots in such a way as to render life intolerable for them. They were free to lead their lives in much the same way as the citizens of many other countries and indeed with greater security for themselves and their property, access to a higher standard of justice, greater freedom of expression and less interference by the state in their religious, educational, cultural and commercial affairs than in many countries claiming to be civilised and independent. It may even be that in most aspects of their daily lives the Cypriots enjoyed greater latitude and suffered less restriction than the peoples of the two motherlands. That may have been no compensation for the denial of self-determination; but it surely calls into question the justification for a resort to armed struggle. Even if that could have been confined to attacks on the ruling power and its agents, the moral justification was questionable. The enforcement of British rule may have been objectionable in principle since it did not rest on the consent of the governed, but in practice it was far removed from the oppression and 'State terrorism' of which the blacks accuse the South African and the Palestinians the Israeli authorities. However, what clinches the case against EOKA's resort to violence is that it was bound, sooner or later, to result in the killing of innocent non-combatants and that it introduced into the political life of Cyprus a habit of violence which is still manifest thirty years later and which may now have become ineradicable. That is the grim legacy that EOKA has left behind it in Cyprus.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British connection,*  
pp 56–58

### 3 'Conversion' to independence, 1958

II,10 REDDAWAY, John (see item II,9 above)

There is no certainty about what really motivated decisions by a man so subtle, not to say devious, as Archbishop Makarios. The assertion that has often been made that his newfound flexibility and moderation in the autumn of 1958 were the result of a genuine, *ex animo* conversion from Enosis to independence may be true, but it is certainly not indisputable. In an off-the-

record interview with the New York Times in December 1957 (when he was in New York for the UN debate on Cyprus), the Archbishop said that – ‘independence would be a first step and that the Cypriots has not given up their desire to unite later with Greece’.

The contrary view that this change on his part was in reality simply an enforced reaction to the new British initiative (sc. The Macmillan Plan) is both more credible and, indeed, more creditable to the Archbishop himself. Perhaps it needs to be repeated that there was nothing ignoble in the Greek Cypriot aspiration for Enosis. It may have been impracticable from the outset and certainly became so, as the conflict developed. It may have been unjust to the Turkish Cypriots. The methods the Archbishop chose to employ were misguided and reprehensible. But that does not mean that his devotion to the cause of Enosis needs to be excused or explained away. Somehow or other the idea has become established among many non-Cypriot students of the Cyprus problem that it is wrong and unfair to the Archbishop to believe that he remained from first to last true to his Enosist ideals. Those who suggest that he meant what he said about Enosis both before and during the EOKA campaign (and continued to say, openly and repeatedly, even after he had formally renounced the pursuit of Enosis by signing the independence agreements) are dismissed as animated by cynicism and suspicion, if not by pro-Turkish bias. Some of his ‘defenders’ go so far as to maintain – against the evidence of the Archbishop’s own public statements – that he was never really committed to Enosis and in his heart only wanted independence. If that were so, his political sagacity and the morality of his leadership become more, not less, open to question. To assert that a national leader did not himself really believe in the cause for which he encouraged his followers to take up arms and to kill and be killed is to denigrate, not defend, him – all the more so if the aim he is alleged to have really had at heart was one which could have been pursued by non-violent means with equal or greater chance of success. In any case, a man in public life is what he stands for, not what he is thought to believe in within the secrecy of his own heart. If at any time Enosis had been attainable, the Archbishop would not have been able to escape his public commitment to it, even had he wished to do so. That is not to say that he would not have driven a hard bargain to secure the largest possible degree of independence for Cyprus *under Greek sovereignty*.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British connection,*  
pp 116-117

## II,11 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

My proposals to Barbara Castle, though appearing to be a concession, constituted a tactic which the situation imposed and any cool confrontation with reality demanded.

Writing to Grivas at the end of September 1958 about his switch to independence (quoted in S G Xydis, *Cyprus, Reluctant Republic*, p 244)

*Editorial Note*

Presumably the Archbishop had presented his conversion to independence in a different light to Mrs Castle who was sufficiently sure of his sincerity to declare in the House of Commons on 30 October 1958 that - 'The Archbishop cannot go on endlessly offering compromise after compromise only to get snub after snub and insult after insult'.

II,12 STAVRINIDES, Zenon

*Editorial Note*

This Greek Cypriot writer in his study of the Cyprus conflict has posed the question whether the Archbishop may not himself have been a main force in keeping alive the Enosis Movement after the advent of independence and the decline which then ensued in Enosisist zeal among his compatriots.

A fuller study of the Cyprus conflict may be able to show that the personality of Archbishop Makarios, which commanded Greek Cypriot affairs for a quarter of a century, was as much of a power-source of the Greek nationalist movement, as a representative of it.

*The Cyprus Conflict*, p 34

#### 4 Zurich and London

II,13 EISENHOWER, President Dwight (then President of the USA)

*Editorial Note*

At the time when the settlement was reached at Zurich and endorsed in London, there was widespread acclaim for it in international circles and in the world's press.

President Eisenhower endorsed the Agreements as a 'victory for common sense', an 'imaginative and courageous act of statemanship' and a 'splendid achievement'.

Dept. of State Bulletin, no 40 of 6th March  
1959, pp 367-8

II,14 PANTELI, Stavros (a Greek Cypriot historian)

In the first years of independence Cyprus was to pay dearly for the precarious settlement granted her by the allied Western powers. The folly of the 'peacemakers' and 'godfathers' personified by Macmillan and his Tory entourage, Karamanlis and Averoff, Menderes and Zorlu, was to have unprecedented consequences. It was in fact a rogues' deal - nothing more and nothing less.

S. Panteli, *A New History of Cyprus*, pp 341  
and viii

**II,15** MACMILLAN, Harold (then Prime Minister of Britain)

I believe that we have closed a chapter of bitterness and strife in the history of Cyprus and that we are now embarking, with our Greek and Turkish allies and the people of Cyprus themselves, on a new approach where partnership and cooperation take the place of strife and dissension . . . I regard this Agreement as a victory for reason and cooperation. No party to it has suffered a defeat. It is a victory for all.

H of C debates, vol 600, cols 621-2

**II,16** MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

A new stage of struggle is opening before us today, the stage of the peaceful struggle for the progress and grandeur of our island. Let us, all we Greek Cypriots, advance to this stage united and inseparable and in a spirit of co-operation and love let us make every effort in common with the Turkish element with whom we live for the development and advancement of our country's interests and its promotion as a centre of civilisation, progress and peace in the Middle East.

Sending cordial good wishes to all the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, I greet with joy the agreement reached and proclaim with confidence that this day will be the beginning of a new period of progress and prosperity for our Country.

Speaking at the conclusion of the conference in London at which the Zurich and London Agreements were approved

**II,17** MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959

Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriot Community, having examined the document concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

Archbishop Makarios, at the London Conference 19 February 1959

**II,18** MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and then President-designate of the Republic of Cyprus

The epic grandeur and glory of EOKA's liberation struggle has laid the foundation stone of national freedom. This freedom it is our sacred duty to safeguard and complete. National struggles never come to an end. They

merely change their form, preserving deep down the same substance and the same content. . . . The realisation of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements . . . . The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we celebrate today, has secured for us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for our independence. From these bastions we still continue the struggle to complete victory.

In April 1960 at a celebration of the fifth anniversary of the start of the EOKA campaign

*Editorial Note*

So much for the Archbishop's solemn declaration in London when he accepted the Agreements (see item II,17 above) that 'he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus'. The Archbishop had been elected as President-designate of the new Republic in December 1959).

II,19 AKRITAS PLAN

It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959.

*Editorial Note*

For details of the 'Akritas Plan' for the overthrow of the 1960 Republic, see Part III below. In contradiction of the assertion that the 1960 settlement 'was not submitted to the approval of the people', it has been argued that the Agreements did in fact receive popular endorsement from the Greek Cypriots. In the first Presidential elections held in December 1959 John Clerides stood against the Archbishop on a platform of opposition to the Zurich/London settlement. The Archbishop won by a two to one majority.

## **Part III**

### **The Overthrow of the Cyprus Republic 1963-1968**

- 1 Persistence in Enosis
  - 2 An Unworkable Constitution?
  - 3 The Archbishop's Thirteen Points
  - 4 Attempted Genocide, 1963-8
  - 5 The Attack on Mansoura and Kokkina, August 1964
  - 6 Renewed Crisis, 1967
  - 7 In Retrospect - True or False?
- Appendix: The AKRITAS Plan

## 1 Persistence in Enosis

### *Editorial Note:*

In Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus undertook -

not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.

The Treaty was initialled in draft and later signed by Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek Cypriots and by Dr Fazil Küçük on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. It was incorporated in the Constitution of the Republic. The Constitution also provided (in Article 185) that -

The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded.

In Articles 42, 59 and 69 the Constitution provided that the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Council of Ministers and the members of the House of Representatives should, on taking office -

solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus.

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III,1 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus  
13.12.1959

. . . for the first time in eight centuries the government of the Island passes into Greek hands.

Archbishop Makarios, on the announcement of his election as President-elect of the Republic of Cyprus

1.4.1960

The epic grandeur and glory of EOKA's liberation struggle has laid the foundation-stone of national freedom. This freedom it is our sacred duty to safeguard and complete. National struggles never come to an end. They merely change their form, preserving deep down the same substance and the same content . . . The realisation of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements. The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we celebrate today, has secured

us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for our independence. From these bastions we will continue the struggle to complete victory. There is nothing impossible for man when he works for something and believes in it. Let us therefore work with faith for the future of our country and let us be certain that the task we began five years ago will soon be completed and bear fruit.

Archbishop Makarios, speaking on the fifth anniversary of the start of the EOKA campaign on 1.4.1955

28.7.1960

The Agreements do not form the goal, they are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause and shape their future in accordance with their will. The Zurich and London Agreements have a number of positive elements but also negative ones, and the Greeks will work to take advantage of the positive elements and get rid of the negative ones.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement reported in the Greek Cypriot press

16.8.1960

Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA struggle . . . Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow . . . New bastions have been conquered and from these bastions the Greek Cypriots will march on to complete the final victory.

Archbishop Makarios, on the day when the Republic was inaugurated

5.1.1962

The noble struggles of the people never come to an end. These struggles, although they undergo transformation, are never terminated. The struggle of the people of Cyprus too will go on.

The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this struggle, but at the same time, are a starting point and bastion for further struggles, with the object of capitalising on what has been achieved for further conquests.

Archbishop Makarios, in a public statement in Nicosia

15.8.1962

Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes . . . The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal . . .

Archbishop Makarios, in a sermon at Kykko Monastery

4.9.1962

Until this small Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the hereos of EOKA can never be considered as terminated.

Archbishop Makarios, speaking at his home village, Panayia

13.3.1963

The aim of the Cyprus struggle was not establishment of a Republic. These Agreements only laid the foundation.

Archbishop Makarios, in a public statement in Nicosia

28.3.1963

No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a State, but not a Nation.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement to the *Cyprus Mail* of 28.3.1963

9.4.1963

The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement to *The Times*

5.9.1963

It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview in *Uusi Suomi* of Stockholm

3.11.1963

What is our desire? We have proclaimed it many times: our union with the Motherland, eternal Greece. What will our reply be if such a solution is made difficult, and if some think compromises are required or that something be given in return? 'No' is the reply, and the struggle will continue until complete fulfilment.

Archbishop Makarios, in a sermon at Paralimni

27.10.1964

Greece has come to Cyprus, and Cyprus is Greece. I firmly believe that the PanHellenic struggle for the union of Cyprus with the motherland Greece will shortly be crowned with success. This success will be the beginning of a

new era of Greek grandeur and glory.

Archbishop Makarios, on the occasion of a visit to Cyprus by the Greek Minister of Defence

21.1.1965

I agree absolutely that, in the case of an unprovoked attack by Turkey against Cyprus, when Greece, as you have repeatedly declared will come to the aid of Cyprus with all its resources, the struggle will be conducted in the name of Enosis, which will be immediately proclaimed by the two Parliaments, the Greek and the Cypriot. Because, as you mention in your letter, the Greek Army cannot fight under the banner of 'the unfettered independence' of Cyprus, which must be the demand in the forum of the United Nations, but is absolutely unsuitable as the flag of the Nation at war. I would wish, while on the point, to add that, even if Cypriot Hellenism were to face the unlikely event of struggling without the aid of Greece, the aim of the strggle would be Enosis and not its unfettered independence. Enosis was what we had as our sole watchword in all our struggles. Enosis was what we had as our aim when, under the pressure of facts and in order not to encompass the Motherland in risky ventures, we were compelled to accept, with the insistent advice of the Greek Government, temporary solutions.

Archbishop Makarios in a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou

16.5.1965

No power is able to close the Cyprus Question. We shall keep it open and will never close it under any circumstances or conditions . . . until we close it through our union with Greece, a genuine Enosis without bartering . . .

Archbishop Makarios, in a public speech at Larnaca

26.5.1965

Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or become a holocaust . . . The road to the fulfilment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal – which is Enosis – alive or dead . . .

Archbishop Makarios, in a public speech at Nicosia

1.2.1966

The Cyprus leadership is doing its utmost in order to shorten the way to Enosis. We shall overcome the difficulties and impediments with patience, perseverance, courage and determination, and we shall reach the desired goal. In 1950 as the head of the Office of Ethnarch, the honour of organising the Enosis Plebiscite was bestowed upon me. Today as the responsible leader of the Cyprus people I consider that plebiscite as my own will. With

the help of God, I believe, I shall fulfil this will completely.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement in Athens on the anniversary of the Enosis Plebiscite of 1950

15.6.1966

The demand for Enosis is based on the democratic principle of self-determination. . . . Enosis is the right of the people.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement to *ITN*, London

III,2 KYPRIANOU, Spyros

16.7.1966

The national leadership, which voices the wishes of all the people, is not prepared to accept any compromise solution adulterating the people's national restoration. The Cyprus people want union with Greece. The Greek Cypriot people will continue to struggle having as their standard the Greek flag, Greek virtues and Greek Ideals.

Spyros Kyprianous, Greek Cypriot PIO press release

1.4.1967

Cyprus is now a sovereign and independent state and, therefore, the struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before.

Spyros Kyprianou, Greek Cypriot PIO press release

III,3 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Greek Cypriot)

26.6.1967

Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the Motherland, without any intermediate stages.

Unanimous resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives

III,4 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

1.10.1967

The real victory will be achieved when Cyprus will be annexed to Greece without any concessions whatsoever . . . I am for Enosis, but it must be genuine Enosis without curbs or strings.

Archbishop Makarios, in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Ethniki*

- III,5 PAPADOPOULOS, Tassos  
23.10.1967  
Freedom for us means only the integration of this southern outpost of Hellenism into the national entity . . .
- Tassos Papadopoulos, at the celebration of United Nations Day in Limassol.
- III,6 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus  
19.8.1970  
. . . I shall never violate my oath, and I shall never deviate from my goal. I have desired Enosis, and I have never struggled for anything else other than its achievement.
- Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given to the Greek newspapers *Eleftheros Kosmos* and *Ta Simerina* in Athens
- 14.3.1971  
Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of history, and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece.
- Archbishop Makarios, in a speech at Yialousa village
- III,7 KYPRIANOU, Spyros  
24.3.1971  
The unity of purpose, aim and policy existing between Greece and Cyprus is absolute. The line of policy by the two governments is one and the same. Neither Cyprus nor Greece can possibly accept solutions that might, sooner or later, be considered by the people and history, and by posterity, as nationally inadmissible compromises. The struggle of Cyprus is the struggle of all Hellenism. Cyprus, where Greek virtue is being tested, is today the place where Greek History and the Greek struggle are continuing . . .
- Spyros Kyprianou, at a Greek Independence Day celebration in Limassol (PIO press release)
- III,8 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus  
25.3.1971  
National restoration has not yet been completed. But Cyprus has faith and follows others' examples. With a solid, internal front, with domestic accord and unity, as dictated by certain lessons of the 1821 struggle, Cyprus will always remain faithful to Greece, its motherland, goal of its struggles and target of the sacrifices of its sons.
- Archbishop Makarios, on the 150th Anniversary of Greek Independence.

21.9.1971

I am in favour of Enosis. Enosis is the national aspiration of Greek Cypriots.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview with  
*ITN* London

29.10.1971

. . . I can now disclose that I have stated clearly and categorically to the Greek Government from time to time that I would unhesitatingly proclaim Enosis, if I had the consent to this end, that is if Greece were prepared to accept Enosis and share the responsibilities for the repercussions from such a venture.

Archbishop Makarios, in a statement on the  
internal situation in Cyprus

16.3.1972

If your aim is the launching of a struggle for Enosis, both I and the people of Cyprus are ready to enter such a struggle provided it is backed by the Greek Government.

Archbishop Makarios, replying to a Greek  
Government note of 11.2.1972

5.11.1972

Those who disagree with the way of handling Cyprus's national problem and call themselves Enosists accuse and call the others, the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot people, anti-Enosists. The charge is false and inadmissible. All Greek Cypriots are and will be Enosists.

Archbishop Makarios, in a speech at the  
unveiling of a statue of an EOKA fighter at  
Akaki village

19.2.1973

I have struggled for the union of Cyprus with Greece, and Enosis will always be my deep national aspiration as it is the aspiration of all Greek Cypriots. My national creed has never changed and my career as a national leader has shown no inconsistency or contradiction. I have accepted independence instead of Enosis because certain external conditions and factors have not allowed a free choice.

. . . If I had any ambitions, my greatest ambition would be for my name to be associated with Enosis.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given  
to the French magazine 'Le Point'.

6.4.1973

I would say that General Grivas is rather in direct control of the Enosis campaign. He is a good patriot and he would desire to see, as all Greek Cypriots would, Cyprus united with Greece.

Union of Cyprus with Greece has always been the national aspiration of the Greek Cypriots. This national feeling has deep roots and the Greek Cypriots would favour Enosis under any circumstances. Various factors, however, and mainly the opposition of Turkey do not make Enosis attainable.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given to the *Daily Express*, London

16.5.1974

Enosis has always been for the Greek Cypriots a deep-rooted national aspiration. To me independence is a compromise. In other words, if I had a free choice between Enosis and independence, I would support Enosis.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview with the *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported in the *Cyprus Mail*

2.7.1974

The Cyprus state could be dissolved only in the event of Enosis.

Archbishop Makarios, in a letter to the President of Greece, Gen Phaedon Ghizikis

III,9 SAMPSON, Nicos

17.7.1974

I was about to proclaim Enosis when I quit.

Nicos Sampson, reported in the *Cyprus Mail*

III,10 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

12.3.1977

It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed.

Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given to the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet*

## 2 An Unworkable Constitution?

III,11 REDDAWAY, John (who served as Administrative Secretary in the Government of Cyprus under Field Marshal Sir John Harding (later Lord Harding) and under Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon))

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What the Greek Cypriots at large thought about it (sc. the Zurich/London settlement) no one can say with any certainty. They welcomed the Archbishop back to Cyprus with delirious enthusiasm and applauded his assurances that: 'We have won'. But probably their enthusiasm had more to

do with the joy of seeing him back again in Cyprus than with any conscious approval of the settlement. However, an interesting sidelight on their state of mind at that time was cast four years later by a passage in the secret Akritas Plan (see below) prepared with the Archbishop's approval by his then Minister of the Interior:

It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959.

It has been argued that the Agreements did in fact receive popular endorsement from the Greek Cypriots. In the first Presidential elections held in December 1959 John Clerides stood against the Archbishop on a platform of opposition to the Zurich/London settlement. The Archbishop won by a two to one majority.

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The outline constitution which had been devised at Zurich and endorsed in London was elaborated into a detailed, formal constitution by the Joint Constitutional Commission which was set up under the London Agreements. Britain was not represented in the Commission. When the text of the Constitution was made available to the British Government, they merely informed the other parties that they had no comments on it. The Commission was composed of delegations from Greece, Turkey and Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It had the benefit of the advice of leading constitutional experts from both Greece and Turkey and also of a neutral (Swiss) legal adviser. The Greek Cypriot delegation included four of the most distinguished Greek Cypriot lawyers and, as a legal adviser, the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General in the British colonial government in Cyprus (who later filled the same post under the Republic). After independence he and other members of the Greek Cypriot delegation emerged among the severest critics of the constitution they had helped to draw up.

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It is worth spending a little time studying what the Constitution actually contained. It is certainly complicated; but there are no grounds for writing it off as 'incomprehensible' and 'a legal monster'. That is indeed unjust to the distinguished jurists who drew it up and put their names to it as members of the Joint Constitutional Commission.

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It seems clear that the Greek Cypriot objections to the Constitution were political rather than practical. The Greek Cypriots simply did not accept bi-communalism in the form and to the extent that it informed the 1960 settlement and from the outset were determined to resist and frustrate it as far as lay in their power. They did not disguise their intention and from their standpoint the position they took was logical, even if questionable on the grounds that it involved dishonouring commitments solemnly entered into

at London. The settlement did involve an equality of partnership between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus which seemed to them unjust and which was anathema to them as a denial of their national aspirations and rights as a majority.

The crux of their objections was this equality of power-sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish minority. It is undeniable that the powers vested in the Turkish Vice-President and in the Turkish element in the legislature and in the public service commission did place them on an equal footing with their Greek Cypriot counterparts in certain fundamental respects. To this extent the Turks are right in maintaining that the settlement did treat the two communities as equal partners and not as a majority and a minority. Since 1974 insistence on equal partnership has been the hallmark of their negotiating position.

Greek Cypriot leaders have insisted that they were animated by a sincere desire to make the Constitution work and that they were frustrated by its inherent unworkability and by the uncooperative and obstructive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, who, they allege, were inspired by a continuing attachment to the aim of partition. The record of their own public statements cannot but raise serious doubts about the sincerity of their wish to see the Constitution succeed. From the outset they continued to proclaim publicly their undiminished devotion to the cause of Enosis and their conviction that this was still attainable if independence was treated not as an end in itself but simply as a stage on the road to union with Greece.

*Burdened with Cyprus - the British connection*  
pp 124, and 128-32

- III,12 FORSTHOFF, Dr Ernst (Professor of Law at Heidelberg University (who was appointed in 1960 as the neutral president of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Cyprus and who resigned in 1963 because President Makarios refused to comply with rulings of the Court regarding the establishment of separate Turkish municipalities as provided for in the Constitution).

from the moment I commenced my duties I noticed that there were allegations to the effect that the Constitution was not capable of being implemented, that revision was necessary and the like. I faced these allegations with the following thought: Every constitution can have its peculiar problems. There is no constitution in the world which has not got its particular difficulties and problems. This is primarily a question of goodwill. If there is goodwill a constitution can be implemented and this Constitution is capable of being implemented.

In an interview with *Associated Press* on 5  
January 1964

- III,13 MILLER, Linda B. (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University)  
Whatever its defects, the Constitution did correspond to the actual state of

affairs on the island, where each ethnic community lived separately within the major towns, worked in separate enterprises, and conducted its daily life within the confines of its own group. A disinterested observer may find the Constitution excessively detailed and uncertain on such basic points as the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights; yet the Constitution might have worked, despite the limitations its drafting imposed, had the two communities shown a greater willingness to co-operate with each other.

*Cyprus, the Law and Politics of Civil Strife,*  
p 5

III,14 STAVRINDES, Zenon (Greek Cypriot writer and historian)

It must be remembered that the Constitution was, in its origin and conception a little like a peace treaty – and an attempt to bring about peace and hopefully co-operation and good will, between two sides: Greece and the Greek community of Cyprus, and Turkey and the Turkish community of Cyprus. The Republic was established in 1960 against a background of fear, suspicion and ill-feeling between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Those who led the State, the Greek and Turkish nationalist leaders, made no serious effort to change the traditional self-images of their respective peoples.

*The Cyprus Conflict,* p 55

III,15 VLACHOS, Angelos (a Greek diplomat who served as Consul-General in Cyprus during the EOKA period and afterwards in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens with responsibility for Cyprus affairs)

When in June 1963 Mr Karamanlis left office and Greece entered a phase of political instability, the Archbishop thought the occasion opportune for making a first testing of the ground. It is noteworthy that, every time that political instability was noticeable in Greece, the Archbishop exploited it to undertake some initiative which would bind the Greek Government.

A few months before, the Archbishop has begun to express his conviction that the Zurich Constitution was unworkable. But even the best constitutions are unworkable if those who are called upon to ensure their operation do not want to make them work. And the Archbishop did not wish to put into operation the relevant constitutional provisions which envisaged the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities, a separation which Makarios himself had insisted on. Influenced perhaps by those around him, he refused to put into operation the relevant provisions, and the Turks, utterly distrustful and suspicious, in order to compel the Archbishop to yield, took reprisals by obstructing the voting of taxation laws by the Parliament. According to the Constitution separate majorities of Greeks and Turks were required for the imposition of taxes, customs dues and tariffs. It was natural that an impasse should be created as a result of the Archbishops's backsliding.

*Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the  
Cyprus Problem) p 277

### 3 The Archbishop's Thirteen Points

#### III,16 CONSTITUTION OF CYPRUS, 1960

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#### ARTICLE 182

1 The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of the Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal.

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#### *Editorial Note:*

The 'basic Articles' thus defined included all the provisions which the Archbishop proposed to amend or abolish in his Thirteen Points; hence all those proposals were in violation of the Constitution which the Archbishop had accepted.

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#### ARTICLE 42

1 The President and the Vice-President of the Republic are invested by the House of Representatives before which they make the following affirmation:-

I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus.

#### *Editorial Note:*

The part of the text of the affirmation relating to faith to, and respect for, the Constitution was included among the 'basic Articles'.

#### III,17 AVEROFF, Evangelos (then Foreign Minister of Greece)

At the beginning of 1963, the Greek Government had simply been informed that Archbishop Makarios was intending to raise the question of revising the Constitution; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Averoff-Tositsas, sent to the Archbishop on 19.4.1963 a letter of which the principal extract is the following:

. . . More especially, in so far as concerns Cyprus affairs, we are determined to continue to help you in the way which we have done up to now, *but to separate in public even our line from yours if a unilateral abrogation of the Treaties or part of them is pursued.* This is something that imposes itself on Greece in a special way, even independently of honouring, as is the hallowed practice between civilised states, a signature once it has been put to paper. In fact, it is not permissible for Greece in

any circumstances to accept the creation of a precedent by which one of the contracting parties can unilaterally abrogate or ignore provisions that are irksome to it in international acts which this same party has undertaken to respect . . .

Angelos Vlachos, *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou*  
(Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem), p 275

III,18 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic  
*Thirteen Points for the amendment of the 1960 Constitution*

- (1) The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned.
- (2) The Vice-President to deputise for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
- (3) The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not separately by the Greek and Turkish members respectively.
- (4) The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House.
- (5) The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives for the enactment of certain laws to be abolished.
- (6) Unified municipalities to be established.
- (7) The administration of justice to be unified (involving the disappearance of the Supreme Constitutional Court).
- (8) The division of the Security Forces into Police and gendarmerie to be abolished.
- (9) The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.
- (10) The proportion of participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
- (11) The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from 10 to 5.
- (12) All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
- (13) The Communal Chambers should be abolished and a new system should be devised. Should the Turkish Community, however, desire to retain its Chamber, such a course to be open to it.

III,19 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

. . . It is not my intention by any of these proposals to deprive the Turks of their just rights or interests or proper safeguards. The purpose is to remove certain causes of friction and obstacles to the smooth working of the State. . . .

In his memorandum presenting the Thirteen  
Points to the Vice-President, Dr Küçük

III,20 KÜÇÜK, Dr Fazil, Vice-President of the Republic

I have considered the President's Memorandum with great care and anxiety. I see in it a pre-determined policy to abrogate the Agreements which brought about the Republic of Cyprus and to create an independent Greek State in which the Turks will be left at the complete mercy of the Greeks. We hope we are wrong in this conclusion, but the net result of the adoption of the President's suggestions is so obvious that it leaves us no room for manoeuvre and gives us no chance at all to sit round the table and consider practical solutions to any problems which the application of our Constitution is alleged to have brought about. I look upon these proposals as an invitation to us to sit round a table with the Greek side for the mere purpose of signing away all our rights and conceding that we accept the position of a minority in Cyprus. It is in this light that I read the President's concluding paragraphs where he says that it is not his intention to deprive the Turkish community of their just rights and interests or proper safeguards. But all those provisions of the Constitution which the President suggests in his Memorandum should be abolished relate certainly to our just rights, interests and proper safeguards. The President says that his purpose is to remove certain causes of friction and obstacles to the smooth working of the State, but unfortunately he has in mind not a State brought about by Greco-Turkish partnership but a Greek State in which the Turks have no say at all. His allegation that the main object of a Constitution should be to secure within its framework the proper function of the State and not to create sources of anomaly and conflict is a statement of a general principle. Our Constitution was prepared having this in mind after long deliberations. Any anomaly which exists is due to the method of approach to the Constitution by the Greek side and the conflict of interest which has arisen is due to the determination of the Greek side, formed even before the Agreements were signed, not to honour them. The President further says that experience has proved that our Constitution falls short of this object and certain of its provisions have created great difficulties in practice. My reply to this is that the fault does not lie with the Constitution but with the Greek side who has decided from the very beginning not to adhere to the Constitution. When the President says that in the interests of our people we must remedy this, I am sure, after having studied his proposals in detail, that he has in mind the interest of those Greeks who are sworn to annex Cyprus with Greece. Therefore I can state categorically that the Turkish community sees no way at all to accept any of the President's suggestions. I wish to reiterate here that I am ready and willing to consider with our Greek compatriots all the difficulties which they allege they have encountered in the implementation of our Constitution, with a view to finding practical ways and means, within the framework of our Constitution and without disturbing the political balance of powers between the two communities which it has maintained and safeguarded. But I cannot agree that the remedy for any real or imaginary difficulty lies in the abrogation of those parts of the Constitution which have recognised just rights and interests or proper safeguards to the Turkish community.

Concluding paragraphs of Dr Küçük's

reply to President Makarios's memorandum containing the Thirteen Points. December 1963

III,21 VLACHOS, Angelos (see item III,15 above)

. . . the Archbishop decided to put forward the famous 13 points, the beginning of all the dread events which followed.

The ill-omened points were presented by the Archbishop in a memorandum to the Vice-President Dr Küçük, on 30.11.63, when the very new Prime Minister (of Greece) was G. Papandreou, and the Archbishop also communicated this memorandum to the three Guarantor Powers (Greece, Turkey, Britain). The memorandum was the result of co-operation between the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, and the Cypriot side invoked the British diplomat's commendation as an alibi to rid itself of the responsibility for the initiative. A curious alibi since this initiative had been taken in spite of the known opposition of Athens and at the moment when G. Papandreou was Prime Minister of only twelve days standing. By invoking this argument the Cypriots were accepting indirectly that they had more confidence in the competence and sincerity of a British diplomat than in the Greek Government. The reality was that, once again, the Archbishop was putting into effect vis-a-vis Athens his policy of the *fait accompli*.

*Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem) pp 278-9

*Editorial Note:*

A number of different sources have recorded that the then British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Sir Arthur Clark, supported and encouraged the Archbishop in putting forward his proposals. One Greek diplomat (D. S. Bitsios) implies that the High Commissioner himself instigated the Archbishop to take this action; and adds that he told the Archbishop that what he was doing was 'an act of great statesmanship' and that the High Commissioner later expressed 'perplexity and surprise' at Turkey's rejection of the Thirteen Points. In Nicosia there are Greek Cypriot politicians and journalists who claim to have seen a copy of the proposals annotated in the High Commissioner's own hand. Greek Cypriot writers have used such reports to corroborate their presentation of the proposals as moderate and unobjectionable.

If these reports are true – and they do not seem to have been denied officially by the British Government – the High Commissioner's involvement in this episode can hardly have been simply a personal initiative on his part. On an issue of this importance he must have consulted the Commonwealth Relations Office in London and have obtained their authority. Indeed, the then Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, reported that at a meeting he had with the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys, in the middle of May 1963, he raised the question of amending both the Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee and that Sandys 'expressed the view that any discussion of the Treaty of Guarantee was premature, but recognised the need for certain amendments to the most controversial clauses of the Constitution' adding that 'the matter was worth examining in Nicosia,

with the co-operation of the British High Commissioner'. On the other hand the then Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, concluded from a meeting he had with Sir Alec Douglas-Home on 31 May 1963 that the British Foreign Secretary not only 'would discourage any change in the contractual status quo, but was unable to understand the Cypriots' attitude even on the problem of the Municipalities. Sir Alec appeared to consider Ankara's position as moderate.

If the then British Government did indeed encourage the Archbishop to put forward his proposals, then this amounted to taking sides with the Greek Cypriot leadership against the Turkish Cypriots in action designed to undermine the settlement which Britain had itself guaranteed to maintain five years before. A cursory study of the actual content of the Thirteen Points should have made it clear that this was what they were all about.

Sources for the above:

Crawshaw N., *The Cyprus Revolt*, p 366

Stephens R., *Cyprus - a place of arms*, p 179

Polyviou G., *Cyprus - the Tragedy and the Challenge*, p 40

Bitsios D. S., *Cyprus - the Reluctant Republic*, pp 120, 122 and 123-5

Vlachos A., *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou*, pp 278-9

Christodoulou M., (formerly President Makarios's official spokesman), *Agon*, 18.4.87

### III,22 STEPHENS, Robert

... there is no reason to doubt that when Makarios put forward his thirteen points he genuinely thought he was making moderate proposals designed to make Cyprus a more workable independent state.

*CYPRUS A Place of Arms*, p 182

### III,23 REDDAWAY, John (see III,11 above)

The effect of these proposals is clear. They did away with -

- the power of veto vested in the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President in regard to both legislation and decisions of the Council of Ministers on foreign affairs, defence and security.
- the power of the Turkish members of the legislature to block legislation on elections, municipalities and taxation;
- the separate Turkish municipalities;
- the 70:30 ratio in the public services and the 60:40 ratio in the armed forces;
- the power of the Turkish members of the Public Service Commission to refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court disputed choices between a Greek or a Turk to fill a particular vacancy;
- the Supreme Constitutional Court (as a result of unifying the

administration of justice);

– the Communal Chambers, while grudgingly allowing the Turks to keep theirs if they wanted to; (what effect this would have in the financing of communal services, particularly education, is not clear; it might mean that the Turks would have to continue paying for their communal services out of communal funds, while the whole cost of the Greek communal services would be transferred to the central Budget).

In short the amendments emasculated the Constitution of all those provisions which were of fundamental importance to the Turkish community and on which they relied to protect them from subordination to the Greek majority in an independent Cyprus.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British connection,*  
pp 136–7

### III,24 AKRITAS Plan

The text of the Plan is appended (after item III,81 below). This secret plan was prepared, with President Makarios' approval, by his then Minister of the Interior, Polycarpus Yeorkadjis (who had been one of Grivas's principal lieutenants in EOKA and who later turned against Makarios and – it is alleged – attempted, unsuccessfully, to assassinate him). He prepared the plan in 1963 in collaboration with other Greek Cypriot Ministers in the Makarios' government and with Greek Army officers stationed in Cyprus. He was himself 'The Chief, AKRITAS'. It was a conspiracy to destroy progressively the Zurich/London settlement and to overturn the Republic. It was to be carried out in stages, the first being to convince the world that the 1960 Constitution was unworkable; the second to put forward proposals for amending it, ostensibly to make it more workable, but in reality to remove the restraints which it imposed on unfettered Greek Cypriot control of the government. Later stages were to be the suppression of the Turkish Cypriots by force, the abrogation of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (on which the settlement rested) and, finally, the unfettered exercise of self-determination by the Greek Cypriots alone without regard for the wishes of the Turkish Cypriots. The existence and details of the plan were divulged in a Greek Cypriot newspaper opposed to President Makarios in April, 1966. Its authenticity has not been denied by the Greek Cypriot leadership and has in fact been confirmed by a leading Greek Cypriot who was serving at the time as President of the House of Representatives and who is himself alleged to have been involved in the preparation of the plan. The existence of such a plan was corroborated by the Greek Army general who was then serving as Commander of the National Guard in Cyprus. The plan has been widely discussed in the Greek Cypriot press, eg in *Simerini* of 14 November 1979.

### III,25 PATRICK, Richard A. (a Canadian geographer at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, who specialised on Cyprus in the period 1963 to 1971)

All in all, these proposals (sc. the Thirteen Points) represented the culmination of persistent Greek Cypriot attempts to amend the 'negative'



Dobbins in *The Boston Traveler*  
**"The Greeks have a  
word for it."**

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Reprinted in *New York Times*, February 23, 1964, IV, p 9

parts of the 1960 constitution in accordance with the first stage of the Akritas Plan.

*Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-71, p 41*

III,26 FORSTHOFF, Professor Ernst (see item III,12)

All this happened because Makarios wanted to remove all constitutional rights from the Turkish Cypriots. From the moment Makarios started openly to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their rights, the present events were inevitable.

In an interview given to a UPI correspondent on 30 December, 1963.

III,27 PAPANDEOU, George (then Prime Minister of Greece)

**ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Athens, 25 February 1964  
TOP SECRET

Your Beatitude

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I start from the conscious knowledge that our Nation, that Hellenism, constitutes a single, undivided whole. Cyprus constitutes a significant section of Hellenism, of the Nation. And I consider that the principles, which should govern the relations of the parts to the whole, should be relations of mutual awareness, co-operation, solidarity. And there should always exist harmonisation and established order in regard to both means and aims. And today, in the relations between the Greek Government, which bears the more general responsibility towards Hellenism, and the leadership of Cyprus, *unfortunately this is not happening*.

We are in danger of getting our information about your initiatives merely as readers of the international press and of your getting your information in more or less the same way about the decisions of the Greek Government. Besides that, it is evident that the initiatives involving the use of force by the Greeks of Cyprus are up to the present day unco-ordinated between us.

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I desire to assure Your Beatitude that it is the decision of our Government to give unqualified assistance in the new Struggle of the Cypriot People to acquire all their rights. But the form of the assistance will have to be defined following joint agreement.

Quoted by Angelos Vlachos, *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Question), p 286-8

## III,28 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

Nicosia, 1 March 1964

Our aim, Mr Premier, is the abolition of the Zurich and London Agreements, so that it may be possible for the Greek Cypriot people, in agreement with the Motherland, to determine in an unfettered way its future. I am a signatory of these Agreements on behalf of the Greeks of Cyprus. In my personal opinion, in the conditions then prevailing, 'naught else was to be done'. But not for a moment did I believe that the agreements would constitute a permanent settlement. It was a settlement of harsh necessity and, in my view, was the solution of the Cyprus drama which was the lesser evil at that time. Since then internationally and locally the conditions have changed and I think that the time has come for us to undertake to rid ourselves of the Agreements imposed on us . . . The unilateral abrogation of the Agreements without the process of law and without the agreement of all the signatories will possibly have serious repercussions. But we shall not proceed to any such action without prior agreement with the Government of Greece . . .

Quoted by Angelos Vlachos in *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem), p 289



Reprinted in *New York Times*, February 16, 1964, IV, 2

Top secret discussions on the Cyprus problem

Archbishop Makarios, General Grivas, Spyros Kyprianou (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Polycarpus Georgadjis (Minister of the Interior) at the Grande Bretagne Hotel, Athens, on 14 April 1964

*Editorial Note*

This photograph, together with its caption, is reproduced from *A New History of Cyprus* by Stavros Panteli, p 87. Those taking part in these "top secret discussions" were in fact plotting the destruction of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus which resulted, ten years later, in the coup of 15 July 1974, the Turkish intervention and the virtual partition of Cyprus.

## III,29 GRIVAS, George

I come as the apostle of Enosis.

On his return to Cyprus at the invitation of President Makarios to assume the duties of Supreme Commander of the Greek and Greek Cypriot Armed Forces, June 1964

## III,30 GRIVAS, George

The Greek forces from Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus on the Turks. We want ENOSIS, but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will on the Turks. We are strong and we shall do so.

Addressing the Greek Cypriot Armed Forces after his return to Cyprus (quoted in *New Cyprus*, May 1987, p 23)

## III,31 DENKTASH, Rauf (President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus)

The annulment of the 1960 Agreements and the destruction of the bi-nationality of the State were necessary steps in the direction of Enosis. Once the Greek Cypriot wing laid its hands on the wheels of the State the rest would be easy. The first step was to force the Turkish Cypriots to accept amendments to the Constitution thus ending the notion of partnership, of equal political status of the two communities, and then Cyprus would be regarded as a Greek Cypriot land. If Turkish Cypriots refused to amend the Constitution then they would be attacked and ejected from all the organs of the State. The legitimacy which rested on the bi-nationality of all of the organs of the State would thus be usurped by force of arms by the Greek Cypriot wing of the State . . . As stated in his letter of 2 July 1974 to General Gizikis of Greece (released by the Greek Cypriot PIO on 6 July 1974). Archbishop Makarios regarded this achievement as 'the nearest point to Enosis' from which he vowed, he would not budge except for Enosis! But to the non-aligned and the rest of the world he would pass himself off as the courageous fighter for independence! . . .

*The Cyprus Problem (23rd Year) 1986*

#### 4 Attempted Genocide 1963–1968

## III,32 UNITED NATIONS Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

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Art. 2 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Art. 3 The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

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*Editorial Note:*

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was drafted following the Second World War. During the War, the Nazis, in addition to individual acts of murder, killed groups of people selected on the basis of their national, ethnic, racial or religious identification. The International Military Tribunal acted on the postulate that such killing of groups was in violation of pre-existing law and that the perpetrators incurred individual criminal responsibility. The drafters of the Convention were motivated by a desire to prevent mass killings in the future.

There are two elements involved in the definition of the crime of genocide. The first is the commission of certain acts, and the second is the requisite state of mind defined as the 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part,' a particular identifiable group.

The Convention was approved by General Assembly resolution 260A(III) of December 9, 1948 and entered into force on January 12, 1951. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus are parties to it.

III,33 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

Until this small Turkish community, forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated.

In a speech at his birth-place, the village of Panayia, on 4 September 1962

*Editorial Note:*

Rauf Denktash, in his capacity as President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, sent a written protest on 15th September 1962 to the Archbishop about this statement, but received no reply.

III,34 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Communal Chamber)

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We are part of Cyprus. You can't throw us out. So accommodate us. Let

us accommodate ourselves. We don't want much. But we don't want to be 'not wanted'. That is the difficulty. For years we have been told by words and by action that we are not wanted in Cyprus, that Cyprus is not ours. And that . . . makes any community very angry, and makes any community entitled, at least in their own conscience, to take all steps in order to prove that a land where they have lived for centuries is theirs and they intend to keep it as such.

In an address at the Rotary Club of Nicosia on 21 January 1974. (Quoted in R Denktash, *The Cyprus Problem*, p 60 and in Z. Stavrindes *The Cyprus Conflict* p 63)

III,35 VLACHOS, Angelos (see III,15 above)

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 there exist well-founded proofs leading to the conclusion that, from 1962 onwards, the Archbishop had begun to toy with the idea of a new act of power, that is to say, a new offensive. In January 1963, without the knowledge of the Greek Government, planning exercises were carried out for three days at the Presidential Palace in Nicosia, with the objective of neutralising the Turks. The Archbishop's staff officers envisaged the participation also of the Greek Force in Cyprus in the operations, that is to say, they were discounting conflict between Greek and Turkish forces;

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 In order to begin his new offensive, the Archbishop waited for Mr Karamanlis, who had signed the Zurich/London Agreements to be removed from power.

III,36 KARAYIANNIS, Lt-Gen George (a Greek Army Officer then commanding the Cyprus National Guard)

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 When the Turks objected to the amendment of the Constitution, Archbishop Makarios put his plan into effect and the Greek attack began in December 1963.

In an article in the Greek newspaper *Ethnikos Kiryx* on 15 June 1965

III,37 PATRICK, Richard A. (see item III,25 above)

As early as 1962, Polycarpos Yeorgadjis, the Minister of the Interior, had warned the officers of his underground army that in the following year, President Makarios would propose amendments to the constitution which would be so unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots that TMT\* would start fighting. When the amendments were proposed, there was general dismay

\*the Turkish Cypriot underground force which had been set up to combat EOKA

among many of the leaders of this Greek Cypriot force that Turkish Cypriots did not rise to this bait. As a result, elements of the Greek Cypriot police and a number of armed Greek Cypriot irregulars were attempting to goad TMT into action in December 1963. Had the incident of 21 December not occurred there can be no doubt that a similar incident would have been precipitated by Christmas.

*Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-71, p 46*

III,38 KÜÇÜK, Dr Fazil (then Vice-President of the Cyprus Republic)

The Greeks of Cyprus, taking advantage of and abusing their majority in the Government and Security Forces of the Republic, have planned and put into execution an organised armed attack by the Greek Cypriot Police and civilians on the Turks and Turkish property in towns and villages, including my own residence and office, since the night of the 20th December 1963.

These attacks continued in a most brutal and barbarous manner until the intervention of the three Guaranteeing Powers. During these attacks Turkish houses in Nicosia and elsewhere have been broken into and many innocent Turks, including women and children, have been murdered in cold blood in their houses or driven away as hostages. - - - -

Even after the cease-fire, Turks have been killed and kidnapped and many Turkish houses have been looted or maliciously set on fire by the Greeks. Turks both in towns and villages are still besieged and all means of communication have been cut off to them. Also, the normal supply of foodstuffs to Turkish citizens is no longer possible.

Reliable reports reaching us indicate that, even now, the Greeks are arming and preparing another onslaught for a general massacre on a larger scale than before.

From an Appeal sent to All Heads of States  
on 5 January 1964.

III,39 VLACHOS, Angelos (see III,15 above)

The Turkish Government rejected the memorandum (sc. the Thirteen Points), as was to be expected, at the beginning of December; and the Archbishop's action - which perhaps was aimed at that - inaugurated a new Cyprus crisis with a consequential Greco-Turkish crisis which was to continue, waxing and waning, for many years.

The Crisis assumed very dangerous dimensions when, on the pretext of a minor incident, on 20.12.63, bloody clashes took place between Greeks and Turks. The Archbishop's statements and the replies of the Turkish Cypriot press had provoked great tension between the two elements of the population and it was to be expected that a small beginning would provoke the explosion.

The Archbishop's arbitrary and untimely initiatives and the creation of a major Greco-Turkish crisis provoked the indignation of the Greek Government.

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A wind of frenzy was then blowing in Nicosia. What could the Archbishop be hoping for? What supports did he have to sustain him in opening a new phase of the national adventure which had come near to ending in shipwreck four years before? The Archbishop knew very well what would be the position of the new Greek Government which would have, as the main guiding element in its policy, the principle that Greece continued to find itself in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis Turkey with respect to protecting Cyprus effectively. The Archbishop, persistent in his brinkmanship, had not thought out anything. He had been surrounded in Cyprus by Greek officers, despatched by the Greek Government to organise units of the Cyprus Army, who, being influenced by extremist elements, had cultivated in the Cypriots the spirit that Enosis, after the ending of the British rule, was an easy enterprise which needed not much determination and daring.

*Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the  
Cyprus Problem) pp 280-1 and 284

III,40 VENIZELOS, Sophocles (then Foreign Minister of Greece)

**TOP SECRET**

Athens, 29 December 1963

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Often in the past, the handling of the problems of Cyprus on the part of the Greek Government has obliged it to give second place to putting in order Greece's own problems. Often, also in the past, the Greek Government, not being informed in advance of actions by the Cyprus Government, has been called upon, after the event, to help the Cyprus Government in facing disagreeable situations which stemmed from these actions of the Cyprus Government, on which there had been no prior understanding with the Greek Government.

Of course, no Greek Government is in a position to continue this practice, that is to say, as a consequence of actions, on which it was not informed from the beginning, to be called upon to set in motion diplomatic and other mechanisms for regularising the actions of the Cyprus Government which had been undertaken without any prior understanding with it (the Greek Government).

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The Royal Government desires to make clear to its Cypriot brethren and their Government that it is resolved to do everything possible to promote the smooth functioning of the Cypriot state and genuine co-operation between the Greek population and the Turkish minority, in such a way that the

future, the progress and the well-being of independent Cyprus will be assured.

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 The path of negotiations which the Royal Government judges to be the only possible way towards improvement of the Cypriot state, but also towards excluding catastrophic developments, certainly excludes the path of solutions by force.

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 The above stance of the Royal Government may displease certain circles in Cyprus. We are indeed informed that recent actions of the Royal Government, which were everywhere judged to be prudent and thanks to which an irremediable disaster to the detriment of Cyprus and its people was averted, were misconstrued by some circles in question who, it seems, see the solution of the Cyprus problem only in deadly conflict between Greeks and Turks.

From a letter to Archbishop Makarios  
 (quoted in Angelos Vlachos, *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou*, 281-3)

III,41 VLACHOS, Angelos (see III,15 above)

This letter (sc. that from Sophocles Venizelos quoted above) somewhat restrains the Archbishop but does not bring him to his senses and persuade him not to undertake new initiatives (on his own and without reaching agreement with Athens). Alone he decides to have recourse to the United Nations and alone he sends a telegram to many heads of state in order to communicate to them his decision to abrogate the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee of Cyprus entered into with Greece, Britain and Turkey.

*Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the  
 Cyprus Problem), p 283

III,42 DENKTASH, Rauf R. (who led the Turkish-Cypriot Delegation to the London Conference in February 1964)

For five days while Greek policemen and EOKA thugs attacked the Turks of Cyprus, killing, mutilating and wounding hundreds – mostly women, children and old men – Archbishop Makarios's propaganda machine (having first ensured the Turks' silence by severing all their communication links with the outside world and preventing all foreign journalists from going to the Turkish sector) informed a bewildered world that his 'security forces' were dealing with 'Turkish rebels' in Nicosia. On this pretext the wholesale massacre of Turks in Nicosia, and in the villages where they were surrounded by Greeks, began and continued relentlessly for five days.

It was only when Turkey intervened as one of the guaranteeing powers, followed by British intervention, that British and foreign journalists were able to see for themselves the true, horrifying facts. What they saw lifted the



**Van Wieringen in Dagblad De Telegraaf, Amsterdam  
Kutchuk, a Turkish Cypriote, is Vice President of Cyprus.**

Reprinted in *New York Times*, March 15, 1964, IV, p 9

shameful Greek curtain which had concealed these facts from the world and the free world gasped with horror at what an Archbishop's rule had done in Cyprus.

These impartial observers were able to see that -

1 There was no 'Turkish rebellion' and this was used as a monstrous pretext for the massacre of Turks.

2 The attackers were Greeks and the defenders Turks.

3 The so-called 'security forces' of Archbishop Makarios were Greek policemen and gendarmerie, heavily reinforced by various factions of EOKA, the terrorist organisation.

4 The attack on the Turkish community was a calculated and organised attack for which they had fully prepared themselves in advance by taking up positions - in the villages and in Nicosia - ten days earlier. They then intensified their campaign of provocation, intimidation and terrorisation and launched their attack at the most opportune time.

Thanks to these writers who presented the world with the true and appalling facts of 1963-4 attacks on the Turkish Cypriots.

In a foreword to a collection of extracts from the world press on the 1963-4 events in Cyprus.

III,43 DAILY EXPRESS (London)

**IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY**

We went together into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print - horrors so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to an hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears.

Excerpts from a report by Rene Maccoll and Daniel Mgeachie.

III,44 DAILY MAIL (London)

**THE FATE OF MISSING TURKS**

. . . I was allowed to move through the whole besieged Turkish sector. I was taken to the Kumsal district and trod over shattered glass into a green and white house with orange trees in the garden, and an ownerless black and white cat wandering around. The bathroom of this house was a bloodsoaked shambles with a woman and three small boys lying dead huddled together in the bath, and in an adjoining room another dead woman. My guide said this second woman and her children were the family of a Turkish major and were all shot by Greek Cypriots.

Wherever I looked in the Turkish sector there were the stark and tragic signs familiar to any town which has endured civil war. Sandbags and sentry positions, haggard men with guns whose faces behind the stubble of beard

show nothing but fatigue. Men and women lying on their backs in impoverished aid centres with shot and stab wounds, gazing up blankly at a world they no longer recognise. The uncheckable allegations . . . 'They used dum-dum bullets . . . our soldiers obeyed orders from Ankara not to move . . . they (the Greeks) changed into civilian clothes and attacked . . . they took 30 women and children, some one, two and three years old and we know nothing of their fate'.

Report by John Starr from Nicosia, 28  
December 1963

III,45 THE GUARDIAN (London)

### **UNEASY CALM AND STATE OF ANARCHY IN CYPRUS**

. . . Whoever fired the first shots in the early morning of December 22, when a Turkish man and woman were killed, there is no doubt that certain Greeks had been deliberately provoking the Turks to action. For a week or two before this, Greeks in civilian clothes had been demanding to see the identification papers of Turks in Nicosia which caused bitter resentment and when on December 23rd armed Greek police shot at Turkish school boys who booed them, the tinderbox was set aflame.

31 December 1963

III,46 THE GUARDIAN (London)

### **TURKS BRUTALLY MURDERED**

It is nonsense to claim, as the Greeks do, that all casualties were caused by fighting between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the wife and three small children of the Turkish head of army medical services – allegedly by a group of forty men, many in army boots and greatcoats.

31 December 1963

III,47 DAILY HERALD (London)

### **IN A SILENT VILLAGE IN ONE NIGHT OF TERROR 350 MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN VANISHED**

In this village of shame today I found grim evidence of the hatred between Greek and Turk that has bedevilled this beautiful island. A few days ago, 1,000 people lived here, in their solid, stone built homes which hug the coast road to Kyrenia, 13 miles from Nicosia. Then in a night of terror 350 villagers – men, women and children – vanished. They were all Turks. Today I was one of two British correspondents to drive to the village to investigate the mystery. In the dusty village street I found hungry Greek children playing listlessly. From doorways men and women eyed me suspiciously. When I asked where are the Turks, the women averted their gaze. The men shuffled their feet and said 'We don't know. They just left.'

Peter Moorhead reporting from the village  
of Skylloura, Cyprus. 1 January 1964

III,48 DAILY HERALD (London)

**AN APPALLING SIGHT**

And when I came across the Turkish homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the walls, they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm bomb attack could have created more devastation. I counted 40 blackened brick and concrete 'shells' that had once been homes. Each house had been deliberately fired by petrol. Under red tile roofs which had caved in, I found a twisted mass of bed springs, children's cots and cribs, and ankle deep grey ashes of what had once been chairs, tables, wardrobes.

In the neighbouring village of Ayios Vassilios, a mile away, I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were all Turkish. From this village more than 100 Turks had also vanished. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to any Greek house.

1 January 1964

III,49 DAILY SKETCH (London)

**SAVAGERY OF EOKA MEN**

. . . Turkish homes in the city had been set ablaze by arrows tipped with paraffin soaked rags, and hundreds of hard core EOKA men were prowling towns and villages under arms.

Reported by Louis Kirby from Nicosia. 2  
January 1964

III,50 DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)

. . . A sinister demonstration of EOKA power occurred during the height of the Christmas crisis at Kyrenia, the north coast harbour town. EOKA men, working with the regular Greek Cypriot police, took control of key points. These included the telephone exchange, where EOKA men with sub-machine guns made the Turkish operators leave their posts with their hands up and guns at their backs. They were told to go home and stay there. Telephone lines to most British and other foreign residents in the area were cut and these are still out of order.

EOKA groups put up road blocks in the town and on mountain roads behind it. Turkish policemen were arrested by men with guns. Four leaders of the Turkish community were arrested on Christmas Day when they arrived for a conference with the Greeks on keeping order in the town. With the policemen, they were hand-cuffed in pairs and imprisoned for seven days in a village near Kyrenia. They were told all the Turks in Kyrenia would be wiped out if Turkish forces landed in Cyprus.

3 January 1964

III,51 THE TIMES (London)

**TURKS TO BE EXTERMINATED**

. . . On the Greek Cypriot side the extremists resent President Makarios's acceptance of British intervention and would have preferred the fighting to

continue, leading to the extermination of the Turkish community.

4 January 1964

III,52 NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

**LOOTING**

. . . Some of the heaviest fighting took place in the Turkish suburban neighbourhood of Omorphita. Dozens of homes were burned down or gutted. Greek youths can be seen pulling doors and shutters off houses. A looter's car, nearly sagging under the weight of everything from an old refrigerator to mattresses, slowly chugged away. Curiously, some houses had not been touched. The Greeks claim the suburb was a hive of underground tunnels with caches of arms, but a British sergeant on patrol said 'You can have my 12 months' pay if you can find any tunnels around here'.

13 January 1964

III,53 IL GIORNO (Italy)

**THEY ARE TURK-HUNTING, THEY WANT TO EXTERMINATE US**

Discussions start in London; in Cyprus, the terror continues. Right now we are witnessing the exodus of Turks from the villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, land, herds; Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious behaviours.

Article by Giorgio Bocca, Correspondent of  
*Il Giorno*, 14 January 1964

III,54 DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)

**GRAVES OF 12 SHOT TURKS FOUND IN CYPRUS VILLAGE**

Silent crowds gathered tonight outside the Red Crescent hospital in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, as the bodies of 9 Turks found crudely buried outside the village of Ayios Vassilios, 13 miles away, were brought to the hospital under an escort of the Parachute Regiment. Three more bodies, including one of a woman, were discovered nearby but they could not be moved.

Turks guarded by paratroops are still trying to locate the bodies of 20 more believed to have been buried on the same site. All are believed to have been killed during fighting around the village at Christmas.

**FAMILY OF SEVEN**

It is thought that a family of seven Turks who disappeared from the village may be buried there. Their house was found burnt, and grenades had been dropped through the roof.

Shallow graves had apparently been hurriedly scooped by a bulldozer. The bodies appeared to have been piled in two or three deep. All had been

shot. One man had his arms still tied behind his legs in a crouching position and had been shot through the head. A stomach injury indicated that a grenade may have been thrown into his lap.

14 January 1964

III,55 LE FIGARO (Paris)

. . . I have seen in a bathtub the bodies of a mother and of her three young children murdered just because their father was a Turkish officer . . .

Archbishop Makarios is too much of an ecclesiastic to express himself so brutally, but it is a fact that he has never openly condemned the horrible excesses committed by his partisans, leaving a delirious press the task of pursuing a campaign against the Turks . . .

. . . The Turks at least are logical with themselves. They say, 'Life under these conditions is impossible. We are 120,000 menaced, in the full sense of the word, by extermination. There is but one solution: the partition of the island in two, we in the north, the Greeks in the south.' The Greeks are less frank. They deny the evidence . . .

. . . According to him (Archbishop Makarios) some changes in the constitution would be enough. The trouble is that these 'amendments' all tend to deprive the Turks of the rights and guarantees which had been accorded to them in 1960. The Turks reply: This amounts to saying to a drowning man 'Remove your lifebelt and everything will be all right! . . .

Report by Max Clos 25-6 January 1964

III,56 DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)

**CYPRUS RISKS ALL**

If the Turkish Army has not already landed reinforcements to its Treaty Force in Cyprus, that is simply proof of the patience of Turkey. Its right to do so cannot be denied. If international treaties mean anything, Turkey can protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from further massacre. It is racial discrimination in its most bestial form. Although there have been efforts to cloud the issue by suggesting that both Cypriot communities are to blame, by far the heaviest guilt is that of the Greek Cypriot force known as Eoka or Edma.

'Cyprus Risks All', editorial 15 February 1964

III,57 LE FIGARO (Paris)

It is a real military operation that the Greeks launched against the six thousand inhabitants of the Turkish quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman of the Greek Cypriot Government has recognized this officially . . .

It is hard to conceive, how Greeks and Turks may seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened . . .

Excerpts from a report by Max Clos 15-16 February 1964

## III,58 WASHINGTON POST

**HATRED IN CYPRUS MAKARIOS ENIGMA**

Archbishop Makarios, robed and bearded cleric who serves as President of Cyprus, has a Byzantine talent for equivocation . . .

. . . His government deliberately provoked the clashes and is bent upon the extermination of the Turkish population . . .

Some sort of federal system of two separate communities seems inevitable as the minimum to reassure Turkish Cypriots who demand outright partition . . .

Excerpts from 'Hatred in Cyprus Makarios Enigma' article by Robert H. Estabrook, 16 February 1964

## III,59 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Washington)

. . . Outnumbered ten to one the Turkish Cypriots packed most of their women and children into a movie theatre and school in their sector (sc. of Limassol). As their local leader, Ramazan Cemil, a Turkish member of the Cypriot House of Representatives, stated to foreign journalists after pointing out the precarious defensive position of his men. 'We are getting ready to die' . . .

Excerpts from 'Makarios Gains on Two Fronts'. A report by John Rigos 17 February 1964

## III,60 THE WASHINGTON POST

**CYPRUS TRAGEDY**

Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide . . .

Editorial in issue of 17 February 1964

## III,61 THE GUARDIAN (London)

Day by day and as murder follows murder detached observers here find it harder and harder to credit the Government of Cyprus with any real determination to stamp out violence. If the President really wants peace on earth and to restore the rule of law he could start by investigating publicly the circumstances surrounding last Thursday's attack on the Turkish inhabitants of Limassol. The known facts are that on Wednesday the British peace keeping forces were assured by the Greek authorities that no attack would be made on the Turkish Community. Accordingly the British Army did not patrol the town. At 5.30 the following morning Greek Cypriot security forces launched what our special correspondent describes as 'a heavy well organised attack against the Turkish quarter of Limassol'. It was carried out by hundreds of steel helmeted men armed with automatic weapons and supported by one tank and two armoured bulldozers. If the Greek Cypriot authorities connived at this formidable attack their behaviour is inexcusable. If they were ignorant of its coming they must forfeit their

claim to govern and control their own people, let alone the whole Cypriot Community.

20 February 1964



Sanders in The Kansas City Star

**"I thought you'd never get here! Now hold this!"**

Reprinted in *New York Times*, April 12, 1964, IV, p 9

III,62 THE TIMES (London)

**POLITICAL RECKLESSNESS**

It would be taken to mean that the whole Greek community from Archbishop Makarios downwards, is back in the old track of trying to achieve ENOSIS by force. It would, rightly or wrongly, be assumed that Greek co-operation with the United Nations was at an end and that the Turkish community was to be crushed or, better still, expelled.

15 April 1964

III,63 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir, OBE, QC (who served as Solicitor-General in the Government of Cyprus during the period of British rule; as Judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Republic of Cyprus; and as President of the Supreme Court of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, as Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and as Adviser to President Denktash in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus)

On the 30 November 1963, Makarios proposed his 13-point memorandum for the amendment of the Constitution with the full knowledge that it could not possibly be accepted by the Turkish Cypriot Community and was certain to be rejected. Within three weeks of the making of these proposals, that is to say, on 21 December, 1963, the Greek armed onslaught against the Turkish Community was launched.

The Turkish resistance could not be broken within 24 hours as planned. In order to stop the massacre of the Turkish Cypriots, already underway, Turkey as a guarantor power did her utmost to persuade the other two guarantor powers – Britain and Greece – to take action. These two guarantor powers, for reasons of their own, failed to move into action. Greece on her part, was actively engaged in helping the Greek Cypriots in their attack on the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey was thus compelled to intervene at the eleventh hour and she ordered a warning flight by two planes over Cyprus. During the initial four days of the Greek Cypriot armed onslaught hundreds of Turkish Cypriots lost their lives. Nearly 30,000 Turkish Cypriots had to evacuate 103 villages and, characteristically, soon after their departure, the Greek Cypriots started burning down and demolishing their houses.

The incidents which started in December 1963 went on until the end of 1967 in the form of armed conflicts. Turkish Cypriots who had to evacuate their villages in order to escape Greek Cypriot atrocities were not allowed by the Greek Cypriot Administration to return to their former homes.

The Turkish Cypriot Community perhaps lived its darkest days during the period between December 1963 and the middle of 1968. During this period areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots were placed under siege and a merciless economic blockade was imposed on those areas by the Greeks.

The Greek Cypriot Administration prohibited the importation into Turkish Cypriot areas of so-called 'strategic materials', ranging from certain articles of clothing, building materials, cement to petrol, electrical equipment etc. This list of prohibited 'strategic materials' was modified from time to time. A revised list issued on 1 March 1965 comprised 38 items. The Greek Cypriot side, it is said, resorted to the tactics of adding to the list,

as they wished, in between the periodic meetings on Cyprus of the UN Security Council and then of removing those additional items (which they themselves had previously added in the first place) on the eve of the UN Security Council meeting with a view to giving the members of the UN Security Council a false impression of a 'gesture of good will'! A sort of 'cat playing with the mouse' tactics.

Freedom of movement was denied to the Turkish Cypriots and those who had to venture out of their areas to meet their pressing needs were invariably abducted from the roads and were never seen again. During this period the constitutional rights and guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots were systematically and consistently violated while hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered and Turkish Cypriot property in 103 villages worth millions of pounds was destroyed. The perpetrators of these crimes were not only unpunished but in some cases were even praised by the Greek Cypriot authorities. Turkish villages were left without water supply and in many instances the economic blockade had reduced the Turkish inhabitants to starvation point. Turkish produce was purchased by Greek controlled boards at 15-20% reduced prices and postal services were denied to the Turkish Cypriots and very often mail addressed to them was destroyed.

Newly-born Turkish babies could not be registered in the Register of Births for eleven years. The payment of salaries to Turkish civil servants was suspended and payment of social insurance benefits to Turkish Cypriots who had for years been contributing to the Social Insurance Fund was withheld. In short, the Greeks were doing all they could to make life unbearable for the Turkish Cypriots and were trying to achieve by economic blockade and other inhuman methods what they had failed to achieve by use of armed force (for fear of provoking Turkey's intervention), namely, the subjugation and complete domination of the Turkish Cypriot Community in order to pave the way for ENOSIS. This is how armed Greek Cypriots who surrounded the Turkish villages and Turkish sectors of the towns used to address the Turkish Cypriots with loudspeakers: 'If you do not like this sort of life, leave the island'. The same 'advice' was given to the Turkish Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot press. Indeed many thousands of Turkish Cypriots were forced to emigrate from Cyprus during this period.

During the period 1964 and 1967 Cyprus was virtually under the occupation of Greece through its 20,000 troops and officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. In 1967 a second major attack was launched against the Turkish Cypriot Community with the object, once again, of bringing about the union of Cyprus with Greece. The 1967 crisis subsided, however, as a result of Turkey's warning that it would intervene and the consequent undertaking by Greece to withdraw her forces from Cyprus. While the immediate danger of ENOSIS was thus averted, the suffering and hardships of the Turkish Cypriot Community on the Island had not come to an end.

Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots who were turned into an impoverished community without employment, without security and uncertain as to their future, continued their resistance with relief aid from Turkey. However, even this aid was a source of constant friction because the Greeks not only charged import duty on foodstuffs sent to the Turks through the Red

Crescent but actually prevented the import of essential supplies, such as shoes, etc., on the pretext that they were 'strategic materials'.

The fact that half of the Turkish Cypriot population lived on assistance is confirmed by United Nations reports. Harassment and armed attacks against Turkish Cypriots continued unabated until peace between the two Communities was established following the Turkish Peace Operation of 1974. The Ayios Vasilios massacre, and the armed attacks against Turkish Cypriots in Limassol, Gaziveran, Paphos (Ktima), Kokkina, Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros are typical events of the period 1963-1974.

There can be no doubt that the fundamental human rights of the Turkish Cypriots were consistently violated by the Greek Cypriots throughout the past two decades and, particularly between the years 1963-1975. Indeed, this is what Lord Home, a former British Prime Minister, had to say on this subject at page 242 of his book - 'The Way the Wind Blows' -

'I was early convinced of the view that . . . Archbishop Makarios, unless he could bring himself to treat the Turkish Minority as human beings, was inviting the invasion and partition of the island . . .'

#### *Editorial Note*

The author cites the following reports by the UN Secretary-General in support of the account of events given above: S/5764 of 15.6.64, S/5950 of 10.9.64, S/6102 of 10.12.64, S/6569 of 29.7.65, S/7001 of 10.12.65, S/7350 of 10.6.66 and S/8286 of 8.12.67.

#### III,64 BALL, George W. (then Under-Secretary of State in the US State Department)

Three or four vignettes of my Cyprus days stand out sharply in my memory. A massacre took place in Limassol on the south coast in which, as I recall, about fifty Turkish Cypriots were killed - in some cases by bulldozers crushing their flimsy houses. As Makarios and I walked out of the meeting together on the second day, I said to him sharply that such beastly actions had to stop, that the previous night's affair was intolerable, and that he must halt the violence. With amused tolerance, he replied, 'But Mr Secretary, the Greeks and Turks have lived together for two thousand years on this island and there have always been occasional incidents; we are quite used to this.' I was furious at such a bland reply. 'Your Beatitude,' I said, 'I've been trying for the last two days to make the simple point that this is not the Middle Ages but the latter part of the twentieth century. The world's not going to stand idly by and let you turn this beautiful little island into your private abattoir.' Instead of the outburst I had expected, he said quietly, with a sad smile, 'Oh, you're a hard man, Mr Secretary, a very hard man!'

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Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that.

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'The Greek Cypriots,' I wrote, 'do not want a peacekeeping force; they just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots.'

*The Past Has Another Pattern, Memoirs,*  
pp 341 and 345.



"But gentlemen the problem is settling itself."

Reprinted in *New York Times*, February 16, 1964, IV, p 2

### III,65 TURKEY, Government of

All individual or collective assaults and acts committed against the Turkish community in Cyprus such as murder, pillage, robbery, arson, rape, torture and the like be stopped forthwith; that an immediate cease-fire all over the island be established and all existing cease-fire agreements and the Green Line agreements in Nicosia be observed completely and without exception; that all sieges around any Turkish locality be lifted forthwith anywhere; that the liberties of complete movement, communication and correspondence be immediately restored and that the Turkish hostages and the bodies of those murdered be returned to the Turkish community without delay. Otherwise, the Government of the Turkish Republic declares that it will use the right to take unilateral action conferred upon it by the Treaty of Guarantee of 16th August 1960.

Ultimatum issued by the Turkish Government to President Makarios on 13 March 1964

### III,66 IOANNIDES, Dimitrios (then serving as a major in the Cyprus National Guard; later to become head of the Junta in Athens)

In 1963 and 1964 he had been in Cyprus as an officer of the National Guard, and one day he came to see me, accompanied by Sampson, in order to 'explain to me secretly a plan that would settle everything'. He had bowed to me, he had kissed my hand most respectfully, then: 'Beatitude, here's the plan. To attack the Turkish Cypriots suddenly, everywhere in the island. To eliminate them one and all. Stop.' I was flabbergasted. I told him I couldn't agree with him, that I couldn't even conceive the idea of killing so many innocent people. He kissed my hand again and went away in a huff. I tell you, he's a criminal.

Archbishop Makarios quoted by Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History*, (Boston) 1976, p 318

*Editorial Note*

In this interview the Archbishop was speaking after the Sampson *coup d'état* against him in 1974, which Ioannides had masterminded. He was also speaking for public consumption in America and elsewhere. His remark about being 'flabbergasted' hardly rings true since Ioannides' plan was so much in line with the Akritas Plan which Makarios had himself endorsed.

## III,67 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

The Union of Cyprus with Greece required the extermination of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In an interview with Karin Kaemmereit published in the German weekly, *Bunte Illustrierte*, 1972

## III,68 OBERLING, Pierre (Professor of History of Hunter College, Cuny, USA)

The 1963–64 crisis was a most unusual phenomenon: it was not a revolution by a downtrodden minority against an arrogant, oppressive majority, but a revolution by an arrogant, oppressive majority against a downtrodden minority. Makarios tried to compel the Turkish Cypriots to accept constitutional changes which would have deprived them of their political rights by launching a campaign of terror against the various Turkish Cypriot enclaves and by forcibly disarming the TMT militiamen who were protecting them. But all he succeeded in doing was to frighten the Turkish Cypriot population of many isolated and mixed villages into leaving their homes and seeking shelter in the larger Turkish Cypriot enclaves, which his ill-organised and incompetently led forces were unable to overrun. Thus his attempts to carry out the Akritas Plan almost completed the physical separation between the two communities. The Greek Cypriot leaders angrily accused the Turkish Cypriot leaders of having encouraged the process of demographic consolidation. However, the Turkish Cypriots needed no prompting to desert their burning homes or abandon villages where they lived in constant fear of being massacred. It must be added that it was in the interest of the Greek Cypriot villagers to force their Turkish Cypriot neighbours to move since they could then seize their homes, fields and orchards, and that consequently many of them did their best to encourage the exodus.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 120–1

## III,69 THE TIMES (London)

During the years leading up to 1974, when Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship, Turkish civil servants received no salaries, Turkish judges found themselves unable to enforce their judgments, Turkish villages were deprived of services, and Turkish government officers were subject to intimidation.

In short, the constitution was put aside in favour of de facto tyranny of

Greek over Turk. Appalling massacres of Turkish villagers occurred, and while Archbishop Makarios dissociated himself from the worst of these crimes, he proved unable to prevent them, and indeed often seemed quietly to condone them. Finally he was himself deposed, by the vile terrorist Nikos Samson, whose accession threw the country into civil war.

The immediate effect of the civil war was to drive Turks in thousands from their homes, and to subject them to the risk of genocide at the hands of the Eoka fanatics who now controlled much of the island. These fanatics were aided by large contingents from the mainland Greek army, which had been installed illegally during the previous years. After the Turkish intervention those Turks who could escape to the North were able at last to find refuge from danger. For the first time in more than 20 years, the Turkish community had the prospect of safety.

Roger Scruton, *Who will heed the Turks of Cyprus?* 22 November 1983

## 5. The Attack on Mansoura and Kokkina

August, 1964

III,70 OBERLING, Pierre (see item III,68 above)

As Greek and Greek Cypriot statesmen were ostensibly debating the merits of the Acheson Plan, General Grivas and his staff were planning a series of large-scale military operations in northern Cyprus by the National Guard. To soften up the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the Greek Cypriot government banned the delivery of all Red Crescent (Turkish Red Cross) supplies. Then, on August 1, the National Guard subjected St Hilarion Castle and other Turkish Cypriot strongholds on the Kyrenia range to an intensive military bombardment. But the barrage was interrupted by the arrival of UN troops.

Grivas next concentrated a large force in the Tylliria hills, in northwestern Cyprus. It consisted of 2,000 National Guardsmen armed with six 25-pounder guns, two 4-barrelled Oerlikon 20mm. guns, several mortars and some armored cars. When General Kodendera S Thimayya, who had succeeded General Gyani on July 8 as Commander of the UN peacekeeping force, complained to Archbishop Makarios about the troop buildup, the latter reassured him, asserting that no attack was being planned. However, on August 6 Grivas launched a major offensive against the Turkish Cypriot-held Kokkina salient, and Makarios announced that the struggle for enosis had entered its 'final phase'.

The Kokkina salient included the little port of Kokkina, as well as the villages of Mansoura, Alevga, Selain t'Api and Ayios Theodoros Tyllirias. It had great strategic importance, for it controlled the vital coastal road and was the principal entry point of supplies from Turkey to the hard-pressed

mücahids.\* The enclave was defended mostly by 500 youths who had been studying in Turkey and England and who had just returned home via Kokkina because they had been delayed entry through Kyrenia and other harbors in Greek Cypriot hands.

As the attack began, the UN observation posts in the area were speedily overrun, and the officers and men of the peacekeeping force were compelled to run for their lives. Grivas was determined not to allow the United Nations to stand in the way of total victory this time. On August 7, the bulk of Grivas' army advanced towards Kokkina from the village of Pakhy Ammos, on the north-western fringes of the salient. All day long Grivas' artillery shelled Turkish Cypriot villages, and that evening a patrol boat opened fire on Kokkina and Mansoura from the sea. However, Grivas, by not pressing his attack with sufficient energy, lost precious time, enabling his adversaries to summon outside help.

The Turkish government was thoroughly aroused by the Tylliria offensive for, in Turkish eyes, the National Guard, led as it was by Greek officers and containing at least 9,000 Greek soldiers, was a Greek force. Hoping to discourage any further advance by the National Guard in the Kokkina salient by a mere show of strength, the Turkish leaders ordered warning flights to be made over the area. Accordingly on the evening of August 7 four Turkish F-100 fighter planes buzzed concentrations of National Guardsmen and fired rockets into the sea. But the next day the National Guard continued to tighten its grip on the dwindling Turkish Cypriot enclave. Makarios and Grivas were still utterly confident that world pressure would prevent the Turks from becoming militarily involved in the Cyprus conflict. Hence, when General Thimayya implored Makarios to put an end to the slaughter, he was rebuffed, and his commander in the Tylliria region, Colonel Jonas Waern, was not even able to arrange a temporary truce to allow some of his own men as well as a group of Turkish Cypriot women and children to be evacuated from an area under constant bombardment.

By the afternoon of August 8, all the villages in the salient had fallen except Kokkina, which was crowded with some 700 refugees and was being shelled from both land and sea. It was now clear to the Turkish leaders that the warning raid of the previous evening had not had any effect and that more vigorous steps would have to be taken to save the population of Kokkina and its defenders. Consequently, a fleet of jets was once more despatched to Tylliria, but this time with orders to fire in earnest. The National Guard's positions around Kokkina were blasted with rockets, machine gun fire, bombs and napalm, and one of the patrol boats which had been shelling the Turkish Cypriots was spotted from the air and sunk.

In a radio broadcast that evening, Archbishop Makarios, in an emotional speech, claimed that thousands of innocent Greek Cypriot civilians had been killed in the Turkish raid. Premier Papandreou, upon hearing of the latest developments, became fearful that the conflict would now spread. He pleaded with Makarios to 'cease immediately' all military operations in northern Cyprus. However, Makarios defiantly replied that the Greek Cypriots would fight 'till death'.

\* Freedom fighters.

On August 9, a new wave of Turkish aircraft bombed the National Guard's positions and several Greek Cypriot villages where reinforcements were being gathered for a final assault on Kokkina. This raid at last stopped the Greek Cypriot offensive. It also destroyed the Greek Cypriot leaders' dream of achieving enosis by means of a quick, dramatic victory. While the air raid was in progress, Makarios, in a paroxysm of grief and frustration, threatened that unless the Turkish Air Force left the scene within half an hour he would order the massacre of the entire Turkish Cypriot population. But when the horrified UN officials threatened, in turn, to order the immediate departure of the peace-keeping force, which would have left the island at the mercy of the Turks, he withdrew his ultimatum. Later, when he visited the morgue of the General Hospital at Paphos and saw the bodies of nine young Greek Cypriot soldiers killed in the Turkish raids, he wept openly. But, as the Newsweek correspondent observed, 'It was somewhat late for tears'.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 117-120

III,71 THE GUARDIAN (London)

**GREEK ATTACKS ON KOKKINA**


... How can Mr Soteriades, the Greek Cypriot High Commissioner in London, defend or explain in rational terms his assertion of yesterday evening that Cyprus was ready to defend its independence and territorial integrity even if this means the start of a third world war? It ill becomes Mr Soteriades, in any case, to exclaim in horror that yesterday's attack was unexpected. Greek Cypriot forces had been laying siege to Kokkina which is the last Turkish stronghold in the area. The Turks had made it plain that unless the siege was called off they would feel obliged to act. The siege continued and 64 Sabre jets took off. The Turkish delegate, Mr Eralp, spoke convincingly in the Security Council last night when he said that all that President Makarios wanted of the United Nations was 'to tell the troublesome Turks not to interfere with his massacres.' The President's sincerity in his dealings with the United Nations has been questionable for a long time. He would not permit the UN forces (who were there to help him govern the island) to disarm civilians; he would not permit them to control or even to witness the furtive, nocturnal reinforcements of the Greek Cypriot forces. As lately as yesterday his men were preventing the UN from evacuating Turkish women and children from villages where their lives were in danger. He has protested that he cannot discover what has happened to two UN soldiers, Major Macey and Private Platt, who have been missing since early June. Since Christmas, when he first called for help, first from Britain and then from the UN, his behaviour has been scheming, deceptive and occasionally cruel as well.

Last week's attacks on beleaguered Kokkina, attacks in which the President persisted in spite of the plainest warnings, suggest that his real object is to drive the Turks off the island or into positions in which they will be at his mercy - a quality in which many Greek Cypriots are notoriously deficient. The Greek Cypriots may have felt themselves strong enough to risk reprisals

because of the reinforcements they have summoned up. It has been known for some time that the President has been recruiting 'volunteers' in Greece and smuggling them into the island, that the 'volunteers' have been armed with artillery and that their mission is to defend Cyprus against a Turkish invasion. And no one, not even President Makarios, has tried to explain how field guns can be volunteers.

The Government of Cyprus used the UN's presence on the island as a cloak for its own warlike preparations. Now that these are complete the Government has authorised an unwarranted attack on a village which any Cypriot, from the President downwards, must have known that the Turks would be bound to defend. It was an irresponsible act and a dangerous one. By continuing to persecute the Turks in Cyprus the President was putting at risk far more than the lives of his own eager soldiers. Other outside powers besides Greece and Turkey have become interested, too, some of them at the President's own urging. He has no right to jeopardise the peace of the whole of the Levant merely in order to assert his hold over one mountain village. Nor has he done himself or the cause of peace a service by treating with disrespect the UN forces who came at his request to help him. The UN's good name matters to the whole world. If the President defies the United Nations he defies us all.

10.8.1964



### III,72 DAILY MAIL (London)

#### **EXTREME PROVOCATION AND SELF DEFENCE**

The Cease-fire is accepted by Makarios if the Turks agree to it. They in turn, accept it if the Greeks evacuate the Turkish villages they invaded and occupied last week. That is a reasonable request. It has been half-forgotten that the Turkish raids were launched in defence of Turkish positions and under extreme provocation. Makarios has bitten off more than he can chew.

He has had an extremely bad press. The eyes of the world seem at last to be opened to his real nature.

10.8.1964

III,73 YORKSHIRE POST

**REMARKABLE TURKISH PATIENCE**

President Makarios of Cyprus has officially asked Russia and Egypt for military help. His High Commissioner in London said last night that 'Cyprus would not reconsider her position even to avoid a third world war'. President Makarios approached Russia and Egypt despite the strongest pressure from Britain and the United States. It was an act for which history may judge him. Yesterday morning Greek Cypriot forces resumed their attack on the Turkish Cypriot village of Kokkina. Less than half an hour later, according to Greek Cypriot official sources, Turkish jet aircraft attacked the Greek Cypriot positions around Kokkina. They later attacked other places further south.

... last night the Security Council (Russia and Czechoslovakia abstaining) asked both Greece and Turkey to cease fire. Turkey has long demonstrated a remarkable patience over the Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots. It is a question whether she can now be given grounds for sufficient confidence that they will be protected from what looks like an attempt at genocide. She is determined to prevent a *fait accompli*. But a new situation has been created by Makarios's request to Russia and Egypt for military help. Turkey and Greece (unlike Cyprus) are members of NATO. This, of course, means nothing to President Makarios (or to President Nasser of Egypt). NATO was set up to counter the threat of Soviet aggression so Russia must be presumed to welcome a weakening of it.

10 August 1964

III,74 VLACHOS, Angelos (see III,15 above)

In August 1964 the Archbishop and Grivas launch an attack against the Turkish enclaves of Mansoura and Kokkina and compel the Turks to withdraw. Simultaneously the Archbishop rejects a Turkish demand, which is pending, for a partial troop replacement of the Turkish Force in Cyprus. He declares that he regards as illegal the presence of the Turkish Force in Cyprus. The reaction of Turkey is terrifying. The Turkish Air Force bombards Polis tis Kyrysokhou and causes many casualties. Athens is in despair. How is the Archbishop to be restrained?

The Greek Prime Minister sends to the Archbishop and to Grivas an identical telegram on 8 August:

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Athens, 8 August 1964

To the Royal Embassy, Nicosia.

After yesterday's operations at Mansoura please communicate to the

Archbishop, General Grivas and Generals Karayiannis and Georgiades the message below from the Head of the Government:

We express our deepest sorrow that all our agreements are in vain. What we agree is one thing and what you do another, and most adverse consequences ensue. Thus we are faced with the question how far and in what manner we can go forward towards the future.

COSTOPOULOS

*Dheka Khronia Kypriakou* (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem) p 294

III,75 PAPANDREOU, George (then Prime Minister of Greece)

Athens, 29 August 1964

Your Beatitude,

After the new crisis which has been provoked by the impending partial replacement of the men of the Turkish Force in Cyprus. I regard it as a duty imposed on me to recapitulate and also elucidate in writing the views we have in common.

1 We remained agreed that the Cyprus Question will be brought for solution to the General Assembly of the United Nations, demanding unfettered independence, including the right of self-determination. And after the decision of the General Assembly we shall review together the situation in order to take the appropriate further decisions.

2 We remained also agreed that, until then, we shall preserve peace in the Island. And not only will we not ourselves proceed to hostilities or provocations, but, on the contrary, we shall apply ourselves to a *peace offensive*, promising amnesty to Turkish Cypriots, as well as the preservation of all human and political rights. And this because: First, we are thus disarming the Turkish aggressive tendencies. And second, we are creating the best conditions for our presence at the General Assembly of the United Nations. But also for the basic reason that, according to all possible forecasts, eventual war, apart from the other dire results, leads not to advancing but to frustrating Enosis.

3 There exists however also *the possible case of unprovoked Turkish attack*. In regard to this case, I declared that Greece will stand by Cyprus, with all its resources. And because, of course, the Greek Army cannot fight under the banner of 'unfettered independence', which must be the demand in the forum of the United Nations but is utterly inappropriate as the flag of the Nation at war, the two Parliaments will at once proclaim the union of Cyprus with Greece *and the struggle will be conducted in the name of Enosis*.

4 The critical question is, however, who will be the judge of the specific action, if it is to be attack, defiance or defence. And how far this right belongs unilaterally and exclusively to the Cypriot Leadership as has happened up to now in practice.

This is the great question. And it needs a thorough elucidation which must of course be carried out when things are quiet as at present. For if hostilities have already broken out, it is too late. From then on, Greece is faced with the tragic dilemma: Either not to take part and to have its absence judged as a national betrayal; or to take part and for its participation to be a wretched one – that of being dragged into action by others.

We have up to now two instances: The attack on Mansoura which was decided on completely without the knowledge of the Greek Government; and now the threatening crisis over the partial troop replacement of the Turkish Force in Cyprus regarding which you have threatened armed resistance leading to war, without our approval.

5 This, Your Beatitude, cannot continue. We have reached agreement earlier on, when the destinies of Greece and Cyprus in the event of war had not yet become so closely identical, that the leadership of Hellenism must belong to Athens and hence responsibility for the political and belligerent initiatives of the constituent parts of the Nation must also belong to Athens, which has to co-ordinate the struggle.

But the issue today does not concern the general and theoretical case. It is rather a concrete issue, in pursuance of the decisions we have taken and published, that of *the outbreak of armed conflict between Turkey and Cyprus immediately leading Greece also into war*. And war is too great a matter for it to be permissible for Greece to be dragged into it as an unwilling victim of others' initiatives. I would be a leader unworthy of the Greek people's trust if I were to acquiesce in being dragged into war and leading both Youth and Nation to the ultimate sacrifice, without even being asked and without having approved the decision. Both the People, and the Nation, and History would never forgive me. I have no doubt that you also fully understand that I could never allow myself to assign to others the right and the responsibility I have for the destiny of the Greek people.

I hereby ask that for the future the agreement should be observed, in its entirety and in all circumstances, which we had reached and which has twice up to now been violated. *No decision is to be taken in Cyprus which either directly or indirectly leads to hostilities without having been preceded by our own concurrence and agreement.*

If we shall agree, all will be well. If we disagree then the opinion of Athens must be accepted because it bears the responsibility for the whole of Hellenism. But if in the specific instance the Cypriot Leadership maintains its disagreement, then the disagreement will be communicated, honourably, bravely, to the Nation. And everyone will undertake his responsibilities vis-a-vis the Nation and will bear with him the consequences.

6 I appreciate that, by reason of your long and hard struggles, you have acquired the habit of taking your decisions personally. But after the presence in force of Greece in Cyprus, which allows you to speak from a position of strength, and after our joint and publicly announced decision that in case of a Turkish attack Greece will undertake with all its resources the defence (of Cyprus), it is evident that we have entered into a new period. And it is necessary to adjust to that.

I hope that this full and definitive elucidation will receive unreserved acknowledgement on your part. *And that on these principles our national*

*compact will be concluded.* There will thus be added a new and mighty guarantee to the happy issue of our joint national struggle, Enosis, which will allow Cyprus to assume its new historic mission: to become Hellenism's base of civilisation in the East.

With sentiments of the greatest amity,  
GEORGIOS A. PAPANDREOU

*Editorial Note*

The text of the above letter is given in full in Angelos Vlachos, *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou*, pp 297-300



*New Cyprus*, January 1987

III,76 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

*Editorial Note*

The Archbishop did not reply to Papandreou's letter until 21 February 1965, that is, six months later. Vlachos comments: 'This makes clear the measure of respect and esteem that the Archbishop nourishes for the Greek Prime Minister, and also the weight which he gives to the opinion of the Greek Government'.

1 I did not reply in writing to that letter because, having visited Athens a

few days earlier, I had the opportunity to discuss its content personally with you. I understand, however, that the omission of a written reply has caused misunderstandings and perhaps also the impression that I did not wish to define clearly and in writing my position in regard to certain questions and views you put in the letter. However, an Athenian newspaper, having received information in relation to the letter in question and having been falsely and deliberately led astray by it, proceeded to publish unjust and unseemly articles against me.

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I refer now to the more serious incident: The attack on Mansoura, which was decided on, as you put it, completely without the knowledge of the Greek Government. The battle for the Mansoura areas was not decided on by us by cold calculation, but was provoked by the Turks. As I had the opportunity of also explaining personally to you, the Turkish Cypriots of the area were steadily spreading out, installing guard posts and continually bringing under their control a larger area. A few days before the battle they had installed an armed post on a high peak within the forest (on the hill 'Dorovouno'), severing also the last forest road which was being used by the inhabitants of the Greek village of Pachyammos in order to get out of the Turkish encirclement of their village.

Having been myself transported by helicopter to the village and having ascertained the tragic position of the villagers, I called on the responsible officer there of the UN Force, a Swedish officer, to persuade or exert pressure on the Turks to withdraw from the peak. The attempt proved fruitless. Nevertheless, we put up with the situation. In order, however, to check the further dangerous expansion of the Turks, I gave orders to the commander of the National Guard to send to the area a military force, which would occupy certain positions with a view to obstructing the advance of the Turks. As soon as the Turks who were installed on the peak of Dorovouno perceived our forces on a neighbouring peak, they began to fire on them. Our forces, being in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the Turks, who were holding the higher peak, had two men killed as from the first hours of their defence. We found ourselves faced with the dilemma: either to retreat abandoning our positions or to hold on to and reinforce them, even though we suffered losses. After nightfall I called into conference the military leadership. It was decided that we would hold on to our positions, being led to that conclusion by the thought that, if we were to abandon the peak held by our troops, the Turks would take it, in order then to fire from there against another position further on which our forces would be occupying on withdrawing from the first. In this way, however, the expansion of the Turks would not be stopped. Therefore we decided to hold on to our position on the peak, but, if the Turks continued firing from Dorovouno, to undertake the seizure of that hill. Before however, we proceeded to put this decision into effect and while the conference was still continuing, I sought to communicate by telephone with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr St Costopoulos, in order to inform and seek the views of the Greek Government. But the army men present told me that it was preferable for them to communicate themselves with the Greek General Staff, so that they

might give further explanations from the military angle. As I checked later, they did in fact communicate with the General Staff, as soon as they left my office.

The Turks continued firing against the position of our troops when, during the afternoon of the following day, our forces counter-attacked and finally seized the peak of Dorovouno, which constituted the principal Turkish strong-point. However, the Turks being in possession of a chain of peaks, then fired on Dorovouno which had been taken by our troops. Hence our forces were compelled to advance beyond Dorovouno to clean out the nests of Turkish firepower. Within a short space, all the chain of the Turkish guard posts and strong-points had been broken through and destroyed. The Turks began retreating and concentrating towards the sea shore, in the area of the Turkish village of Kokkina. And then began the bombardment by aircraft from Turkey, against our military forces and against Greek villages in the area.

It might be that describing the battle of Mansoura might have served no useful purpose. I have, however, set out the facts in order to draw the conclusion that we were compelled to give battle. We informed the Greek Government through the General Staff, we received from it (the General Staff) congratulations for the destruction of the Turkish strong-points (as the command of the National Guard reported to me) and at the end of it all Your Excellency's message with the observation that 'what we agree on is one thing and what you do another.'

I much regret that the battle of Mansoura created so many misunderstandings with the Greek Government. It is nevertheless fortunate that, under provocation, we did give battle. Certainly we mourned many victims and underwent a harsh trial, but that battle had the result of destroying the greatest and strongest Turkish 'canton' through which Turkey was continuously reinforcing the Turkish Cypriots and which, as we ascertained after its destruction, would constitute an inaccessible bridgehead in the event of a Turkish invasion. Without that battle the danger of dismemberment of Cyprus or its 'cantonisation' would be immeasurably greater.

7 In this connection I would like, Mr Premier, to add the following: When your message was received, I called General Grivas and the commander of the National Guard, General Karayiannis, and other military men to exchange views on the way to confront the situation. General Grivas considered himself affronted by the content of your message and did not wish to express an opinion in a responsible capacity, declaring that he is resigning from his post, and subsequently avoiding for two days going to the headquarters of the National Guard. General Karayiannis declared that, inasmuch as the Leader of the Greek Government has expressed disagreement regarding the battle of Mansoura, he cannot have an opinion differing from that of the Greek Government. I then found myself compelled to shoulder alone the responsibilities of conducting the fighting, which, following your message was deprived for two days of direction by the highest military leadership'.

*Editorial Note*

The text of the Archbishop's letter is given in full in Angelos Vlachos, *Dheka Khronia Kypriakou*, pp 300-8. The Archbishop's account of the battle, and of where the responsibility lay for starting it, does not accord with those of other, independent sources, including UNFICYP.

## 6 Renewed Crisis, 1967

### III,77 OBERLING, Pierre (see item III,68 above)

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By 1967, Grivas obviously felt a new surge of self-confidence. His forces were stronger than ever. Although the 1960 Treaty of Alliance limited the number of Greek troops on the island to 950, as many as 20,000 of them had infiltrated into Cyprus. In addition, there was the Greek-officered National Guard, which comprised 10,000 active soldiers and 20,000 reserves. These forces were well-armed with automatic weapons, artillery and armoured vehicles, and their battle readiness had been tested in large-scale military manoeuvres in the summer of 1966. In comparison, the Turkish Cypriot side was practically defenceless. The Turkish Army contingent still comprised only the 650 men allowed by the Treaty. TMT had 5,000 men and was led by a small cadre of highly competent Turkish Army officers smuggled in for the purpose. But they were armed mostly with shotguns.

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The attacks on Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou had dire implications. As the correspondent of Newsweek observed:

Since the end of the civil war that racked the island in 1963-4, the Turks have steadfastly refused to come out from behind the weed-covered sandbags and rusting barbed-wire barricades that hedge their scattered villages and urban enclaves. 'The Greeks', explained a Turkish Cypriot leader in Nicosia recently, 'are like a hunter who has chased the rabbit into a bush; they are standing there with their fingers on the triggers waiting for us to come out'. Now, however, the hunter was apparently no longer content to wait; he was coming in shooting. (Issue of 4 December 1967, p 37)

The capture of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou also had strategic significance, for it effectively cut off the Turkish Cypriots in the south of the island from those in the north.

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It was now quite clear that the Turks were willing to go to war over the Cyprus issue and that Grivas had grossly underestimated the determination of the Turks to protect the Turkish Cypriot community.

At this point, President Johnson once more intervened in the Cyprus conflict. On November 22, he despatched Cyrus R Vance, a distinguished lawyer and a former Deputy Secretary of Defence, as his special envoy with instructions to help the two United Nations mediators, Jose Rolz-Bennett

and Manlio Brosio, negotiate a settlement. Using the kind of 'shuttle diplomacy' later made famous by Henry Kissinger, Vance convinced the governments of Greece and Turkey to accept a compromise solution. This agreement provided for:

- (1) The withdrawal from Cyprus within 45 days of all Greek and Turkish troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance.
- (2) The dismantling of Turkey's war preparations on a step-by-step basis to coincide with the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Cyprus.
- (3) The dissolution of the National Guard.
- (4) Compensation to the Turkish Cypriot victims at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou.
- (5) Expansion of the size and powers of UNFICYP.
- (6) The dismissal of General Grivas (already then an accomplished fact).

Greece did its best to comply with the agreement and withdraw its forces from the island. But Makarios cunningly succeeded in scuttling three of its provisions, with the result that the National Guard was not disbanded, UNFICYP's size and powers were not extended and the victims of Grivas' military campaign received no compensation. Makarios was also strengthened by the departure of his chief rival for power, Grivas. But his chances of ever again presiding over a unified, bi-communal government had become much more remote, for the Turkish Cypriots had been forced to form their own separate administration.

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 With the formation of the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration, the separation between the two communities became complete. Hence, the splitting up of Cyprus into two ethnically-homogeneous, self-governing states was not achieved by the Turkish armed intervention of 1974, as is commonly believed, but by Makarios and Grivas in the 1960's.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 133-4, 138-9 and 141-5

## 7 In Retrospect - True or False?

### III,78 PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (Greek Cypriot)

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 the people of Cyprus had done their best to ensure the smooth functioning of the new State; but their efforts had been doomed to failure. In November 1963 the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios in a sincere desire to improve the situation, suggested thirteen amendments to the Constitution, amendments not involving any of the radical changes which had been necessitated by subsequent events but designed rather to remove some of the more obvious causes of friction. Those amendments had been submitted to

the leaders of the Turkish minority in Cyprus; but before the latter had a chance to consider them, the Turkish Government – to which they had been communicated simply for information – had dismissed them as unacceptable thus compelling the Turkish Cypriot leadership to follow suit. In December 1963 there had been a more ominous reaction from the Turkish Government – the rebellion against the State launched by the Turkish underground organization in Cyprus, and threats of invasion and acts of aggression by Turkey itself, which had seized the President's proposals for amending the constitution as an excuse for putting into effect its long-prepared plan for the partition of Cyprus.

The Vice-President, the three Turkish Ministers, the Turkish members of the House as well as Turkish Public servants withdrew from the Government to head the rebellion against the State, the Vice-President publicly declaring that the Republic of Cyprus had ceased to exist. On the false and outrageous pretext that the Government of Cyprus and its forces were about to annihilate the Turkish minority, the agents of Turkey in Cyprus controlled by Turkish officers from Turkey, had resorted to the forcible movement of sections of the Turkish population – not for their protection, as had been hypocritically asserted at the time, but in order to create compact Turkish areas and bring about a geographical separation of the Turkish minority from the Cypriot people, in preparation for eventual partition. The Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance had assisted the rebels by moving out of its barracks and illegally deploying north of Nicosia in hostile occupation of Cyprus territory; and it is still so deployed.

*Cyprus – The Problem in Perspective*, p 7.  
May 1971

III,79 DENKTASH, Rauf (President of the Turkish Cypriot Republic of North Cyprus)

For more than twenty years past – ever since the overthrow of the 1960 settlement – the Turkish Cypriots and their government have been faced with one of the hardest tasks in the whole range of international affairs – how to get the world to change its mind after it has got hold of the wrong end of the stick and clung to it year after year. It is in the nature of governments and international organisations that they should be reluctant to admit that they have been in the wrong or even to 'think it possible they may have been mistaken'. But that is the simple truth about the position which the world at large has taken up in regard to Cyprus from 1964 onwards.

... It is not we, the Turkish Cypriots, who brought political violence and bloodshed to a peaceful Cyprus. We did not embark on a lunatic adventure to secure, not independence for Cyprus, but its subjection to another State. We did not accept the independence agreements in 1960 with the intention of dishonouring them as soon as we could. We did not prepare and try to impose a clandestine plan to overthrow the Republic and to abrogate the Treaties on which it was based. We did not attack and try to annihilate by force the other Cypriot people. We did not persecute them for years afterwards with savage inhumanity and heartless repression when they

refused to succumb. We did not secretly bring into the Island thousands of foreign troops in an attempt to create a *fait accompli* of its annexation to another State. And, in the end, it was not we who either provoked or launched the bloody *coup d'état* in 1974 which compelled Turkey to intervene in Cyprus in order to stop the bloodshed and protect the Cypriots from a regime of terror headed by a homicidal maniac.

And yet it is those who set in train all this folly and mischief and evil who were rewarded for their aggression against us by being accorded recognition in 1964 as the legitimate 'Government of Cyprus'. The United Nations and its member states (with the honourable exception of Turkey) still persist in that error, as do other international organisations such as the EEC and the Commonwealth.

From the introduction to a revised edition  
(1988) of his book *The Cyprus Triangle*

III,80 LIVERAS, Dimitrios (Greek Cypriot Minister of Justice)

'Peaceful co-existence', Mr Liveras said, 'is the firm objective also of our own country, as regards its relations both with its neighbouring countries and the form of society which we are traditionally seeking with our compatriots, the Turkish Cypriots, the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins.

The Cypriot people and their Government firmly adhere to this policy. In no case did the people and the Government decide that confrontation, violence and war should be used for the promotion of objectives', the Minister added.

Speaking at a cultural festival on 'Peaceful Co-existence' held at Nicosia on 18 June 1987 (reported in the *Cyprus Mail* of 19.6.87)

III,81 ANONYMOUS

*The Death of the Republic*  
or  
*Who killed poor Cyprus?*

Who killed poor Cyprus?  
I, said Makarios,  
In the end my nefarious  
Folly killed Cyprus

Who struck her dead?  
I, said Akritas,\*  
I planned her quietus  
And I struck her dead.

\* the code name for the leader of the Greek Cypriot plot to overthrow the bi-communal Republic in 1963 (see item III,24)

Who cut her in pieces?  
George Grivas\*\* said, I did,  
My forces divided  
The island in pieces.

Who saw her die?  
Not I, said UK,  
I looked t'other way  
I turned a blind eye.

Who reported her death  
Galo Plaza\*\*\* said, I did,  
I wrote my one-sided  
Report on her death.

Who dug her grave?  
The UN said, We did,  
Foul play went unheeded,  
While we dug her grave.

Then the UN in session rewarded aggression,  
Crying, Long live Makarios, happy, victorious!  
While the Turkish community buried their dead,  
In the graveyard of Cyprus they buried their dead.

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\*\* the EOKA terrorist leader whose renewed attacks on Turkish Cypriots in 1964 caused them to seek refuge in Turkish enclaves and thus initiated the process which has now ended in the virtual partition of Cyprus (see sections 4 and 5 above)

\*\*\* the UN Mediator for Cyprus, 1964-65 (see item IV,7 below)

# Appendix

## Akritas Plan

Top SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take in the near future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to time, and the measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination.

As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because methods of the presentation and the handling of our cause within and outside the country are different.

### A METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE

In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. But the question of the Turkish minority had been introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties.

- (a) Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.

(b) The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:

- (i) that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just;
- (ii) that the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties;
- (iii) that the demand for the revision of the agreement is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonour their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival for them;
- (iv) that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
- (v) that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely.

(c) Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.

(d) Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives we must materialise the second stage on an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:

- (i) that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove the unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism;
- (ii) that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
- (iii) (Omitted)
- (iv) that this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise; and
- (v) that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world, public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the Agreements (eg the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external

intervention. For this reason our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the First Agreement to be cited as not being recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.

It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialise, our future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions to be taken are as follows:-

- (a) The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent *de facto* nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (*passage omitted*) whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.
- (b) Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
- (c) Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express and apply its will.
- (d) It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then be completely independent.

It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (a) to (d) to be carried out in the order indicated.

It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (a) if stage (d) is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements.

The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in the international field.

## B THE INTERNAL ASPECT

Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.

1 The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally tenable at least if not entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The

history of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention, even if legally inexcusable, has the attacker been removed by either the United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack on Suez by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eilat in the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus.

If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage, ie at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose.

The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed (Omitted)

2. It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:

(a) The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c)

(b) Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks.

The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn up for the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of intercommunal strife. We do not intend to engage, without provocation, in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (*section omitted*) the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret, we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to a plan. Our Actions will have a legal form.

3. (Omitted)

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible for us to proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more general Plan as described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason the existence and the strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because (a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks, in towns in particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.

(b) In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.

(c) The forceful and decisive suppression of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their Community.

(d) In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.

5 In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally essential for our success and survival.

This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing to the fact that, for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public.

Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities we need a strong and stable government, up to the last minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are good for nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. A typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated and kept at a distance.

We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives **ONLY VERBALLY**. Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the Organisation to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to enlighten others. **NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY SORT IS ALLOWED. LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE IS EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON.** There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.

Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who will control the speech or statements. But in any case such speech or statement **MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION.**

The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made on to enlighten our members and the public **VERBALLY.** Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.

**NOTE**

The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office of sub-headquarters.

The Chief  
AKRITAS



## **Part IV**

### **Rewarding Aggression**

- 1 Folly at the UN, 1964-5
- 2 Put not your trust in Guarantors, 1964
- 3 More folly at the UN, 1974-84

# 1 Folly at the UN, 1964-5

## IV,1 STEPHEN, Michael

It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the constitution by force but actually rewarded it by recognising the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus. (Security Council resolution 186 of 4th March 1964).

*CYPRUS - Two Nations in One Island*, Bow Group Educational Paper, No 5, p 3

## IV,2 UNITED NATIONS Security Council

1 - *Calls upon* all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus or to endanger international peace.

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2 - *Asks* the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

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4 - *Recommends* the creation with the consent of the Government of Cyprus of a United Nations Peace Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom:

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6 - *Recommends* that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus:

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7 - *Recommends further* that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four

governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. . . .

(UN doc S/5575 of 4.3.64)

*Editorial Note*

But who was 'the Government of Cyprus'? Indeed, was there then any 'Government of Cyprus' at all or any 'sovereign Republic of Cyprus' since both the Republic and its Constitution had been overthrown by the Greek Cypriot leadership? No-one could honestly maintain that the Greek Cypriot rump of the former lawful, bi-communal Government of Cyprus established in 1960 retained the legitimacy conferred by the Zurich and London Agreements. Moreover, how could the Security Council conscientiously entrust the restoration of law and order to the very party which had launched the 'violence and bloodshed in Cyprus' and destroyed its law and order?

From this point on the international community (and not least Britain, a Guarantor of the 1960 settlement) allowed Greek Cypriot leaders to get away with murder - the murder of the only compromise on Cyprus ever reached between Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It may or may not have been a good compromise; but it was the only one and did offer a hope of reconciliation. At the time it had been generally welcomed as a miraculous deliverance from strife and bloodshed. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and other members of the international community are still paying for the folly committed by the Security Council in March 1964.

IV,3 WILLIAMS, P. (a Member of Parliament (Labour) in the House of Commons)

Will he confirm or deny the existence of a Government of Cyprus? Does it work? Does it exist? Do the Greeks and Turks talk or not?

Parliamentary Question addressed to the Commonwealth Relations Secretary on 17 February 1964 (H of C debates, Vol 689, col 845)

*Editorial Note*

The Minister (Duncan Sandys) replied evasively that it would not be proper for him to express any personal thoughts about the ultimate solution at a time when the British Government was trying to get a mediator appointed. But only a week later, replying to another Labour backbencher, Francis Noel-Baker, he said - 'The British Government continues to recognise the Government of Cyprus as established under the Constitution'. How anyone can square this statement with Britain's action, a further week later, in voting for the Security Council's resolution (see above) which treated the Greek Cypriot rump of the bi-communal Government established under the Constitution as 'the Government of Cyprus' is beyond comprehension.

- IV,4 REDDAWAY, John (who served as Administrative Secretary in the Government of Cyprus under Field Marshal Sir John Harding (later Lord Harding) and Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon))

Effective intervention by Britain did not, however, stand or fall by the feasibility of military action and it is on the political plane that the Turkish Cypriot criticism of Britain's performance as a Guarantor in 1964 demands a better answer than it received then or since. The essence of the Treaty of Guarantee and of the role assigned to the Guarantors under it was to uphold the 1960 Agreements in the spirit of *pacta sunt servanda*. The Guarantors' power of intervention may have been discretionary, not mandatory. But there can be no question that the Treaty did at least impose on them an inescapable negative obligation – not to condone or connive in action which breached or undermined the validity of the Agreements. By that criterion, rather than by its failure to use its positive power of intervention, the then British Government stands condemned of failing in 1964 to discharge the obligation Britain had accepted in 1960. Ministers could not plead ignorance; even if they had failed to appreciate fully the nature and scope of the Greek Cypriot attempt to overthrow the 1960 settlement, President Makarios had left them in no doubt that his intention was to abrogate important elements in the Agreements. By acquiescing afterwards (albeit in company with other members of the international community) in the Greek Cypriot seizure of power Britain did condone action in breach of the settlement it had undertaken to guarantee. If Britain seriously intended to fulfil its function as a Guarantor, was there not political action which it could and should have taken to promote the re-establishment of the state of affairs created by the Treaty? Britain might, for example, have refused to recognise or have any dealings with both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot administration until and unless they re-established in full the 1960 Constitution. Britain might have taken the lead towards ensuring that no international recognition was given to any 'Government of Cyprus' which continued to be in breach of the 1960 settlement and that the Cyprus seat at the United Nations remained vacant until it could be filled by a representative of a Cyprus Government constituted in accordance with the 1960 Constitution.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British Connection*  
p 156

- IV,5 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic

We have secured a resolution in the first phase of our struggle in the international field. Turkey cannot in future threaten intervention in Cyprus invoking the Treaty of Guarantee.

*The Cyprus Mail*, 5 March 1964

They (the Zurich and London Agreements) today stand abrogated and buried. Neither Turkey nor any other power can breathe life into them again.

In a declaration in Athens on 1 February

1966 on the anniversary of the Enosis plebiscite in Cyprus in 1950

IV,6. REDDAWAY, John (see IV,4 above)

The resolution has been described as 'a triumph for Makarios'. So it was – in the short run. But in the longer run the adoption of this resolution was an ominous development for Cyprus, since it increased both Greek Cypriot intransigence towards the Turks and the likelihood that, sooner or later, Turkey would intervene. The resolution was in fact a crucial step in the process of abandoning the 1960 settlement, reopening the conflict over the Island's final status and, in the end, provoking Turkish intervention and the virtual partition of Cyprus. At the time it no doubt seemed to Ministers in London and to Members of the Security Council in New York that it would be flying in the face of reality for them to insist on a restoration of the *status quo* in Cyprus; and in practice it may be that by then a complete restoration of that state of affairs was no longer practicable. But insistence on a return to the legitimacy and constitutionality provided by the Treaties and the Constitution should have been the keynote of attempts by Britain and the international community to resolve the problem created by the overthrow of the 1960 settlement. Instead they accepted, apparently without adequate thought, the proposition that the breakdown was irremediable and that a new solution must be found. Later, in March 1965, that conclusion was specifically stated by the UN Mediator, Dr Galo Plaza, appointed under the Security Council's resolution, in a report that is not distinguished by either its percipience or its impartiality. Once again the lid of Pandora's box had been lifted and the twin bugbears of Enosis and Taksim had taken wing to plague Cyprus and the Cypriots until the violent denouement of the tragedy ten years later.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British Connection*  
pp 159–160

IV,7 PLAZA, Dr Galo (UN Mediator for Cyprus, 1964–5)

. . . having taken it to be the clear intention of the Security Council that the 'agreed settlement' of the Cyprus problem should be one agreed upon by the very parties which adhered to the Treaties of 1960, I think it logical to expect that the agreed settlement will not be one which merely restores the situation existing before 1963 and that, by agreeing to the settlement, the parties would necessarily agree also formally to abrogate or at least modify those Treaties. It is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution governed by the Treaties. The succession of events, as well as the points of view held by the parties concerned, have left no doubt that the existence of the Treaties and the difficulties encountered in applying them constituted the origin of this crisis and have continued to influence its development. It is of no great importance to try to determine whether the Treaties were in fact incapable of being applied or whether their application was made impossible through the fault, deliberate or otherwise, of one or

more of the parties concerned. It is enough to observe that the difficulties in implementing the Treaties began almost immediately after independence and became increasingly serious. The events which have taken place in Cyprus since December of 1963 have created a situation which makes it psychologically and politically impossible to return to the previous situation. Moreover, the very act of appointing a Mediator in order to help bring about 'an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus' can be said to indicate the conviction of the Security Council that some new solution would have to be found in order to bring an end to the existing crisis.

UN doc S/6252 of 29 March 1965, para 129

#### *Editorial Note*

The logic behind these conclusions is not easy to follow. What Dr Galo Plaza appears to be saying is that, since the Security Council had called for an 'agreed settlement' and since one party to the 1960 settlement had chosen to dishonour its signature and purported to have abrogated the settlement, therefore this had to be accepted as a *fait accompli* by other parties, even though they might regard the 1960 settlement as still in force and wish it to continue; and hence that a new settlement had to be found. This would make a nonsense of the whole concept of international agreements.

#### IV,8 DENKTASH, Rauf, then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

In his report, the mediator expressed a personal conviction that 'the treaties and the constitution were the main cause of the Cyprus dispute'. This was the propaganda line used by the Greek Cypriots.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, p 109

#### IV,9 OBERLING, Pierre (Professor of History at Hunter College, Cuny, U.S.A.)

Galo Plaza of Ecuador, who succeeded Sakari Tuomioja as UN Mediator on September 28, 1964, rapidly fell under the influence of Makarios. He minimized the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots at Kokkina, even though General Thimayya had described conditions there as 'scandalous' and 'degrading', and his final report, issued in March 1965, displayed such a callous disregard for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus that the Turkish government promptly called for his resignation. He characterized the trend towards bi-zonality, which in Turkish Cypriot eyes appeared to be the only hopeful development in recent Cypriot history, as 'a desperate step in the wrong direction'; he questioned the wisdom of retaining such guarantees as the treaties of 1960, which the Turkish Cypriots regarded as vital; and he recommended that 'special measures . . . applied in order to ensure to the members of the minority community a proper voice in their . . . communal affairs and . . . an equitable part in the public life of the country as a whole' be strictly 'transitional'. The UN General Assembly displayed a similar anti-Turkish bias. On December 18, 1965, it voted in favour of a resolution which, like the Cairo declaration, stated that Cyprus

was 'entitled to, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference'. The Greek Cypriot leaders felt that this resolution would effectively deter Turkey from intervening in Cyprus in the near future. But by June 1966 much of the support which Makarios had mustered at the UN had eroded because of his intransigence. At that time, seven of the states that had voted for the UN resolution of the previous December (Nepal, Uruguay, Lebanon, Syria, Gabon, Ethiopia and Ghana) gave vent to their dissatisfaction by publicly announcing that their vote was in no way to be construed as an endorsement of *enosis*.

The Road to Bella Pais, p 125

IV,10 UNITED NATIONS General Assembly

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*Noting* the report of the United National Mediator on Cyprus, submitted to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965.

*Noting further* that the Government of Cyprus is committed, through its Declaration of Intention and the accompanying Memorandum, to:

- a) The full application of human rights to all citizens of Cyprus, irrespective of race or religion,
- b) The ensuing minority rights,
- c) The safeguarding of the above rights as contained in the said Declaration and Memorandum,

1 *Takes cognizance* of the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference;

2 *Calls upon* all States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it;

3 *Recommends* to the Security Council the continuation of the United Nations mediation work in conformity with Council resolution 186 (1964).

General Assembly resolution 2077 of 18 December 1965.

*Editorial Note*

While the General Assembly was thus expressing -

- (a) its concern about a presumed *external* threat to the independence and integrity of Cyprus;
- (b) its confidence in the goodwill and humanity of a regime which had dishonoured international agreements, overthrown constitutional government, destroyed law and order and attempted the genocide of the Turkish population of the Island;

and

(c) its endorsement of the Greek Cypriots' determination to relegate the Turkish Cypriot community from the status of a co-partner in a bi-communal Republic to that of a mere minority in a Greek-dominated state; all in pursuit of the declared Greek and Greek Cypriot aim, not to preserve the independence of Cyprus, but to secure its annexation to Greece;

What was actually happening on the ground in the Island?

- a clandestine Greek invasion of Cyprus was already far advanced, many thousands of regular Greek troops, with their arms and equipment, including tanks and artillery, having been smuggled into the Island in the guise of volunteers, in implementation of a secret agreement between the Prime Minister of Greece, George Papandreou, and the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios;
- a wholly Greek Cypriot National Guard, officered by Greek Army officers and numbering upwards of 20,000 men, had been established by the Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus';
- the notorious terrorist George Grivas had been brought back to Cyprus by Archbishop Makarios and given supreme command of the Greek and Greek Cypriot armed forces; on his arrival he had announced: 'I come as the apostle of Enosis';
- a quarter (about 25,000 persons) of the whole Turkish Cypriot population had been uprooted from their homes and were living as homeless refugees in Turkish Cypriot enclaves which were surrounded and closely invested by Greek and Greek Cypriot armed forces;
- 527 houses belonging to Turkish Cypriots in 109 towns and villages had been destroyed and 2,000 more had been damaged, property worth millions of pounds had been looted, pillaged and destroyed;
- besides the 25,000 refugees, a further 23,500 Turkish Cypriots had been deprived of their employment or other means of livelihood and 7,500 more were either dependents of missing persons or had been disabled in the fighting; altogether more than half the whole Turkish Cypriot population (which then numbered about 110,000 persons) were receiving international relief, having been reduced to a state of indigence by the Greek Cypriot onslaught;
- the provision of that relief had often been hindered and interfered with by the Greek Cypriot authorities who insisted on charging customs duty (for the sole benefit of the Greek Cypriot community) on relief supplies;
- the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole had been subjected to a vicious economic blockade by the Greek Cypriots on the pretext of preventing them from receiving 'strategic materials' (which were defined to include clothing, building materials, spare parts for motor vehicles and electrical, telephone, radio and fire-fighting equipment); the UN Secretary-General observed that: 'The economic restrictions, which in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action' (UN doc S/5950, para 222); this economic blockade continued until March 1968 when it was lifted in response to the threat of Turkish intervention during the crisis of 1967; the

rationale behind the blockade was that 'economic sanctions, unlike the deaths caused by military confrontations, would not offer a dramatic justification for a Turkish invasion' (R A Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*, p 106);

- all the government machinery and public services of the bi-communal Republic had been seized by the Greek Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, Turkish members of the police, of the Cyprus armed forces and other Turkish Cypriot government employees, whose places of work were in Greek sectors, had been driven away by threat of armed force (some of them were actually killed or abducted) and the payment of the salaries and remunerations of some 4,000 Turkish Cypriot government employees had been stopped; public services had been denied to the Turkish Cypriots (including postal services, the payment of social insurance benefits, the registration of births and the issue of passports, except for Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate); all public funds had been appropriated by the Greek Cypriots and used for the benefit of the Greek Cypriot community alone;
- the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic was prevented from exercising his powers of veto, of reference back to the legislature and Council of Ministers and of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court; the duly elected Turkish Cypriot representatives in the legislature had been excluded and when, in July 1965, they attempted to resume their seats, they had been told by the Greek Cypriot President of the House of Representatives that their return would be prevented by force unless they accepted the changes made in the Constitution and the laws passed by the Greek Cypriot members in the absence of the Turkish deputies. (UN doc S/6569)
- no Greek Cypriot had been prosecuted for crimes committed against Turkish Cypriots.

This grossly partisan resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by 47 votes against 5. But half of the member states taking part in the debate abstained. Most of those voting for the resolution were non-aligned states or members of the Afro-Asian group. The United States voted against. Britain and other European countries, lacking either moral principle or an adequate understanding of the facts, contented themselves with abstention.

## 2 Put not your trust in Guarantors, 1964\*

IV,11 TREATY OF GUARANTEE between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus

### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or

\*Put not your trust in princes . . . in whom there is no help. *Psalms* 146:3

economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

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#### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

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#### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

#### IV,12 REDDAWAY, John (see IV,4 above)

In 1964 it is unquestionable that there were valid grounds for intervention by Britain. Serious breaches of the Treaty had occurred in contravention of the undertaking the Republic had given in Article I to ensure 'respect for its Constitution' and to prohibit 'any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any state or partition of the Island'.

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If the correct interpretation of the Treaty was (as Greek Cypriots and their sympathisers have argued since 1974) that the Treaty imposed an obligation on the Guarantors to intervene in the event of a breach of the Treaty, then there is no question but that Britain ought to have intervened in 1964 to re-establish 'the state of affairs created by the Treaty'. If on the other hand the right of intervention was discretionary (as the British Government argued after 1974), then all that can be said is that there could hardly have been stronger grounds justifying a resort by Britain to its discretionary right of intervention than those which were provided by the crisis of 1964.

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The breaches of the Treaty of Guarantee and of the Constitution were of such gravity and magnitude as not merely to provide ample grounds for the Guarantors to invoke their discretionary right of intervention, but also to put to the test the validity of the whole concept of guarantees provided under

the Treaty. If in these critical circumstances, when the whole settlement was endangered, the Guarantor Powers could not or would not intervene effectively to re-establish the state of affairs created by the Treaty, that was tantamount to accepting that the Treaty was void and incapable of implementation.

The Turkish Cypriots have solid grounds for criticising Britain for its failure to intervene at this time. But their criticism has been muted because Turkey also then failed to take any effective action. The real question for the then British Government was not whether they had grounds for intervening nor, indeed, whether they ought to do so – there could hardly have been more cogent reasons for intervention. The real question was whether intervention was feasible, politically and militarily. They apparently decided that it was not.

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On the political plane British policy was in a mess. The Government had acquiesced in, if not actively encouraged, the Archbishop in his ill-advised attempt to change the Constitution. Too late they realised the dangers involved, but by then they had already committed themselves to an initiative which was, in essence, designed to subvert the whole 1960 settlement. If they now intervened in order to restore that settlement (and that in their view was the only legitimate ground they had for intervention), they would at the very least be open to accusations of misleading inconsistency from the Greek Cypriots. It would also have meant intervening in direct opposition to the Greek Cypriot leadership and would certainly have provoked outraged protests, not merely from the Greek Cypriots but from many other quarters as well, that Britain was attempting to re-assert control over the domestic affairs of the Cypriots and making a mockery of their independence. Then too it would have appeared as though Britain were intervening on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriot majority (rather than simply to restore constitutionality) and this would have revived accusations of pro-Turkish bias and of complicity in the pursuit of partition. The scope for misrepresentation would be greatly increased if Britain and Turkey appeared to be intervening in collaboration and, even more, if Greece objected or attempted to resist such action.

Serious though these political difficulties were, it was no doubt the military objections which were decisive in so far as any intervention by physical force within the Island was concerned.

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It is understandable that the Turkish Cypriots should feel that they, and indeed Cyprus as a whole, were ill-served by Britain's failure in 1964 to show greater consistency, wisdom and courage in discharging its role of Guarantor. It is surprising, and to the credit of the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Turkish Cypriot community at large, that they do not exhibit more bitterness and resentment against Britain on that account. They were badly let down by Britain at that time – and so, as it later emerged, were their Greek Cypriot compatriots.

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The probable explanation for the position which successive British Governments have taken up since the overthrow of the 1960 settlement in 1964, and which does, on the face of it, appear to have been not altogether even-handed, is that they have been motivated (as governments often are) by political expediency rather than by any strict assessment of rights and wrongs in the dispute. Once the Greek Cypriots had succeeded in getting international recognition of their claim to constitute 'the Government of Cyprus', it was hardly possible for Britain as a matter of practical politics to stand out alone against this recognition and to dissociate itself from the overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations and from its friends and allies in the EEC, the Commonwealth and elsewhere. The leading role which Western powers, particularly Britain and America, played in formulating and encouraging the exclusive recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration may in some degree reflect anxiety about the security of the British bases which are adjacent to Greek Cypriot controlled territory and vulnerable to interference and sabotage by a potentially hostile Greek Cypriot population. The great superiority of the Greek Cypriots over the Turkish Cypriots in the political presentation of their case pre-empted any disposition there might have been on Britain's part to press for a more balanced approach; and again, Ministers and officials may well have been inhibited by Britain's colonial past in Cyprus and by the certainty of misrepresentation if it appeared to be taking, even to a limited degree, a more sympathetic stance towards the Turkish Cypriots.

Since 1974 political expediency has also no doubt discouraged governments in London from doing anything which might be represented as endorsing the second phase of the Turkish military operations and the resulting occupation of territory much in excess of what could be justified by the ratio of Turkish to Greek population.

*Burdened with Cyprus – the British connection,*  
pp 150, 152-3, 160 and 185

IV,13 CRAWSHAW, Nancy

Great Britain, from whom decisive action might have been expected, played a negative role even to the extent of disregarding her obligations to safeguard 'the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution'. It was as if inhibited by her former position as colonial ruler she was determined to stand aside.

*The Cyprus Revolt, p 364*

IV,14 BALL, George (US Under-Secretary in the State Department)

The British wanted above all to divest themselves of responsibility for Cyprus.

quoted by Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus,*  
p 50

## IV,15 WOODHOUSE, the Hon. C M

It seems clear not only that the Labour Government behaved in a pusillanimous and evasive fashion in 1974, but also that neither Labour nor Conservative governments, nor their civil and military services, had ever given serious consideration to the obligations which they were undertaking from the first. The guarantee was given to Cyprus in 1960 in much the same way that similar guarantees were given to several east European states in 1939, on the assumption that the mere existence of the guarantee would deter aggression and ensure that the guarantee never had to be honoured.

*Cyprus: the British point of view, essay in CYPRUS in transition, 1960-1985, pp 92-3*

### 3 More folly at the UN, 1974-84

## IV,16 GENEVA DECLARATION of the Guarantor Powers (Greece, Turkey and Britain)

. . . the three Foreign Ministers agreed that negotiations, as provided for in Resolution 353 of the Security Council, should be carried on with the least possible delay to secure (a) the restoration of peace in the area and (b) the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus. To this end they agreed that further talks should begin on 8 August 1974 at Geneva. They also agreed that representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities should, at an early stage, participate in the talks relating to the constitution. Among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution. The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation the Ministers agreed to consider at their next meeting the problems raised by their existence.

#### *Editorial Note*

This declaration clearly recognized that 'constitutional government' did not exist in Cyprus. Why else would it need to be re-established? It also recognised that what existed was two autonomous administrations. Yet by referring to Security Council Resolution 353 (see Item V,24 below) it recalled the UN's one-sided recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as 'the Government of Cyprus'.

The recognition by the three Ministers that there existed in practice 'the two autonomous administrations' was clearly embarrassing to the Greek Cypriot leadership. One distinguished Greek Cypriot legal expert disposes of the difficulty by simply omitting the passage in question from the text of the Declaration when quoting it in his book. He also omits an earlier passage requiring that 'All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot Forces should be immediately evacuated'. (Polyvios G Polyviou, *CYPRUS. The Tragedy and the Challenge*, p 174).

For the full text of the Declaration see item V,26 below)

Declaration issued at Geneva on 30 July  
1974 (after the ceasefire in Cyprus on 22  
July 1974)

IV,17 CLERIDES, Glafcos (who represented the Greek Cypriots at the Second Geneva Conference held on 8 to 13 August, 1974)

. . . They (sc. he himself and Rauf Denktaş, who was representing the Turkish Cypriot community at the Conference) have agreed that this revision (sc. of the governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus) must result in the establishment of a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within suitable boundaries, united under a central government . . .

10 August 1964

*Editorial Note*

Denktaş, in his record of the agreement they had reached, put it in more detailed and specific terms: 'Bearing also in mind the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, they agreed that this revision should result in the establishment of a federal system of government based on the following fundamental elements:

- (a) The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent bi-national state;
- (b) The Republic shall be composed of two federated states with full control and autonomy within their respective geographical boundaries;
- (c) In determining the competence to be left to the federal government, the bi-national nature of the State shall be taken into account and the federal competence shall be exercised accordingly; . . .

IV,18 UNITED NATIONS General Assembly resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974

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3 *Considers* that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities;

4 *Commends* the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good offices of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights. . . .

*Editorial Note*

The wording of this resolution, adopted in the immediate aftermath of the violent events of the summer of 1974, was markedly different from that of earlier UN resolutions. It contained no reference whatsoever to any 'Government of Cyprus', merely to 'the Republic of Cyprus'. It spoke of negotiations 'taking place on an equal footing' and 'reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement' based on the 'fundamental and legitimate rights' of both communities. It seemed that, at last, the

General Assembly had accepted that there were two equal partners in the Republic and that the Greek Cypriots alone did not and could not constitute the legitimate Government of the Island. However, this new-found realism and impartiality at the UN was not to last.

#### IV,19 THE AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION

The Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration . . .

Having come to the conclusion that the only way to bring tranquillity, security and permanent peace to the island is for the two communities to live side by side in their respective region, developing their own internal structure; and

Having noted the fact that the Greek Cypriot community has not made any constructive response to the proposals for the establishment of an independent Federal Republic of Cyprus on the above reasonable basis; and . . .

Mindful of the necessity of creating in their own region the legal basis of an order leading to the establishment of the future independent Federal Republic of Cyprus; and . . .

Reaffirming that their final objective is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a bi-zonal federation;

Have resolved that the autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration should be restructured and organized on the basis of a secular and federal state, until such time as the 1960 Constitution of the Republic, the basic articles of which were determined by international agreements in compliance with international law, is amended in a similar manner to become the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, and until the said Federal Republic is established.

Statement issued on 13 February 1975  
(published as an Annex to the UN Secretary-General's report S/11624 of 18 February 1975)

#### IV,20 UNITED NATIONS Security Council

*Having considered* the situation in Cyprus in response to the complaint submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

2 *Regrets* the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a 'Federated Turkish State' as, *inter alia*, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, and expresses its concern over all unilateral actions by the parties which have compromised or may compromise the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

3 *Affirms* that the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above does not prejudice the final political settlement of the problem of Cyprus and takes note of the declaration that this was not its intention;

4 *Calls* for the urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXLX), endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974);

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UN Security Council resolution 367 (1975)  
of 12 March 1975

#### *Editorial Note*

Salient points in this resolution are:-

(1) it reintroduced reference to 'the Government of Cyprus' which had been conspicuously absent from the earlier General Assembly resolution (Item IV,18 above); indeed, the preamble makes clear that the Council had returned to the problem in response to a complaint by this wholly Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus' about the Turkish Cypriot action in setting up, provisionally, its own autonomous administration;

(2) it deplores the 'unilateral decision' of the Turkish Cypriots, while continuing to acquiesce in the unilateral decision taken by the Greek Cypriots in 1964 to impose their own autonomous administration on Cyprus; it could at least be said for the Turkish Cypriot action that they were not trying to impose their administration on the other Cypriot community and that their action was specifically conditioned by a reaffirmation that 'their final objective (was) to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a bi-zonal federation' (such as the Greek Cypriot representative had accepted at Geneva in August 1974); the same could not be said for the Greek Cypriot side;

(3) it endorsed the General Assembly's call for negotiations 'on an equal footing' but did not explain how this equality of footing could be achieved so long as the Council itself continued to treat one party as legitimate and representative of the whole of Cyprus while treating the other party as illegitimate and secessionist (to the extent even of deploring its attempt to establish itself on an equal footing as an autonomous administration for its own community); the Council never seems to have considered the possibility that the Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus' was itself secessionist since it resulted from a break-away insurrection (in 1963-4) against the bi-communal Republic established by agreement of both sides in 1960.

IV,21 THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS: Declaration of Statehood, 15 November 1983

#### DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed by the unanimous vote of the Legislative Assembly of the hitherto Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which is a democratic representative body of the Turkish people of Cyprus. The proclamation

stressed that the Republic would adhere to all treaties and agreements binding on it, including the Treaty of Guarantee, would follow a policy of non-alignment, would remain faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter and would endeavour to facilitate the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots could co-operate in peace and harmony. The proclamation emphasised, *inter alia*, that the founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a manifestation of the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people of Cyprus. The declaration also stipulated that the newly created entity will not unite with any other state, except with the southern unit to form a federal republic of Cyprus.

The Declaration included the following passage:-

**'WE EXTEND ONCE AGAIN OUR HAND IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT PEOPLE'**

- The two Peoples of the island are destined to co-exist side by side.
- We can, and must, find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all our differences, through negotiations on the basis of equality.
- The proclamation of the new State will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of a genuine federation.
- The new Republic will not unite with any other State.
- The good offices of the UN Secretary-General and negotiations must continue.
- On matters which can be resolved in the short term, immediate measures of good will must be taken.

See UN docs A/38586 and S/16148 of 16 November 1983 for the full text of the declaration

IV,22 GROOM, John (Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent)

The declaration was striking in its timidity – as though they were tip-toeing out of the door leaving it carefully ajar so that they could quickly and easily come back in again. The declaration reads almost like a classic case of *reculer pour mieux sauter* in the direction of a pan-Cypriot polity. The Turkish-Cypriot community had, in the months before independence, clearly signalled its intentions. Mr Denktash was reported in the *Turkish News* of July 1983 as saying 'I have always maintained that going to Federation with the Greek Cypriots passes through the way of establishing our own State first, because the Greek Cypriots will not accept us as their equals'. Indeed, the constant theme of Turkish-Cypriot apologists was that an independent state was necessary to assert their status as co-founders of a future federal republic and to ensure that the sovereignty of the republic would be derived from the existing two states joining together as equals to form the future federal republic.

## IV,23 UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983)

On 18 November, the Council adopted resolution 541 (1983), in which it deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities for the 'purported secession' of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered that declaration as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal; called for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975); requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus; called upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices; called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus; called upon all states and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation, and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

Z M Nejatigil, Attorney-General of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, *Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 106-7

*Editorial Note*

The debate leading to the adoption of this resolution was initiated jointly by the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece. Britain thus aligned itself with the parties which had overthrown in 1964 the Republic whose independence, integrity and Constitution Britain had guaranteed in 1960 and did so in denial of the Turkish Cypriots' right of separate self-determination which Britain had promised them in 1956.

## IV,24 TURKEY, Government of

The Turkish view about the Security Council resolution\* was expressed by Ambassador Kirca. The proclamation of statehood could not be regarded as null and void. That decision was taken in accordance with the principle of self-determination in order to re-establish the state of affairs laid down in the basic provisions of the Constitution as envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee, and as a means of remedying the continuous usurpation by the Greek community of the title 'Government of the Republic of Cyprus'. In his view, the Council would have done better to recognize the legal truth and declare null and void the illegal amendments made unilaterally by the Greek Cypriot community to the basic and unalterable provisions of the 1960 Constitution, in violation of that Constitution and of the Treaty of Guarantee. Therefore Turkey had to reject the relevant paragraph of the draft resolution. He said emphatically, 'since there can be no question of the Turkish community's revoking its proclamation of independence, it would be absolutely unthinkable for Turkey to withdraw recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'

Z M Nejatigil, Attorney-General of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, *Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 106-7

\*Item IV,23 above

IV,25 DENKTASH, Rauf, President of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus

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It (the Security Council) considered China non-existent for 30 years and East Germany non-existent for 25 years. It does not matter; they are now here among us, and I greet them with respect.

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We are not seceding from the independent island of Cyprus, from the Republic of Cyprus, or will not do so if the chance is given to us to re-establish a bi-zonal federal system. But if the robbers of my rights continue to insist that they are the legitimate Government of Cyprus, we shall be as legitimate as they, as sovereign as they in the Northern State of Cyprus, but we shall keep the door wide open to re-establishing unity under a federal system.

(Commenting on the paragraph of the draft resolution which considered the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to be 'invalid').

UN doc S/PV 2500 of 18 November 1983  
pp 61-2



## **Part V**

### **Nemesis, 1974**

#### **- end of a Greek dream and of a Turkish nightmare**

- 1 The Greek Invasion of Cyprus, 1964-74
- 2 Missed opportunities - the inter-communal negotiations, 1968 to 1974
- 3 The July coup, 1974
- 4 Turkish intervention, 1974
  - (A) The First Turkish Military Operation, 20 to 22 July
  - (B) The First Geneva Conference, 25 to 30 July
  - (C) Interim, 31 July to 7 August
  - (D) The Second Turkish Military Operation, 14 to 16 August
  - (E) A justifiable intervention?

## 1 The Greek Invasion of Cyprus, 1964-74

V,1 KARAYIANNIS, Lt Gen George (the Greek Army Officer then in command of the Cyprus Army)

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In August of 1960, his patience having been exhausted by the negative stance of the Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus Parliament and their menacing offensive for partitioning the island by surprise, President Makarios decided to proceed with the following:

A) to organise for battle the Greek Cypriots and arm them,

B) to proceed with the revision of the Constitution, so that, with the cancellation of the Vice-President's VETO, it would become possible to put the state into proper working order.

First of all he put into operation a specially prepared scheme for organising the Greek Cypriots for battle. When progress with this organisation reached such a point that the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots would be deemed manageable, he would proceed next to the revision of the Constitution.

The organisation of the Greek Cypriots for battle which was thus created and which initially bore the title 'the organisation', finally took the name of THE NATIONAL GUARD OF CYPRUS. The Minister of the Interior, Polycarpos Yeorkadjis, was appointed as its commander, and the President of the Parliament, Glafcos Clerides, and the Minister of Labour, Tasos Papadopoulos, as its sub-commanders . . .

*Ethnikos Kiryx* (Athens newspaper),  
13 June 1965

### *Editorial Note*

This means that as early as August 1960, the month when the transfer of power from Britain to the new Republic took place, and before the new Constitution had been given a chance to work, President Makarios had *already* decided to impose by force of arms on the Turkish Cypriots, a revision of the Constitution.

V,2 VLACHOS, Angelos (a Greek diplomat who served as Consul-General in Nicosia during the EOKA period and afterwards in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens with responsibility for Cyprus affairs)

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The inflexibility of the Archbishop has one minimal extenuation, that, from the middle of 1964, the Greek Government began to send to Cyprus, secretly, an augmented brigade of the Greek Army. The enterprise took many weeks. The Greek Government's principal motive was the fear

provoked in it by the Archbishop's turn towards the East, which was bound to influence favourably the development of AKEL. As will be developed below, the despatch of a large unit of the Greek Army was a major political mistake by the Government of G Papandreou.

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 Perhaps this turning (towards the East) by the Archbishop may have been among the reasons which led the Government of G Papandreou to despatch 'clandestinely' the augmented Greek brigade to Cyprus. But the despatch of a large Greek unit to Cyprus constituted a mistake of such dimensions that it is difficult to find an epithet to describe it.

(A) This brigade could not secure the defence of Cyprus. It was a 'suicide squad' since it was impossible for it to have air cover. It is a dogma of the art of war today that, without air cover, any military or naval operation is doomed, so long as the adversary is in command of the air-space.

(B) The presence of a Greek military unit in Cyprus would simply have rendered an invasion operation more troublesome for the Turks. The Turks would always be free to attack Cyprus from many different landing points and with parachute troops.

(C) The presence of Greek troops in Cyprus was enough, even alone, to create among the Turks the conviction that Greece was pursuing Enosis and was ready to face the possibility of a generalised Greco-Turkish conflict.

(D) The immediate consequence of the previous point was for Turkey to reinforce, in every way, the condition of partition which had been created in Cyprus, sending weaponry and cadres to the Turkish enclaves and reinforcing politically Dr Küçük and later Denktash.

(E) The presence of the Greek brigade in Cyprus, which was at once interpreted by various circles in Nicosia as a measure which was directed against the Archbishop, created, with the participation of Grivas, the seeds of a split which was to have disastrous results.

(F) Apart from these points it should have been expected that, once the Greek Government was unable to bring out into the open the presence of the brigade, the situation would backfire and, instead of the Archbishop being controlled by the Greek Government, he would have greater freedom to drag the Greek Government into unwanted situations of *faits accomplis*. After the fall of G Papandreou and during the Government of Stephanopoulos, the Archbishop supplied himself, in 1966, with weapons from Czechoslovakia. Irresponsibility and recklessness characterised again this policy of the Archbishop. Once the presence of the augmented Greek brigade was ensuring, in his opinion, the defence of Cyprus, what was Makarios after in supplying himself with arms from a power of the Eastern bloc? This action on his part had the effect of reducing his credibility vis-a-vis the Greek Government, reinforcing Ankara's enmity, nourishing the USA's suspicion. Finally, it was putting in doubt the Archbishop's sincerity in maintaining that he was pursuing Enosis, since he was turning to the Eastern bloc, which was a declared enemy of Enosis.

(G) Another consequence of the despatch of the brigade was that even the

Greek Government began to have the illusion that it would easily achieve Enosis. The Prime Minister of Greece had said in his speech at the Army Club of Salonica on 2 September 1964:

‘Enosis is coming and, with the springboard of Cyprus, Hellenism will continue its march towards the Middle East, in the tracks of Alexander the Great.’

Turkey replies to this beautiful rhetorical figure of speech by launching in September 1964 a systematic persecution of the Hellenic element in Constantinople, and preparing quietly its forces for an invasion of Cyprus. Ankara changes the command structure of its army, transfers airforce units to its southern airfields, which it is modernising, places orders for helicopters and creates a fleet of landing craft. It prepared the suitable weapon and put its finger on the trigger. It pulled it when the Junta’s crime, on 15 July 1974, gave it the unhoped for opportunity.

*Deka Khronia Kypriakou*, (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem) pp 293–4 and 309–11

- V,3 PAPANDREOU, Andreas (then (1964) a Minister in the Cabinet of his father, George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece)

Makarios visited Athens in early April. He and my father, who was handling personally all aspects of the Cyprus problem, reached complete agreement.

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A clandestine operation then began on a huge scale of nightly shipments of arms and troops, of ‘volunteers’ who arrived in Cyprus in civilian clothes and then joined their ‘Cypriot’ units. The process was not completed until the middle of the summer. No less than twenty thousand officers and men, fully equipped, were shipped to Cyprus.

*Democracy at Gunpoint*, p 132

- V,4 THEODORACOPOULOS, Takis, (a well-known Greek journalist)  
Garoufalias\* managed to pull off a magnificent coup. Under cover of darkness, using only small yachts and fishing boats, 9,000 men and 950 officers, fully equipped and heavily armed, landed in Cyprus.

*The Greek Upheaval*, p 138

- V,5 NEWSWEEK (New York)  
Before dawn each day the great iron doors of the port of Limassol are slammed shut. Turkish Cypriot dockers are sent home. United Nations guards are barred. A few hours later, the doors swing open and covered lorries, weaving on heavily overloaded springs, roar out of the port and head northward towards the Troodos mountains.

Report by its correspondent in Cyprus, 27 July 1964, p 40

\* Defence Minister, Peter Garoufalias

## V,6 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General

41. The UNFICYP observations have established that during the month of July the Cyprus Government imported large amounts of arms and equipment which came in the main through Limassol docks. In addition, an estimated 5,000 personnel entered the island in the same way, presumably from Greece. It is believed that the imports of arms and military equipment were in excess of 3,000 tons of freight, which left Limassol docks in some 1,000 lorry-loads. UNFICYP has some estimates on the details of these imports, but it is not the purpose of this report to disseminate military intelligence.

UN doc S/5950, of 10 September 1964

22. A number of Greek military personnel of all ranks who are not members of the Greek National Contingent continue to be present in the Island. They wear the uniform of the National Guard, and no precise information as to their numbers is available to the Force. It is believed that the small port of Boghaz, north of Famagusta, has been used on several occasions for the purpose of rotating these Greek officers and men.

29. Over the past few months the Force has noticed increased signs of a tendency to identify the Cyprus National Guard with the Greek Army. These include the widespread use of the Greek Army cap badge by the National Guard and the use of the Greek royal crown in flags and sign boards at many National Guard camps, while the oath taken by recent National Guards recruits on enlistment now incorporates allegiance to the King of Greece.

UN doc S/7969 of 12 June 1967

31. Another serious feature, to which I have already referred in previous reports (S/7969, para 26), is that substantial quantities of war material, including heavy equipment, have continued to be introduced through the port of Boghaz, already mentioned in paragraph 25 above, where unloading is invariably carried out in the utmost secrecy, always *under cover of darkness*, with the National Guard attempting to keep UNFICYP patrols out of the area.

UN doc S/8286 of 8 December 1967

25. The repatriation of the Greek national troops took place between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968, in pursuance of an agreement between Greece and Turkey arrived at in response to the Secretary General's appeals of 22 November, 24 November and 3 December 1967 (S/8248/Add. 3, 5 and 6). Since the responsibility for the repatriation operation was assumed at the time by the parties themselves and did not, strictly speaking, come within the UNFICYP mandate, UNFICYP undertook no independent observation in this connection. It was evident however that several thousand Greek National troops had left the Island, taking with them a considerable amount of equipment and vehicles, including tanks. It is believed that most

of the troops who were embarked came from formed units that were serving as part of the Cyprus Government's armed forces. It is known however that Greek national army officers and men are still serving individually in the National Guard and on the headquarters staff, but UNFICYP has not been in a position to estimate their number.

UN doc S/8322 of 3 January 1968

## 2 Missed Opportunities - the intercommunal negotiations, 1968-1972

V,7 OBERLING, Pierre (Professor of History at Hunter College, Cuny, USA)

One happy consequence of Makarios' political troubles was that he now felt it necessary to make peace with the long-abused Turkish Cypriot community. In 1968, the economic restrictions were lifted and Rauf Denktash was allowed to return to the island. Makarios then initiated a series of inter-communal meetings to explore possible solutions to the Cyprus problems. For six years, Glafkos Klerides, representing the Greek Cypriot community, and Rauf Denktash, representing the Turkish Cypriot community, met on a weekly basis in an effort to achieve a settlement. There were many persons in both communities who wanted the talks to fail.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, p 152

V,8 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir, OBE, QC (who served as Solicitor-General in the Government of Cyprus during the period of British rule; as Judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Republic of Cyprus; and as President of the Supreme Court in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus; and as Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs and as Adviser to President Denktash in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus).

Turkey's action following the 1967 crisis and the undertaking by Greece to withdraw her forces from Cyprus paved the way for the commencement of the intercommunal talks to find a just and peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem. Until then the Greek Cypriot side had adamantly refused to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots whom they called 'rebels'. Greece and the Greek Cypriots now seemed to be inclined to talk with the Turkish Cypriots on a bi-lateral basis and, after considerable prodding by the United Nations, intercommunal talks, which aimed at restructuring the Constitution of Cyprus, commenced on 3 June 1968 between the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community (Mr Rauf Denktash) and the Greek Cypriot Community (Mr Glafkos Clerides), respectively, under the aegis of the Special Representative in Cyprus (Mr B F Osorio-Tafall) of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The talks continued till 20 September 1971 and then became stalled. It is

interesting to remember that it was in 1971 that Grivas, who had left in 1967, returned secretly to Cyprus to stir up trouble again. The talks were subsequently reactivated and enlarged, on the suggestion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the participation in the talks of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus and of two constitutional experts, one from Turkey and one from Greece.

*In search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 23

V,9 DENKTASH, Rauf (then the Turkish Cypriot Interlocutor in the inter-communal negotiations)

The expanded talks resumed on 8 June 1972 and at the inaugural meeting on that day Mr Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, made the following statement:-

The area in which Cyprus is located is highly sensitive; the inseparable ties of the two communities with their respective motherlands are too strong to be denied. The fact that whatever happens between the two communities is inevitably reflected in Ankara and Athens cannot be disregarded. We, therefore, as the two national communities in Cyprus, the co-founders of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, and partners in the Administrative setup of the Cyprus State have a duty not only to our respective communities and to Cyprus as a whole but also have an international duty for maintaining the peace in this delicate area in the knowledge that, by doing so, we help our respective motherlands to normalize their political relations. Cyprus should be – and can be – made a bridge of Greco-Turkish friendship and co-operation. Our role to this end can be most significant. We want peace and justice in the light of established rights and political status.

8 June 1972

V,10 CLERIDES, Glafcos (then Greek Cypriot interlocutor in the inter-communal negotiations)

*Clerides tells of a 'Near' agreement*

The former Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr Glafcos Clerides, has given details of what he called a 'near agreement', during the inter-communal talks in 1971-72 which the (Greek Cypriot) Council of Ministers did not approve.

He himself had recommended acceptance of the agreement he had then reached with Mr Denktash, but the Council did not take the same view.

Mr Clerides who was giving an election speech at Omorphita, was answering a challenge from former Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou . . .

*Cyprus Mail, 8 August 1976*

#### *Editorial Note*

According to a Greek Cypriot author, Polyvios G Polyviou, as a result of six years of arduous intercommunal talks, differences of the two sides on the Executive and the Judiciary were narrowed, complete agreement was reached on the Legislature and even on the thorny problem of local government substantial progress was made.

(See *Cyprus in Search of a Constitution*, Nicosia 1976, particularly part II, chapter VI.)

## V,11 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see V,8 above)

The talks continued, on and off, until 18 June 1974, when there was a recess due to the resignation of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Mr Osorio-Tafall. They would have been resumed after 1 July 1974, but in the meantime the Greek/Greek Cypriot coup of 15 July took place, followed by the ensuing events.

It should be borne in mind that what was essentially being negotiated in these talks was the question of local autonomy. It became apparent during these negotiations that the Greek side would not agree to a settlement that would close the door to ENOSIS. In order to ensure that they would be in a position to achieve ENOSIS at will, Archbishop Makarios insisted on a settlement under which the Turkish Cypriot Community would be treated as a mere minority group deprived of all their partnership status and rights under the Zurich and London Agreements and entrenched in the 1960 Constitution. Such a settlement was obviously unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot Community who were in fact co-founders of the Cyprus Republic.

It thus became abundantly clear that Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership were not prepared to sign an agreement which barred ENOSIS. The Greek Cypriot leaders did not want to compromise their position. They thought they had achieved (by ousting the Turkish Cypriot partner from the administration by force and by creating an all-Greek Cypriot 'Hellenic Government') the nearest thing to ENOSIS. It was for this reason that each time the negotiators came to a near agreement, Archbishop Makarios would always find some excuse for breaking the talks or at least for creating tension by his provocative speeches.

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
pp 24-5

## V,12 DENKTASH, Rauf (then Turkish Cypriot interlocutor in the inter-communal negotiations)

## 'INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS, 1968-74

Turkey's demand was firm: Greece should withdraw its forces from Cyprus; occupied villages should be vacated and the villagers compensated for the loss they had suffered; talks should start for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Greece agreed to all these terms and withdrew its forces from Cyprus immediately. Within six months what was to be known as the inter-communal talks had begun (June 1968). The talks still continue in their expanded form with the addition of two Constitutional experts from Turkey and Greece and with the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of UNO.

Before dealing with the inter-communal talks a few words must be said about the current political and factual position in the Island: Greece, by agreeing to withdraw its forces of occupation from Cyprus, had averted a catastrophic confrontation with Turkey, but her designs to make Cyprus part of Greece remained unchanged. She agreed with Archbishop Makarios that it was not necessary to sign a new agreement with the Turkish Cypriots,

if such an agreement would continue to bar ENOSIS and give Turkey the right to prevent it as a matter of Treaty-right. Talking to the Turks and gaining time would be a good policy. The proposals to be made to the Turks were worked out in detail with the Greek Government. If the Turks did not agree to these proposals nothing would be lost, because the Greek Cypriots were in control of the economy of Cyprus. The separate - and unconstitutional - Greek administration was still internationally recognized as the Government of Cyprus and the Greeks were making money on the continuation of the conflict, with all the UN money coming in, tourism booming and the budget of Cyprus being spent only on Greek sectors. The Greek side could afford to wait.

*The Cyprus Problem* published in Nicosia in 1974 (before the July coup and while the negotiations were still continuing).

### 3 The July Coup, 1974

V,13 MAKARIOS, Archbishop

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GREEK REPUBLIC,  
GENERAL GIZIKIS

Nicosia, 2 July, 1974

Mr President,

It is with profound grief that I have to set out to you certain inadmissible situations and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek Government responsible.

Since the clandestine arrival of General Grivas in Cyprus in September, 1971, rumours have been circulating and there have been reliable indicators that he came to Cyprus at the urging and with the encouragement of certain circles in Athens. In any case, it is certain that from the first days of his arrival here Grivas came into touch with officers from Greece serving in the National Guard from whom he received help and support in his effort to set up an unlawful organisation and allegedly to fight for Enosis. And he established the criminal EOKA B organisation, which has become the cause and source of many sufferings for Cyprus. The activity of this organisation, which has committed political murders and many other crimes under a patriotic mantle advancing Enosis slogans, is well known. The National Guard, which is staffed and controlled by Greek officers, has been from the outset the main supplier of men and material to EOKA B, the members and supporters of which gave themselves the nice ringing title of 'Enosists' and 'Enosis camp'.

I am sorry to say, Mr President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits

of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting to-day, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear I say that cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of the EOKA B terrorist organisation. This explains also the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in illegal activities, the conspiracy and other inadmissible situations. The guilt of circles of the military regime is proved by documents which were found recently in the possession of leading cadres of EOKA B. Plenty of money was sent from the National Centre for the maintenance of the organisation and directives were given concerning the leadership after the death of Grivas and the recall of Major Karousos, who had come to Cyprus with him, and generally everything was directed from Athens. The genuineness of the documents cannot be called in question because those of them which are typewritten have corrections made by hand and the handwriting of the writer is known. I indicatively attach one such document.

Great is the responsibility of the Greek Government in the effort to abolish the state status of Cyprus. The Cyprus state should be dissolved only in the event of ENOSIS. However, as long as ENOSIS is not feasible it is imperative that the state of Cyprus should be strengthened. By its whole attitude towards the National Guard issue, the Greek Government has been following a policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus state.

V,14 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see V,8 above)

There is a tendency in international and Greek Cypriot circles, particularly those with pro-Makarios sympathies, to overlook and underestimate the significant role of Makarios's famous letter of 2 July 1974 to the head of the Greek Junta, General Gizikis, (released by the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office on 6 July 1974) which was, in fact, the last overt act which precipitated the coup of 15 July 1974 and which had virtually made the coup unavoidable and inevitable. Makarios, by publishing his letter and thus openly challenging the Junta, had himself forced the coup with his own hands.

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 29

V,15 SAMPSON, Nicos (notorious terrorist and self-confessed murderer who was installed as 'President of Cyprus' in the coup)

'I was about to proclaim ENOSIS when I quit' says Sampson.

'I averted civil war', Mr Nicos Sampson, the man who was for eight days the President of Cyprus during the coup, declared in his paper *Makhi* yesterday, on the coup anniversary. But he says he had to quit 'just as I was about to declare ENOSIS'.

He claimed that he and Joannides, the Junta's strong man, could not be accused of treason but both of them were, he says, 'victims of the anti-Greek designs of the Anglo-Americans and the Russians and their agents in Greece and Cyprus.'

The paper's front-page banner headline covered an interview Sampson

gave to the correspondent of the Athens paper *Apogevmatini* claiming that his action in accepting the presidency had averted civil war and bloodshed.

'I solemnly declare that had I not been forced to quit, Cyprus would have not fallen into the claws of Ankara,' he said.

From the *Cyprus Mail* of 17 July 1975

(Nicos Sampson has repeated this boast from time to time since then. For a recent example see Greek Cypriot Newspaper *Phileleftheros* of 16 April 1981, which reports that Sampson had even drafted his speech in which he was formally going to declare ENOSIS)

V,16 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus  
ADDRESS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 JULY 1974

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What is happening to Cyprus as from last Monday constitutes a real tragedy. The Greek military regime has openly violated the independence of Cyprus. With no sign of respect to the democratic rights of the people of Cyprus, with no sign of respect to the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus.

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I do not believe that there are men who accept the claims of the Greek military regime. The coup did not take place under such conditions so as to be considered an internal affair of the Greek Cypriots. It is a clear attack from the outside and a flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called coup was the work of the Greek officers who man and command the National Guard.

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It may be argued that what has happened in Cyprus is a revolution and that a government has been established on revolutionary justice. This is not the case in Cyprus, a case which might have been considered as an internal affair. It was an invasion which violated the independence and sovereignty of the Republic. The invasion is continuing as long as there are Greek Officers in Cyprus. The results of the invasion will be subversive for Cyprus if there is no return to the constitutional order and if the democratic freedom is not restored.

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It may be argued that it was the Cyprus Government which led to the appointment of Greek officers to the National Guard. I am sorry to say that it was my mistake to give so much trust to these officers. They misused this trust and instead of helping in the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island, they themselves became invaders.

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For some time talks were being conducted between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus for the finding of a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem which

has on many occasions occupied the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN. The representative of the Secretary General and two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey followed the talks. The Security Council has repeatedly twice a year renewed the mandate of the UNFICYP expressing each time the hope that the problem would be settled soon. It cannot be said that the progress at the talks until now has been satisfactory. But how could there be any progress at the talks when the Cyprus policy of the Athens regime was double faced? It has been agreed by all the parties concerned that the talks would be conducted on the basis of independence. The Athens regime also agreed to this and on many occasions the Greek Foreign Secretary stated that the position of Greece on the matter was clear. If this was the fact how did the military regime of Greece establish and support the terrorist organisation EOKA B the purpose of which it was stated to be the Union of Cyprus with Greece and of which the members called themselves Enosists?

V,17 PAPAIOANNOU, Ezekias (Secretary-General of AKEL)

Who can forget or forgive that the loathsome coupists murdered hundreds of Cypriot democrats, some of whom they buried alive? Who can forget that they were planning to murder about ten thousand, mainly leftists, in order to consolidate the foreign-based fascist regime they imposed?

*Haravghi, (Nicosia) 13 January 1985*

V,18 PAPTSESTOS, Father (priest of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus who was superintendent of the Greek Orthodox cemetery in Nicosia)

It is a rather hard thing to say, but it is true that the Turkish intervention saved us from a merciless internecine war. They [the Sampson regime] had prepared a list of all Makarios supporters and they would have slaughtered them all.

In an article in the Athens daily *Ta Nea* which was reproduced in the Greek Cypriot press of 28 February 1976. In it he describes how he was forced to carry out the mass burial of victims of the Sampson coup.

V,19 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see V,8 above)

What would have happened if the Turkish intervention had not taken place?

Nicos Sampson answered this question in his own newspaper: He said that he would have declared ENOSIS if the Turkish intervention had not taken place. The barbarity committed at Alloa, Sandallaris and Maratha villages and the massacre of the Turkish males who were picked up from Tokhni, Zyyi and Mari and lined up and shot\* are glaring examples of what lay in store for the Turkish Cypriot Community had not the Turkish intervention taken place.

*In search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 31

\* See 'Human Rights in Cyprus' published by the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Committee (Nicosia, 1979)

V,20 OBERLING, Pierre (see V,7 above)

The Greek leaders who organized the coup of July 15 were as blind in their fanaticism and as politically shortsighted as the leaders who launched the ill-fated Anatolian campaign some fifty years earlier, and their overblown nationalism brought them nothing but defeat and humiliation. The Turkish intervention which the coup triggered provoked the collapse of the Ioannides regime in Greece and its puppet regime in Cyprus. Ioannides was replaced by Constantine Karamanlis, who was recalled from self-exile in France to form a new civilian government. Nikos Sampson was replaced by Glafkos Klerides, the Speaker of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives. A lawyer and former RAF pilot, Klerides had a reputation for moderation and had demonstrated a talent for negotiation as his government's representative at the inter-communal talks which were held after the 1967 crisis.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 168-9

#### 4 Turkish Intervention, 1974

##### *Introductory Note*

In 1964 Turkey had ample and undeniable grounds for intervening in Cyprus in exercise of its function as a Guarantor of the bi-communal Republic established by agreement in 1960 (see Part III above). But it had at that time allowed itself to be restrained from intervening by the United States; and so again in 1967. Greece and the Greek Cypriots had as a result been allowed to get away with the violation and virtual abrogation of the 1960 settlement for a period of ten years. This had had the effect of establishing *de facto* in Cyprus a very different state of affairs from that which Turkey (and Greece and Britain) had guaranteed in 1960. In the end the very restraint which Turkey had shown in 1964 and 1967 worked to its disadvantage and served to lend colour to Greek allegations that Turkey's belated intervention in 1974 was an 'invasion' of an independent, internationally recognised Greek Cyprus.

##### (A) *The First Turkish Military Operation, 20 to 22 July*

V,21 ECEVIT, Bülent (then Prime Minister of Turkey)

*A coup d'état* has been carried out in Cyprus . . . Since the forces involved . . . were military units under the direct control of a foreign State, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus have been seriously endangered . . . The purpose of Turkey's peaceful action is to eliminate the threat to the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the rights of all Cypriots, and to restore the independence, territorial integrity and security of the island, and the order established by the basic articles of the Constitution . . . Turkey's purpose on Cyprus, which is a bi-communal State, is to get the intercommunal talks to start as rapidly as possible in order

to restore Cyprus to legitimate order and the situation before the coup.

Announcing the launching of the Turkish  
Peace Operation on 20 July 1974

V,22 OBERLING, Pierre (see V,7 above)

Later Kissinger (then Secretary of State in Washington) was to claim that he opposed making any public proclamation against the Sampson regime for fear of encouraging Turkey to intervene in the crisis. But it was the very fear that the United States was about to recognize the new Cypriot government that convinced the Turkish government to act with haste.

To make matters worse, the United States and Great Britain even prevented the United Nations from condemning the Greek-engineered putsch. The Security Council met in a special session on 16 July to debate the Cyprus issue, but it adjourned without taking action when the representatives of the two powers argued that too little information was available for it to come to any conclusion.

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On July 18, Ecevit, through the intermediary of Under-Secretary of State, Sisco, sent the Greek Government an ultimatum demanding:

- 1) The resignation of Nikos Sampson as President of Cyprus,
- 2) The withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard, and
- 3) Firm pledges to the effect that the island would remain independent.

However, the Junta, convinced that US pressure would, as before, dissuade the Turks from resorting to force, refused to give ground. . . .

*The Road to Bella Pais, pp 162-3*

V,23 ECEVIT, Bülent (then Prime Minister of Turkey)

The Turkish Armed Forces have started a peace operation in Cyprus this morning to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements. At the last stage of the Cyprus tragedy, these extremist elements have started massacring even their own people - the Greeks.

It is acknowledged in all the world that the coup which recently took place was manufactured by the dictatorial regime of Athens. In fact it was much more than a coup. It was the forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of the Cyprus Republic and of the international agreements on which this Republic was based.

Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus. Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility by taking this action. The Turkish Government did not resort to armed action before all the other means were tried, but to no avail.

This is not an invasion, but an act against invasion.

This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression.

The operations of peace that started with the breaking of the day, this morning, will bring an end to the darkest period in the history of Cyprus.

The victory of the Turkish Armed Forces will be a victory for justice, for peace, for freedom.

I appeal to all Greeks in Cyprus who have suffered the atrocities of terrorism and dictatorship. Bury with the past dark days the inter-communal enmities and strifes that were the making of those same terrorists. Join hand-in-hand with your Turkish brothers to speed up this victory and together build a new, free and happy Cyprus.

We are there to help you, not to hurt.

We are there with love, not with hate.

We are there not to fight you but to end your plight.

20 July 1974 *Dış politika* (Foreign Policy),  
Vol IV, nos 213, pp 226-7

V,24 UNITED NATIONS Security Council  
The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General at its 1779th meeting about the recent developments in Cyprus,

Having heard the statements made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements by the Representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other member countries,

Having considered at its present meeting further developments in the Island,

Deeply deploring the outbreak of conflict and continuing bloodshed,

Gravely concerned about the situation which led to a serious threat to international peace and security and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area.

Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus established and guaranteed by the International Agreements,

Recalling Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) of 4th March, 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council on this matter,

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations.

1 Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

2 Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3 Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of operative paragraph 1;

4 Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of International Agreements including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2nd July 1974;

5 Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

6 Calls upon all parties to co-operate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate;

7 Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974

*Editorial Note*

Yet more folly at the UN! Here was the Security Council, after all that had now happened in Cyprus, still recalling its resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 which, by giving recognition to the wholly Greek Cypriot administration as the lawful 'Government of Cyprus', had done much to encourage the Greek Cypriots in monopolising power and refusing to restore the bi-communality of the Republic established in 1960 and had thus also done much to precipitate the final violent dénouement. Yet at the same time this new resolution spoke of restoring the constitutional structure of the Republic 'established and guaranteed by the International Agreements' (and that could only mean the Zurich and London Agreements which the Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus' had violated and claimed to have abrogated). And again, by calling on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace and constitutional government, the resolution clearly implied that the Treaty of Guarantee was still extant and valid and that the three Guarantors still possessed their powers and obligations under it. From 1964 onwards the position taken up by the Council had been one-sided and unfair. It was now fatuous as well. By pretending that the 1960 settlement was still in force, while at the same time persisting in according legitimacy to the regime which had violated and over-thrown it, the Security Council was trying to eat its cake and have it. No wonder, that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, when asked by Callaghan, at the opening session of the First Geneva Conference: 'Does Turkey not recognise the Security Council resolution?', replied: 'We recognise only the "cease-fire" provisions of the resolution'. (M A Birand, *30 Hot days*, p 62)

(B) *The First Geneva Conference, 25 to 30 July*

V,25 BIRAND Mehmet Ali (Turkish journalist who, as *Milliyet's* correspondent, covered the crucial thirty days between the coup of 15 July and the breakdown of the Second Geneva Conference on 14 August; his account is based on his own observation, on interviews with the politicians, military men and officials involved – Turkish, Greek, British and American – and also on confidential documents and minutes made available to him by the authorities in Turkey; his book *30 Hot Days* has been commended by the Foreign Minister of Greece, George Mavros, who took part in the Geneva Conferences, by Archbishop Makarios and by the Greek Cypriot newspaper, AGON, and also by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders and by British historians specialising in Cyprus)

Geneva: The delegates assemble

Future historians will, doubtless, agree that the two Geneva Conferences of 1974 were held in conditions of tension and abnormality which have seldom been equalled; conditions so unstable that the danger of breakdown, and even of renewed fighting, were ever-present. Neither Turkey nor Greece had had adequate time to prepare for the conference. Nevertheless, there was an atmosphere of leniency between the two sides during its early days. In his reply to Ecevit's message, Karamanlis had affirmed his continued belief in Greco-Turkish co-operation and had referred to Ecevit as 'a figure of international repute'.

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According to officials of the Greek Foreign Ministry, the Greek delegation was instructed to insist that further advances by the Turkish troops should cease and no more reinforcements should be sent to the island; that the conference should fix the cease-fire line; that all foreign troops, including Greek officers, should be withdrawn; that the 1960 Constitution should be restored and that Makarios should return. This policy of trying to 'put the clock back' was persisted in right to the end and provided the text of all Mavros's speeches; but Turkey agreed only to the cease-fire call of the UN and rejected, in particular, the demand that her troops should be withdrawn. For the Turkish delegation, the important issue was the question of security. The Turkish forces on the island were confined to a very small area, while Greek-Cypriots were occupying Turkish-Cypriot villages and threatening some hundred thousand of their kinsmen with massacre.

Britain's sole desire was to bring the hostilities to an end, to persuade both sides to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards each other. The British delegation wished to act as arbitrators and, somehow, they managed to do so.

Günes's main concern was that, by resorting to delaying tactics at the conference table, the Greeks might contrive to rob the Turks of what they had gained so far. Turkey must not fall into such a snare. It was imperative, therefore, to settle the security issue first and take up the constitutional problems later, at a date to be fixed by the conference.

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Ecevit was still persisting in his efforts to bring about a political compact. He firmly believed that, provided the Greeks behaved reasonably and realistically, a settlement could be achieved by peaceful means, and recourse to a second operation would be unnecessary. He even planned to meet Karamanlis for a full discussion. But, as the proviso might not materialise, he approved the Army's action in going ahead with the preparations for phase II. The foothold secured in the first operation provided inadequate security for the Turkish units and none at all for Turkish-Cypriot villages scattered throughout the island. It was, therefore, important to be ready to rectify the position at once, should their hopes for a peaceful solution vanish.

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Günes: 'Mr Callaghan, today there is no government authority in Cyprus. First of all, we must fill this vacuum. Until constitutional order is restored,

certain provisional rules must be observed. (1) The Turkish-Cypriot regions must be administered by Turkish-Cypriots and the others by the Greek-Cypriots. (2) In order that the State Presidency may return to legality, Denktash's powers must be restored and he should be enabled to collaborate with Clerides. (3) The state of siege affecting Turkish-Cypriot villages must be ended. (4) We should meet again in 7 day's time to work out the establishment of a new order. (5) Let us create wide security zones round the Turkish units and the Turkish villages until a final settlement is reached. These are my proposals, if they are accepted, there will be no need for further Turkish troop movements.

*30 Hot Days, pp 59-60 and 66*

V,26 GENEVA DECLARATION of 30 July 1974

1 The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland held negotiations in Geneva from 25-30 July 1974. They recognised the importance of setting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularise within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis, having regard to the international agreements signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 and to Resolution 353 of the Security Council of the United Nations. They were, however, agreed on the need to decide first on certain immediate measures.

2 The three Foreign Ministers declared that in order to stabilise the situation the areas in the Republic of Cyprus controlled by opposing armed forces on 30 July 1974 at 2200 hours Geneva time should not be extended. They called on all forces, including irregular forces, to desist from all offensive or hostile activities.

3 The three Foreign Ministers also concluded that the following measures should be put into immediate effect:

a) A security zone of sizes to be determined by Representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in consultation with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at the time specified in paragraph 2 above. This zone should be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which should supervise the prohibition of entry.

Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces should be entered by no forces.

b) All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot Forces should be immediately evacuated. These enclaves will continue to be protected by UNFICYP and to have their previous security arrangements.

Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish Armed Forces shall continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and may, as before, maintain their own police and security forces.

c) In mixed villages the functions of security and police will be carried out by UNFICYP.

d) Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent

hostilities shall be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross within the shortest time possible.

4 The three Foreign Ministers, reaffirming that Resolution 353 of the Security Council should be implemented in the shortest possible time, agreed that within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all the parties concerned and as peace, security and mutual confidence are established in the Republic of Cyprus, measures should be elaborated which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armaments, munitions and other war material in the Republic of Cyprus.

5 Deeply conscious of their responsibilities as regards the maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, the three Foreign Ministers agreed that negotiations, as provided for in Resolution 353 of the Security Council, should be carried on with the least possible delay to secure (a) the restoration of peace in the area and (b) the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus. To this end they agreed that further talks should begin on 8 August 1974 at Geneva. They also agreed that representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities should at an early stage, participate in the talks relating to the constitution. Among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution. The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation the Ministers agreed to consider at their next meeting the problems raised by their existence.

6 The three Foreign Ministers agreed to convey the contents of this declaration to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to invite him to take appropriate action in the light of it. They also expressed their conviction of the necessity that the fullest co-operation should be extended to all concerned in the Republic of Cyprus in carrying out its terms.

#### *Editorial Note*

The following statement was also signed by the three Foreign Ministers in addition to their Declaration:

The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made it clear that the adherence of their Governments to the declaration of today's date in no way prejudiced their respective views on the interpretation or application of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee or their rights and obligations under that Treaty.

V,27 BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

The signing ceremony was followed by press conferences. Mavros praised Güneş and emphasised the importance of the Turco-Greek accord. He declared that his country wanted nothing but peace, and concluded: 'These two countries are destined to live together as friends.' For his part,

Callaghan told reporters: 'In a week's time, on August 8th, there will be a second conference in which the leaders of the two Cypriot communities will participate; and this will restore constitutional order to the island. The formation of two separate autonomous administrations has been accepted and the issues raised by this decision will be discussed at that conference. The conditions of siege to which Turkish-Cypriot villages have been subjected are to be lifted and, meanwhile, pending the full restoration of constitutional order, both sides will be allowed to provision and maintain their units on the island.'

Speaking to the Turkish journalists, Güneş said: 'I can state with complete assurance that there is no longer any question of a return to the old state of affairs in Cyprus. A victory has been achieved here in Geneva.'

*30 Hot Days, p 76*

(C) *Interim, 31 July to 7 August*

V,28 BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

The atmosphere of relief which was created by the signing of the agreement did not last long. Progressive changes in the attitudes of the two sides killed the second conference before it was born and each felt completely justified in its actions. If I am not gravely mistaken, neither Turkey nor Greece wanted a second clash. If one had to choose a single cause for the early death of the second Geneva conference and the launching, by Turkey, of the second phase of her intervention, then it would be the lack of communication between the two sides. Only a high-level meeting could have removed the extreme suspicion and distrust which dogged the two opponents. The political situation in Greece was also a major factor in the course taken by subsequent developments.

*Dissentient voices in Athens*

As soon as the platonic reactions of the first day wore off, the real opposition began to show itself. The left-wing parties and the papers – which were not entirely happy over the selection of Karamanlis – began to describe the agreement as a disgrace while the Greek-Cypriots took the view that 'Greece has let us down'. Even Clerides declared that 'there are many ambiguities in the agreement'. Kyprianou, the former Greek-Cypriot Foreign Minister, who had been sent from London by Makarios to see Karamanlis, told reporters that the first Geneva conference was far too negative and that more care must be exercised at the next one. As the spate of criticism increased, Karamanlis, whose first concern was the survival of his regime, found his freedom of manoeuvre severely restricted.

The situation in Ankara was very different. Güneş was given such a tumultuous welcome that he felt it necessary to emphasise that they were still only at the beginning of things. The absence of Erbakan from the welcoming ceremonies was noted. He was known to be displeased with the Geneva agreement, against holding the second conference and in favour of

the immediate implementation of Phase II. His views were thus diametrically opposed to those of Ecevit. Nor was Erbakan's the only disapproving voice. Apart from the Reliance Party, all the opposition parties had come up with demands such as 'Partition is essential', 'We want the Dodecanese', 'We want Salonika!' They came within an ace of demanding the occupation of Greece itself! These were just wild gestures and Turkish public opinion gave them no heed.

### *Cyprus*

In Cyprus, the outlook was bleak indeed. Turkish reinforcements were steadily arriving. In their restricted bridgehead there were 240 tanks, 400 armoured vehicles and some 30,000 troops, including one of Turkey's crack regiments, the 28th. The Turkish-Cypriot villages were still besieged and Clerides, having little control over events, could do even less about it. Sampson was still at large, making provocative speeches and increasing tension; while Makarios was busy helping to worsen the situation through messages urging the Greek-Cypriots to resist and make no concessions.

### *Hardening stand in Athens*

Greece's prestige had increased and, in view of the strong stand being taken by his party, Mavros realised that he would have no mandate to sign an agreement. In a sternly worded statement, issued three days before the second conference, Mavros said: 'The firing has not ceased; Turkey is constantly violating the agreement. How on earth can I go to Geneva?' Athens was, in fact, having second thoughts about the second conference. In Turkey, Günesh was accusing the Greeks of not having retreated from the Turkish villages, while Ecevit was saying that the conference might not materialise after all.

Greater interest was aroused, however, by a request to Britain for help. I learned from British diplomats in Athens that the British Ambassador had been approached by the Greek Foreign Ministry who had put the point: 'Our forces in the island are very weak, while Turkey is strengthening hers all the time. We want to send 20,000 troops and armoured vehicles to restore the balance. For this, air support is needed.' Britain's reply was immediately forthcoming. Callaghan answered: 'Right from the start, Britain has refused to take sides. We shall not depart from that decision'.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had offered to support Greece in taking the matter to the United Nations. Greece was willing to accept help from anybody and there was feverish diplomatic activity in Athens resulting in formal complaint being lodged with the UN Security Council, with the support of the Eastern bloc. However, America and Britain, particularly the latter, persuaded Greece to attend the second Geneva conference before pursuing the matter in New York. Callaghan, in an attempt to avert any last-minute surprises, announced: 'I am going to Geneva, and whoever wishes to come, too, may do so.' The West clearly did not want the UN to play a leading role as this would bring the Soviet Union into the act.

(D) *The Second Geneva Conference, 8 to 14 August**Introductory Note*

The Conference foundered on the refusal of Greece, the Greek Cypriots and Britain to accept that a settlement should be based on 'the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community', (which the Foreign Ministers of the three Guarantor Powers had noted in their Declaration of 30 July at the end of the First Geneva Conference – see V,26 above). Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had come to Geneva expecting that this would be the basis of the settlement to be negotiated there. They reacted with alarm and suspicion to what seemed to them to be back-sliding on the part of Greece, and, even more, of Britain.

In the course of the Second Conference, the Greek Cypriot representative, Glafcos Clerides, appeared at one point to have agreed with Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot representative in bilateral meetings they had between 10 and 12 August that 'there should be a fundamental revision of the governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus' and that this revision should 'result in the establishment of a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within suitable boundaries, united under a central government'. But when he presented to the Conference on 13 August his proposal to give effect to this agreement, it amounted to no more than allowing each community to administer at a local level the towns and villages where it had a majority of the population. This was not at all the regional autonomy, bi-zonal or cantonal, which the Turks had in mind and which they had assumed would be the basis of the settlement foreshadowed in the Geneva Declaration of 30 July. Nor surely, was it what the signatories of the Declaration could have had in mind when noting 'the existence of two autonomous administrations' in Cyprus. Moreover, when Clerides stated the Greek Cypriot position at a plenary session on 10 August, he called for a return to the constitutional order of 1960, which the Greek Cypriot leadership (including Clerides himself) had overturned in 1964 and had progressively dismantled in the following years of Greek Cypriot majority rule. In a strictly legalistic sense, 'putting the clock back' to 1960 was logical enough; after all, Turkey itself had justified its intervention by reference to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (which, however, the Greek Cypriots claimed to have abrogated). But it was asking too much of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to expect them to accept any such belated recantation by the Greek Cypriots (particularly since there was no guarantee that the Archbishop would endorse it) and then to leave it to new intercommunal negotiations to work out a final settlement. They had experienced too much prevarication and procrastination in the past and were resolved on reaching a settlement 'here and now'. However, the British Foreign Secretary, Callaghan, is reported by Turkish sources to have endorsed Clerides' position and to have declared, 'this conference is not empowered to discuss amendments to the Cyprus Constitution'. (M A Birand, *30 Hot Days*, p 91). For the Turks that spelt the end of the Conference. During the past ten years Britain had acquiesced in the amendments unilaterally imposed by the Greek Cypriots and had recognised the legitimacy of the regime resulting from this unilateral action.

Beyond that, if the Conference (attended by Greece and Turkey, the authors of the 1960 Constitution) was not empowered to discuss amendments to it, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives had even less authority to do so, since the 1960 Constitution had specifically prohibited the Cypriots from making any change in the

'basic articles' agreed at Zurich between Greece and Turkey. It was far too late for Britain, having signally failed in its undertaking to uphold the Constitution when it was overthrown in 1964, to begin insisting now, ten years later, on an exact return to the legitimacy of 1960.

At the time of the breakdown of the Second Conference, it was widely reported and widely accepted that Turkey had refused to give Greece and the Greek Cypriots even the '36 hours' they had asked for to study Turkey's final proposals. Ecevit himself has denied this. On 13 August he offered, through Kissinger, to give them 'not only 36 hours but 36 days', provided that a no-man's-land was established around the area held by the Turkish forces and provided that this area was immediately evacuated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. This offer was not taken up.

The primary cause of the breakdown of the Conference was that neither Greece nor Clerides were then prepared to face reality and concede the principle of regional autonomy because they knew that, if they did so, they would be denounced by Archbishop Makarios and his supporters. Unwisely, the British Foreign Secretary encouraged them in their short-sighted failure to grasp the truly conciliatory offer of a cantonal system made by the Government of Turkey.

At a later stage in the course of the Conference (on 13 August, the day before it collapsed) Callaghan is reported by Turkish sources to have argued that it was, after all, the job of the Conference to discuss amending the constitution: 'This conference, which is being held within the framework of Security Council resolution No 353, carries no wider powers than rectifying and improving the 1960 Constitution. Anything beyond that really concerns only the two Cypriot communities'. (M A Birand, *30 Hot Days*, p 108). But that again was no less unrealistic than his earlier dictum that the Conference was *not* empowered to discuss amendments to the Constitution. If the Conference could not address the basic issues involved in 'the existence in practice of two autonomous administrations', it was idle to suppose that the Cypriots by themselves would be able to do so. Whichever of these two contrary views truly reflected Britain's position, neither gave the Conference any effective role towards restoring peace and political co-operation between the two sides in Cyprus.

#### V,29 MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (London)

Although not participating directly in the talks, the uncompromising spirit of Makarios weighed heavily over the Greek Cypriot delegation. Greece itself was in the throes of political convulsions following the removal of the junta. There was little co-ordination, little awareness of Turkey's determination and the unfortunate overconfidence that somehow, unbelievably, the status quo could be restored, mainly with pressure from Britain and the United States. The Turks had gone to Geneva with definite demands and a firm blueprint which they were not about to change. Greek Cypriot demands for 'additional consultations' were reminiscent of years of political haggling during which the Greek side had not yielded an inch.

*Cyprus: Minority Rights Group Report No 30*  
(1976), p 6

#### V,30 BIRAND Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

The Makarios faction was also becoming more self-assertive. The antipathy between Karamanlis and the Archbishop was widely known and

Makarios, in London, was declaring that he would have both Clerides and Karamanlis branded as traitors and, further, that he would accept no agreement that was signed without his prior approval. In this, he had the support of Mavros who believed that the Greek Cypriots would never identify themselves with anything of which Makarios did not approve. In these circumstances, the Karamanlis Government decided not to sign any agreement at the second Geneva conference. Mavros would insist on the full implementation of the cease-fire and the creation of the buffer zone, but would go no further. Having thus exposed Turkey to world opinion and sealed off the Turkish forces, Greece would then demand the discussion of the constitutional issues between Clerides and Denktash. Intent on carrying out these delaying tactics, Mavros left for Geneva.

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The Conference that died at birth

The second Geneva conference was due to begin on August 8th. At Geneva airport, both foreign ministers made statements intended for foreign consumption. The journalists showed sympathy with Mavros and seemed to share his views, but they had some very harsh questions for Güneş. Clearly the ceasefire infractions were all that the world thought important. No-one was aware that the Greeks had made no move towards lifting the siege on the Turkish villages. Through the eyes of the world press, Turkey was looked on as the country which defied the world by refusing to adhere to the provisions of an agreement to which she had signed her name.

Mavros harshly criticised Turkey and declared that the first task of the conference would be to see that the provisions of the agreement reached at the previous conference were implemented.

Güneş, for his part, accused Greece of not implementing the clauses concerned with the withdrawal of Greek troops from the Turkish villages. He, too, did not mince his words. To the reporters he made it quite clear that his Government would not tolerate protracted talks at Geneva and that, unless Turkey's demands were complied with, the second peace operation would be launched.

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According to the programme, the foreign ministers were to discuss general principles until Saturday (10 August), when they would be joined by Clerides and Denktash and the conference would assume an intercommunal character.

*30 Hot Days, pp 79, 80-81 and 82*

V,31 GÜNEŞ, Turan (then Foreign Minister of Turkey)

We believe that these two communities can live peacefully together only under a federal roof; they will have one nationality but two autonomous administrations. Under British rule, the Greek Cypriots were treated as first-class citizens, the Turks as second-class. In 1960, equality of status was established, but clashes followed. We wish to see both communities living in an independent, sovereign and territorially integral island. When this aim

has been realised, Turkey will withdraw her forces from Cyprus.

Speaking to the Soviet Observer at Geneva before the Conference, *30 Hot Days*, p 81

V,32 ECEVIT, Bülent (then Prime Minister of Turkey)

A solution that is not based on geographical separation will not work. It is out of the question for us to entrust the safety of the Turkish-Cypriots to the Greeks, who cannot even rule themselves. The areas round the Turkish forces are being steadily mined while the Turkish villages are still under siege. In these circumstances, the world must now have a better understanding of the reasons for our insistence on a safety zone. We hope that both the British and the Greeks will make an objective assessment of the situation that will enable them to understand our position. Even Clerides has admitted that he has little control over some sections of the Greek forces.

In an appeal issued at the beginning of the Second Geneva Conference, M A Birand, *30 Hot Days*, p 87

V,33 GÜNEŞ, Turan (see V,31 above)

At 1800 hours (sc. on 9 August) a momentous meeting took place between Callaghan and Güneş. Güneş: 'Turkey wants only one thing; acceptance of the principle of regional autonomy. If this is agreed on, we should at least be able to outline the two regions before we leave Geneva.'

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Callaghan drew Güneş's attention to Makarios's stiffening attitude and his open threats against both Clerides and Karamanlis if they signed an agreement on federation. Güneş: 'We can't put off a settlement just for fear that Makarios won't like it.'

M A Birand, *30 Hot Days*, p 87

V,34 BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

Callaghan: 'How shall we tackle the constitutional issue?' At this point, Clerides who had been listening attentively, dealt the death-blow to the conference, he said: 'I have listened carefully to what the Turkish Foreign Minister had to say and Clause 5 of the Geneva agreement is still not clear. Will the new Government be based on the 1960 Constitution? If the Turkish armed forces carried out their intervention in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, it means that Turkey aims at reviving the 1960 constitutional order. She should, therefore, respect the 1960 Constitution and the order it advocates. If she does not agree to this interpretation, it means that she harbours other ambitions. We are prepared to form a government comprising Greek and Turkish-Cypriots within the framework of the principles envisaged by the 1960 Constitution but you must realise that this cannot be done under armed threats.'

Callaghan at once approved and endorsed Clerides's attitude, but declared: 'This conference is not empowered to discuss amendments to the

Cyprus Constitution.' So that was that and, so far as Turkey was concerned, this last utterance by Callaghan served only to hasten the end of the conference. Turan Güneş had, indeed, lost all hope in the conference. Clerides was practically a prisoner of Makarios, who never agreed to anything. In the hope of clearing his country of any responsibility and, at the same time, putting more pressure on Turkey, Callaghan supported Clerides, saying: 'England cannot suggest amendments to the Constitution of an independent country . . .'

Denktash: 'We cannot revert to the 1960 order which resulted in the torture of Turks over the years. We thought that the Sampson coup would have served as a lesson, but in vain. We have been living in agony since 1960. A Constitution which is unable to protect a community is nothing but a piece of paper. We no longer wish to live in fear of our lives.'

'-- -- these speeches have caused me no surprise at all. I have known all the speakers for years; I grew up among them. They do not keep to their word. We have been suffering hardships for the past 15 years. Clerides says he does not recognise the authority of the Geneva Conference; why then is he here? Mavros's stand is even worse. Greece violated the agreement almost as soon as it was signed. They now say, 'Let us return to the 1960 order.' Only WE know what we suffered in those days. Clerides is the best of them; at least he is fair. But they also have a bunch of murderers with whom no-one can cope.'

*30 Hot Days, p 91*

V,35 OBERLING, Pierre (see V,7 above)

What was becoming increasingly obvious was that Foreign Secretary Callaghan was encouraging the Greeks in their intransigence. The Secretary, who had had a tendency to favour the Turkish position at the First Geneva Conference (in an apparent effort at placating the Turks, who had just landed in Cyprus), was now favouring the Greek position (in an apparent effort at buttressing the new democratic regime in Athens): As a result, even Klerides who, at the beginning of the talks, seemed ready to accept a solution which would have satisfied the minimum requirements of the Turkish Cypriots, gradually toughened his stand.

*The Road to Bella Pais, p 178*

V,36 GÜNEŞ, Turan (then Foreign Minister of Turkey)

Clerides is now questioning the authority of this conference. If he insists on his views and does not show some flexibility we shall be unable to resolve the issue. A return to an inter-communal talks marathon, with no time limit, is out of the question.

Speaking to Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister (M A Birand, *30 Hot Days, p 92*)

We know from experience what will come out of inter-communal talks.

We refuse to be trapped again in the same vicious circle.

Speaking to Kissinger's envoy, Hartman, at Geneva (M A Birand, *30 Hot Days*, p 94)

V,37 BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

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All the morning there was feverish activity among the delegations and the Turkish side finally produced two separate proposals: a bi-regional federation put forward by Denktash, and a cantonal system by Turkey.

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Callaghan: 'Mr Güneş, I have seen the plan proposed by Denktash; Clerides cannot agree to dividing the island into two.' Güneş: 'We have drafted an alternative plan which provides for a main region and five cantons. We would feel satisfied if the borders of the main region were specified now and those of the cantons later . . . We do not intend to include important towns and harbours. You cannot say we are not flexible.'

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Güneş (explaining the cantonal proposal to Hartman, Kissinger's representative at Geneva): 'Our insisting on fixing the boundaries of the main region, which amounts to only 17% of the island, cannot be called unreasonable'.

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Güneş had thus clearly explained his country's stand to the British and the Americans. In abandoning the idea of a bi-regional federation, Turkey was making a hazardous good-will gesture, but she could not afford to wait for long. If she allowed time to slip by, the justice of her cause might be forgotten and eventually world opinion might turn against her. Why had Turkey intervened in Cyprus? To rectify an injustice. This had won her the applause of everyone, including Russia. She now controlled some territory but it was very small, and the Turkish-Cypriot community was still groaning outside it. Unless Turkey carried out the second phase, the entire operation would be imperilled by a Greek refusal to come to some agreement. World opinion was largely unacquainted with the situation in the island and was unaware of the military aspects; which was why Turkey could not satisfactorily explain the need for the second operation.

Why was Ecevit showing such remarkable flexibility in proposing a cantonal system? He hoped to prove that Turkey was not aiming at conquest and did not intend to impose a solution on a defeated side in the manner of a conqueror . . . He was hoping against hope that Greece and the Greek-Cypriots might grasp the gravity of the situation so that there would be no need for the second operation. For them, this was a golden opportunity.

*30 Hot Days*, pp 95-8

*Editorial Note*

Both Güneş and Denktash suggested at Geneva that the total area of the Turkish

Cypriot region would be about 34% of the whole island. Greek and Greek Cypriot commentators have argued that this was unreasonable, having regard to the relative size of the two communities, and hence that this alone was sufficient reason for the Greek side to reject the Turkish proposals. No-one can now say how far the percentage of 34% may have been no more than a first bargaining figure from the Turkish side since their intentions were never put to the test. However, some years later, in a letter to Denktash, Ecevit confirmed that all he was insisting on at that initial stage was that the main Turkish-Cypriot region should be not less than 17%, the size of the subsidiary cantons being left open for negotiation. Even so, the end result would undeniably have been to leave in Turkish Cypriot hands an area larger than could be justified on the sole basis of the ratio of population. The Turkish Cypriots argued that other factors, beside population, had to be taken into account in fixing the size of the regions, viz. economic viability or productivity and land ownership, and this was later conceded by Archbishop Makarios in the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977. What is undeniable is that, if the Greek side had accepted Ecevit's cantonal proposal at Geneva, they would have been left with much more land than they still held at the end of the second round of fighting – and with a much smaller and more manageable problem of Greek Cypriot refugees.

V,38 CLERIDES, Glafcos (representing the Greek Cypriots at Geneva)

Mr Glafkos Klerides and Mr Rauf Denktash, having conferred at Geneva between August 10 and 12, 1974, have agreed that a fundamental revision of the governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to provide the conditions in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will be able to co-exist in peace in the Republic with an utter and mutual confidence that the security of all will be safeguarded. They have agreed that this revision must result in the establishment of a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within suitable boundaries, united under a central government. They have also agreed that these changes will be effected within the framework of a sovereign, independent and united Cyprus Republic.

Reporting on the outcome of his talks at  
Geneva with Denktash, 13 August 1974  
(P Oberling, op cit p 178)

1 The constitutional order of Cyprus shall retain its bi-communal character based on the co-existence of the Greek and Turkish communities within the framework of a sovereign, independent and integral Republic.

2 This constitutional order shall, through an appropriate revision and the active co-operation and free consent of the two communities, ensure an enhanced feeling of security for both.

3 The co-existence of the two communities shall be achieved in the context of institutional arrangements regarding an agreed allocation of powers and functions between the Central Government having competence over state affairs and the respective autonomous Communal Administrations exercising their powers on all other matters within areas to be established as in paragraph (5) herein below provided.

4 The structure of the Central Government shall continue to be based on the presidential regime.

5 The Greek and Turkish Communal Administrations shall exercise their powers and functions in areas consisting respectively of the purely Greek and Turkish villages and municipalities. For the purposes of communal administration such villages and municipalities may be grouped together by the respective communal authorities. For the same purpose *mixed villages* shall come under the communal authorities of the community to which the majority of their inhabitants belong.

6 Legislative authority over the respective Communal Administrations shall be exercised by the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives constituted in separate Councils for this purpose.

13 August 1974

Proposal presented to the Geneva Conference purportedly in pursuance of his discussion with Denktash (Polyvios G Polyviou, *CYPRUS The Tragedy and the Challenge*, p 180)

V,39 DENKTASH, Rauf and CLERIDES, Glafcos

Denktash: 'For goodness sake! These are no different from the provisions we asked for during the inter-communal talks (sc. between 1968 and 1974) and that you then rejected.'

Clerides: 'Doesn't this at least prove my intentions?'

Denktash: 'Don't you understand? Blood has been shed on the island. We now find ourselves here because we have, for years, been unable to get you to accept a regime which would inspire mutual confidence. Don't think that the intervention was carried out just to bring the inter-communal talks to a successful conclusion. How can I accept your offer?'

Clerides: 'Rauf, you are well aware of the attitude of the Archbishop and of Eoka-B.'

Discussing in the Conference the proposals Clerides had submitted (see above), 13 August 1974 (M A Birand, op cit, p 102)

V,40 ECEVIT, Bülent (then Turkish Prime Minister, speaking with KISSINGER, then US Secretary of State)

Ecevit fully realised that the Greeks were only playing for time and that, if it were denied them, they would make effective propaganda on the theme 'We asked for only 36 hours and they wouldn't grant it.' Counter-measures were necessary, but he could not just say NO! and march. He presented Kissinger with a brand-new suggestion.

Ecevit: 'Let them affirm that they accept our basic demands in principle, that is, either a cantonal or a bi-regional system; let us establish a no-man's-land around the area held by the Turkish forces. The talks can then proceed. While they are taking place, I can pledge not to send any more troops to the island. We can wait until the borders of the other cantons are fixed.'

Kissinger: 'Are you prepared to allow them the 36 hours if they accept this proposal?'

Ecevit: 'Not only 36 hours but 36 days, provided they immediately evacuate the demilitarised area.'

Turkey was thus making another move towards solving the affair at the conference table. Kissinger was pleased, for it struck him as a realistic and constructive gesture. He said: 'I will contact them immediately. Please take no action until you know the outcome of my efforts.'

Ecevit: 'They must give their answer by tonight.' Ecevit had, in this way, deprived the Greeks of their most important trump card in the field of world propaganda, for they could hardly reject his proposal and still make capital out of a refusal of 36 hours grace. Moreover, the creation of the buffer zone would give the Turkish army more breathing space and give them more security, while also bringing some consolation to the thousands still besieged in Sinde and Famagusta. The plan had the blessing of the General Staff HQ.

Following this telephone conversation, Kissinger had a round of talks with all concerned, during which he explained to each of them the advantages which the Greeks, and especially the Greek-Cypriots, would derive from acceptance of the Turkish proposals. But his day-long efforts to secure acceptance got no support from Callaghan who, on the plea of wishing to remain neutral, hoped to exert pressure on Turkey to abandon a further operation. According to the Americans, it was this unwillingness that eventually led to the second Turkish operation.

13 August 1974

(M A Birand, op cit, p 104)

V,41 BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (see V,25 above)

Meanwhile, five angry men were engaged in bargaining over the fate of one small island. They were seeking to divide it up, each side hoping for the lion's share. But the surgeons taking part in this carve-up were like deaf men or people talking on different wave-lengths. They had been subjected to mistrust for so long that they could no longer recognise reality. The real culprits, however, were not present at the conference. Those were the leaders and rulers who had precipitated the present situation on the island by acquiescing in massacres, plots and conspiracies which served ideologies and petty interests. In the middle of events, crushed and pushed from place to place, blameless and not knowing what was taking place, the people of Cyprus could only look on.

*30 Hot Days*, p 105

V,42 GÜNEŞ, Turan (then Turkish Foreign Minister)

'I must have been misunderstood once more. I am not saying you should accept my proposals; I am merely asking you to discuss them with me. We may agree on some points, disagree on others. It is only then we need time for consultations. Surely, it is not an offence to wish to hear the views of both Mr Mavros and Mr Clerides.'

replying to a protest from Mavros that the

Greek side was not being given time to consider the Turkish proposals, 13 August 1974 (M A Birand, *op cit*, p 107)

- V,43 DENKTASH, Rauf (representing the Turkish Cypriots at Geneva)  
 'What we want is to create another Switzerland in the Mediterranean. . . . I am a Turk and a Cypriot, but I cannot survive without the support of Turkey. Clerides is in much the same position; he draws his support from Greece. The issue can be resolved only through their assistance. Let us put aside all pretence and set up a new regime'. . . .

at the Geneva Conference 13 August 1974  
 (M A Birand, *op cit*, pp 107-108)

- V,44 CALLAGHAN, James (then British Foreign Secretary)  
 Callaghan: 'I share Denktash's views to a great extent, but I am also worried lest this conference end in failure. This conference, which is being held within the framework of Security Council resolution No 353, carries no wider powers than rectifying and improving the 1960 Constitution. Anything beyond that really concerns only the two Cypriot communities. I feel that Turkey is on the wrong track. If a decision is to be reached tonight, I am not ready for it either. Clerides has a right to ask for time. I support him. Don't forget my words, Mr Güneş, 'Today Cyprus is the prisoner of your army; tomorrow your army will be the prisoner of Cyprus.'

The atmosphere suddenly became tense. Callaghan's words were not the sort that a Foreign Minister could utter lightly. However Güneş did not take up the matter which, in normal times, might have led to the disruption of relations between the two countries; but, some of the Turkish delegates muttered 'The Turkish army is not made of chocolate' and 'Has the man gone mad?' Fortunately, these remarks were made in a whisper – and in Turkish.

at the Geneva Conference, 13 August 1974  
 (M A Birand, *op cit*, p 108)

- V,45 GÜNEŞ, Turan (then Foreign Minister of Turkey)  
 'For 20 years, while the Greek-Cypriot weapons were trained on the Turkish community, and under constant threat of Turkish intervention, the Cyprus problem has been debated backwards and forwards. Forgetting the conditions under which the inter-communal talks were held, you now only speak of Turkish threats. Had we intended to resolve the issue by force, we would not have asked for the convening of this second Geneva Conference. Those who know what has gone on here cannot argue that we favour a military solution'. . . .

Speaking at the final session of the Conference shortly before it broke down, 14 August 1974  
 (M A Birand, *op cit*, p 113)

## V,46 OBERLING, Pierre (see V,7 above)

The private meetings having yielded no appreciable results, Foreign Minister Güneş, on August 13, called for a plenary session, where he formally presented his two proposals for immediate approval or rejection. Although both proposals had already been rejected by the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives, he wanted that rejection to be official. But Foreign Minister Mavros and Acting President Klerides instead asked for a 48-hour adjournment of the conference, ostensibly to consult their own governments. This, in turn, was unacceptable to Professor Güneş and, consequently, the conference broke down. At a news conference at Geneva, on August 14, Denktash, explained that the request for an adjournment was rejected because the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots suspected that the Greeks would take advantage of it to bring Makarios back to Cyprus and to reinforce their troops on the island. They had also come to the conclusion that the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were simply not yet ready to negotiate realistically and were still hedging on the key question of bi-zonality. 'I think Mr Clerides could have averted what happened . . . by conceding one principle', Denktash maintained, 'namely, that the Turks are entitled to full security and (that) this can (only) be provided by a geographical area'.

While the Second Geneva Conference was floundering, the Turks were becoming increasingly irritated by the failure of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to abide by the Agreement of July 30. During the Conference the latter, as a 'gesture of goodwill', started withdrawing from a handful of occupied villages around Limassol and Larnaca. However, this was but a token gesture. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots remained in captivity, some 80 villages remained in Greek Cypriot hands, and some 60 more villages remained cut off from the rest of the island and all hope of relief by the National Guard and EOKA-B. Accordingly, as soon as he learned of the collapse of the talks in Geneva, Premier Ecevit launched a new 'peace operation' in Cyprus.

*The Road to Bella Pais, pp 180-1*

## V,47 DENKTASH, Rauf

The Greek Cypriot representative had gone to Geneva with a large and widely representative team of experts and advisers which obviated the necessity for any consultation in Nicosia. It was obvious that the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives were trying to gain time in order to regroup their forces in the island and to muster enough international support to lever the Turkish peace force out of Cyprus. The Turkish side possessed information that the Greeks were laying mines around the Turkish areas and bringing new forces from Greece. The Turkish forces occupied an uncomfortably small, triangular region between Kyrenia and Nicosia and the area was vulnerable from both flanks. Turkey's request for a no-man's-land around the Turkish forces was rejected. The time factor was vitally important and therefore Turkey insisted on an agreement at least in principle. Moreover, the Greek side was not willing to compromise. News of

genocide in the Messaoria electrified the whole situation and so, on 14 August 1974, the second Turkish operation began.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, p 73

(E) *The Second Turkish Military Operation, 14 to 16 August*

V,48 ECEVIT, Bülent (then Prime Minister of Turkey)

The objective of this operation is not to destroy the State of Cyprus but to contribute to the re-building, on a sounder basis, of the State which was destroyed and to ensure its territorial integrity . . . The objective of this operation is to end the long sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots and to enable them to live freely on their own soil, in a way befitting human dignity . . . Our objective is not against Greece or against the Greek Cypriot community. We intend to establish a balanced society in Cyprus, which will enable Greeks and Turks to co-operate and prosper under equal conditions.

Announcing the Second Operation, 14 August 1974, (quoted in Z Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p 86)

Having reached the conclusion that there is no use but only harm in maintaining the appearance of continuing a conference that is being internationally obstructed and the deliberations of which are unilaterally violated, Turkey has considered it her duty to fulfil by herself her prerogatives and duties as a guarantor power, and her responsibilities concerning the independence of Cyprus as well as the rights and security of the Turkish Cypriot people.

The action now undertaken by Turkey is at least as rightful and legal as the action she started on July 20, as a guarantor power and strictly within the bounds of her authority as such a power, for the same conditions exist today as on the 20 July – conditions that formed the basis of the rightfulness and legality of her action. This new Turkish action is as legitimate as Turkey's initial move and is its logical conclusion.

(quoted in Rauf Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, pp 73-4)

V,49 DENKTASH, Rauf

After a three-day action, freeing Turkish areas and preventing massacres, the Turkish forces stopped their operation on 16 August 1974.

Following the ceasefire on 16 August 1974, Turkey invited Greece and the Greek Cypriots to a new conference between the three guarantor powers and the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities for a discussion on a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Premier Ecevit reiterated that Turkey would be understanding and flexible on the revision of the demarcation line and would speed up the phased reduction of her forces. However, Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected the offer.

The trail of blood and mass graves discovered after the second operation horrified not only the Turks but also the international mass media. Virtually the entire population of three Turkish villages (Aloa, Sandallaris and Maratha), including young babies and men and women in their 80s, had been massacred and dumped in mass graves. Eighty-four male Turkish Cypriots, between 13 and 74 years of age, had been taken away from the villages of Tokhni, Mari and Ziyi and machine-gunned outside Pallodia in the Limassol District. The German newspaper *Die Zeit* wrote on 30 July: 'The massacres of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta are the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention'.

Perhaps the most significant confirmation justifying Turkey's intervention came from Nicos Sampson himself. In an interview with the Athens newspaper *Apoyemmatini* on 15 July 1975, the first anniversary of the coup, he disclosed that he was 'about to declare Enosis' when he was forced to quit the presidency. This illustrates the gravity of the threat to independence of Cyprus immediately after the coup and the danger of a full-scale war between Turkey and Greece.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, pp 74-5

V,50 OBERLING, Pierre (see V,7 above)

In Cyprus itself, the Second Peace Operation caused a major social and political upheaval. At his news conference on August 14, Premier Ecevit asserted that the aim of the operation was 'to put an end to the suffering the Turkish Cypriots have had to endure over the years'. This was a worthy goal and there was probably no other way of achieving it. But the immediate result of the offensive was to put in jeopardy the lives of the very people the Turks were trying to protect. Indeed, as the Turkish army fought its way towards Famagusta, the National Guard and EOKA-B, in a paroxysm of anger and frustration, indulged in wholesale massacres of defenceless Turkish Cypriot villagers, which surpassed in brutality even the mass killings of the previous month.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, p 184

V,51 CRAWSHAW, Nancy

In Cyprus itself the Turkish invasion marked the climax of the struggle for union with Greece which had begun more than one hundred years earlier. The Greek Cypriots had paid dearly in the cause of Enosis: in terms of human suffering the cost to both communities was beyond calculation.

*The Cyprus Revolt*, p 396

(F) *A justifiable intervention?*

*Editorial Note*

Since 1974 there has been much argument about whether the Turkish military operations were a legitimate intervention within the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee or whether they were an 'invasion' (implying an unlawful use of military power). The Greeks brand them as an invasion, usually appending the epithet 'brutal'. This

assumes that an invasion is by definition bad and unjustifiable (which is not how the Allies viewed their invasion of Europe in 1944), whereas an intervention is good and justifiable (which is not how many, including Archbishop Makarios, viewed Greece's 'intervention' in Cyprus affairs in the period leading up to the 1974 Coup). Moreover, if the Turkish action was wrong legally and morally, what does that say for the Greek action in sending secretly a large armed force from Greece to Cyprus at the Archbishop's behest in 1964-5? At least the Turks claim, rightly or wrongly, that their action was undertaken in the exercise of their obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, claimed no such legitimacy for their 'invasion' and indeed admitted that 'our aim . . . is the abolition of the Zurich and London Agreements' . . . ie the very opposite of a legitimate intervention under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee (see the letter from Archbishop Makarios to Prime Minister George Papandreou quoted in Part III,2 above).

The validity of the Turkish claim to have been acting in exercise of Turkey's powers as a Guarantor turns on whether their purpose was that of 're-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty' (viz the Treaty of Guarantee). That is precisely what Prime Minister Ecevit said he was doing. But was that feasible and was it really Turkey's intention to go back exactly to the state of affairs existing in 1960? No-one can now say for sure, but certainly the initial 'Peace Operation' could have had that purpose. Even if it were accepted that an exact recreation of the 1960 situation was no longer practicable because of all that had occurred as a result of the Greek Cypriot overthrow of the Republic in 1964, it could still be claimed that the initial operation was as consistent as was then possible with the intention of the Treaty and hence that it should be accorded a high, even if not complete, degree of legitimacy - particularly since it was the Greek side who were primarily to blame for having destroyed beyond recall the legitimacy of 1960.

Whether the same degree of legitimacy under the Treaty can be claimed for the second Turkish military operation is more debatable. But it can be and has been argued from the Turkish side that it was a necessary and unavoidable extension of the initial military intervention because Greek armed forces, in contravention of the cease-fire, continued to invest Turkish villages, to perpetrate atrocities against Turkish Cypriots and to maintain their positions and fortify them in areas from which they had undertaken to withdraw, and because also, on the political plane, Greece and the Greek Cypriots were not negotiating in good faith for a genuine settlement but were merely playing for time. This was unacceptable to Turkey since the cease-fire which ended the initial operation had left its forces exposed in positions which were militarily untenable in a longer term. However others may choose to view the second operation, for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots it was a thoroughly justified use of superior military power in order to save lives, prevent further bloodshed and restore peace and order to Cyprus.

#### V,52 MAKARIOS, Archbishop of Cyprus

Turkey invaded Cyprus allegedly for the restoration of the constitutional order that is, the implementation of the Constitution of 1960 . . . Although this Constitution gives many privileges to the Turkish Cypriot community in a way that some of its provisions impede the smooth functioning of the State, yet it is still acceptable to us as it stands. Any changes must be made

with the consent of all concerned. What is peculiar is that Turkey is violating the very Constitution which, as she claims, has given her the right to intervene. It is obvious that the Turkish invasion was not intended for the restoration of the Constitution of 1960, but for enforcing her partitionist plans in violation of that Constitution . . . Turkey made it clear that her aim is federation based on geographical separation . . . The autonomy of the small Turkish Cypriot minority of 18 per cent can in no way justify a geographical federation which in practice will mean the partition of Cyprus.

Addressing the UN General Assembly on 1  
October 1974

V,53 GREEK GOVERNMENT, The Court of Cassation in Athens

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus as a Guarantor Power within the framework of the Zurich and London Agreements is legal. Actually the Greek officers against whom the court cases have been brought, are responsible for the intervention.

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Turkey was among the Guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus. General Ioannides and his 102 colleagues endangered the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and created the climate for the intervention. . . .

Judgement No 2658/79 of 21 March, 1979

*Editorial Note*

The judgement arose out of an appeal by the Ministry of the Economy against a decision by a lower court in December 1976. This Court had awarded damages to the family of a Greek soldier who died in a military cargo plane which was shot down while flying over Nicosia on 22 July 1974 by Greek anti-aircraft fire, it having been mistaken for a Turkish transport aircraft. The court decided that: 'The plaintiff is right. He should get compensation from the Treasury'. The Ministry refused to pay and appealed against the award. The Appeal Court upheld the earlier judgement. Attempts were made by the Greek Government to prevent publication of the proceedings, but the judgement was published in the Greek press.

V,54 DIE ZEIT

the massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention.

30 August 1974

*Postscript to Part V - Nemesis*

V,55 SIMERINI (Greek Cypriot daily)  
*Grievous Remembrance*

Her children (sc. the children of Cyprus) were sacrificed and shed their blood to the end that the winner should be the Turk! This is the achievement of our political leadership.

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Everyone knows where our unreal policy has led us all these years. What was lacking was perception, seriousness and proper assessment of all those factors which would have allowed us to survive in a world of ugly and crude interests. We believed that we were the centre of the Earth. We thought that we, small and insignificant as we are, would be capable of exercising policy on an intercontinental plane. But also, above all, we underestimated the Turks . . . The unstable and fickle policy of our leaders has brought Cyprus to the brink of total disaster. If anyone pondered whence and how we set out and where we have ended up, he must feel nothing but grief, rage, tears and indignation.

Savvas Iacovides, writing on Cyprus  
Independence Day, 1 October 1985.



## **Part VI**

### **Unfinished Business**

- 1 Intercommunal Talks, 1975–1983
  - (i) Introductory note
  - (ii) Basic documents
  - (iii) ‘Long Struggle’
  - (iv) Population exchange
  - (v) Bi-zonality
  - (vi) Character of the federal government
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the Denktash proposals, April 1978
  - (viii) Further Turkish Cypriot proposals, August 1981
- 2 The De Cuellar initiatives, 1984–1986

## 1 Intercommunal Talks, 1975–1983

### (i) *Introductory Note*

Believing that time was on their side and that in the end they would succeed in bringing back something like the state of affairs that had prevailed before the Turkish intervention in 1974, the Greek Cypriot leadership, instead of going for a quick and mutually acceptable settlement, opted for a 'long struggle'. By this they meant

- appealing for international intervention by the United Nations and others to put the clock back to before 1974;
- transferring the forum of negotiation from the local plane in Cyprus to the international plane in New York, Vienna and elsewhere;
- scoring 'paper victories' in the form of one-sided resolutions by international organisations such as the United Nations, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference and even the Universal Postal Union Congress (!);
- objecting to meetings 'on an equal footing' between Cypriot leaders (as called for in numerous UN resolutions);
- maintaining a harsh economic blockade against the Turkish Cypriots in the north of Cyprus (which was intended to force them to concede Greek Cypriot demands but which had the effect of driving them closer than ever to Turkey);
- supporting the Greek-American lobby in the United States in demanding the continuation and intensification of the American arms embargo against Turkey;
- rejecting out of hand conciliatory and constructive proposals from the Turkish Cypriot side in regard to power-sharing in a new federal Republic, territory, the re-opening of Varosha (the Greek suburb of Famagusta), a joint project to bring water for irrigation from Turkey for the benefit of both communities and re-opening the international airport at Nicosia;
- seizing on every conceivable pretext to calumniate Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, not only in matters affecting the dispute over Cyprus but also often on matters which had little or nothing to do with that. For example, the use made in Greek Cypriot news media of Armenian and Kurdish allegations against Turkey is clearly propagandist and far in excess of any interest these subjects may have for Cyprus and the Cypriots at large; it sometimes amounts to encouraging terrorism.

Between 1975 and 1977 a series of intercommunal talks was held in Vienna, New York and Nicosia. They produced some agreements in principle (see section (ii) below) but no real progress in practice towards a settlement. Time after time the Greek Cypriot side backed away from unpalatable decisions and the talks were broken off or suspended while they renewed their annual recourse to the United Nations (where they claimed to speak in the name of the whole of Cyprus and did all

in their power to prevent Turkish Cypriots from getting a hearing). This series of talks finally collapsed in the middle of 1977.

The talks were resumed in 1978 on the initiative of the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, supported by the Turkish Cypriot leaders. In order to counter persistent allegations from the Greek side that the Turkish Cypriots had failed to present concrete proposals for a settlement, a new comprehensive set of proposals was prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in consultation with a Turkish expert in constitutional law, and was submitted to the UN Secretary-General. He made a public statement that: 'The Turkish Cypriot proposals deal with the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem in a concrete and substantial way'. But when he transmitted them to Mr Kyprianou, they were at once rejected by him as 'totally unacceptable'. The talks were again broken off and stalemate ensued for over a year, during which Mr Kyprianou refused to meet Mr Denktash.

However, in May 1979 the Secretary-General succeeded in bringing the two sides together again and both accepted the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 (see VI,5 below). But still the Greek Cypriots continued their propaganda campaign (even though the Agreement stipulated that both parties would 'abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of the talks') and in November they succeeded in getting the UN General Assembly to adopt an exceedingly partisan resolution which had the effect of sabotaging the renewed negotiations. Nothing daunted, Dr Waldheim persisted in his 'mission of good offices' and, after consulting both sides, embodied in an 'opening statement' a number of important points which he believed were acceptable to both sides. It was arranged that he would make this statement at a meeting with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 9 August 1980 (see VI,6 below). The Turkish Cypriots confirmed their acceptance. But once again Mr Kyprianou immediately expressed reservations which largely nullified the Greek Cypriot acceptance. Nevertheless, the talks were resumed and lasted through 1980 and 1981. Again the Turkish Cypriots presented comprehensive and concrete proposals on 5 August 1981 and again Mr Kyprianou reacted by saying that: 'the proposals submitted cannot form a basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem'. But this time his reaction was more muted, possibly because the proposals had got a good press and seemed to have favourably impressed even some elements in the Greek Cypriot community. For its part the Greek Cypriot leadership submitted proposals in 1980 and again in 1981 which would have had the effect of giving the Greek Cypriots absolute control of the legislature, of cutting in half the area under Turkish Cypriot administration and of allowing the displaced Greek Cypriots to return *en masse* and reclaim their property. These proposals were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

Towards the end of 1981 the UN Secretary-General tried again. He produced an 'evaluation paper' which set out his own ideas based on a comparative study of the proposals from both sides (see VI,7 below). The talks got started again and dragged on until April 1983 when they were recessed at the request of the Greek Cypriots because they were preparing, yet again, to appeal to the UN General Assembly. Yet another unhelpful resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 May 1983; and the talks were not resumed.

In an attempt to get negotiations moving again the new UN Secretary-General, Mr Perez de Cuellar, produced a set of 'indicators' in August 1983. These covered major issues and took the form of alternative suggestions or parameters within which

the two sides might try to negotiate agreement. The initiative led to a sharp division of opinion within the Greek Cypriot community as to what their response should be. Protracted vacillation by Mr Kyprianou resulted in the resignation of his Foreign Minister, Nicos Rolandis, who was in favour of accepting the initiative. The Turkish Cypriots reiterated their readiness to resume negotiations but had reservations about the method proposed by Mr de Cuellar, since it implied mediation rather than good offices.

On 15 November 1983 the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed (item VII,13) and negotiations ceased while the Greek Cypriots concentrated their efforts on challenging the legality of the new state and the Turkish Cypriots on defending it. By March 1984 the dust had settled enough for the Secretary-General to take up again his mission of good offices (see Section 2 below)

(ii) *Basic documents*

VI,1 DENKTASH/CLERIDES, Population Exchange Agreement of 2 August 1975

1 The Turkish Cypriots at present in the south of the island will be allowed, if they want to do so, to proceed north with their belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP.

2 Mr Denktash reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the north.

3 The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the south, will be permitted to do so.

4 UNFICYP will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north.

5 In connexion with the implementation of the above agreement, priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south to the north.

Vienna Talks, 3rd round, 31 July–2 August 1975

VI,2 GREECE AND TURKEY, Governments of, Brussels Accord of 12 December 1975

1 To ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appeal to the representatives of the two communities to continue their talks without prior conditions with a view of arriving at a package deal on an agenda containing the following subjects: Territorial issues, federal structure, powers of central government.

2 Details of these subjects to be examined by two subcommittees to the extent that would be required.

3 The two Ministers would encourage the representatives of the two communities to respond positively to the appeal of the Secretary-General and

accept the earliest possible date for the first meeting under him.

4 Until the talks were completed all the parties concerned would avoid to reveal the content of the points on which there might be provisional agreement since that would be contrary to the principle of a package agreement. The parties would also abstain from statements which could jeopardise the progress already made. Therefore each party reserved the right to deny statements of leakages which would be contrary to the present agreement.

5 The Ministers decided to meet from time to time to survey the progress made and if necessary to deal with difficulties arising.

6 During such meetings they would also examine all problems affecting relations between the two countries.

(The above text was released by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece on the 22nd May, 1976)

VI,3 MAKARIOS/DENKTASH, Four Guidelines of 12 February 1977

1 We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicomunal Federal Republic.

2 The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

3 Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.

4 The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

UN Secretary-General's report S/12323,  
30 April 1977

*Editorial Note*

On 9 January 1977 Denktash had written to Makarios proposing a direct meeting in order to break the deadlock which had then halted progress in the intercommunal talks. Makarios accepted Denktash's invitation. The above guide-lines were agreed in the presence of the UN Secretary-General as a basis on which the interlocutors would conduct their negotiations in future.

VI,4 UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES and CANADA, Governments of

'ANGLO-AMERICAN' PROPOSALS OF 10 NOVEMBER 1978

1 The Republic of Cyprus shall be a bicomunal Federal State with two constituent regions, one of which will be inhabited predominately by Greek Cypriots, the other by Turkish Cypriots. The independence and territorial

integrity of the Republic shall be assured.

2 The following powers and functions shall reside in the Federal Government:

- Foreign affairs,
- External Defence,
- Currency and central banking,
- Interregional and foreign commerce,
- Communications
- Federal finance
- Customs, immigration and civil aviation.

Residual powers shall belong to the Regions.

3 The legislature shall be bicameral. The upper chamber shall represent the two communities on the basis of equality and the lower chamber shall be elected in proportion to population.

4 There shall be a President and a Vice-President, one of whom shall be from one community and the other from the other community.

5 The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and one neutral judge.

6 Provision shall be made for the participation of members of both communities in the Federal Civil Service.

7 The two regions shall establish regional governmental institutions and shall have their own executive and legislative organs.

8 The territory under each region shall be negotiated on the basis of certain criteria. It is understood that this will involve significant geographical adjustment in favour of the Greek Cypriot side.

9 There shall be an Agency for Regional Cooperation and Coordination.

#### *Editorial Note*

The proposals were supposed to be 'top secret' but were leaked to the Press in Turkey and in Cyprus. The version given above was published in the *Cyprus Mail* of 19 November 1978 which quoted the Turkish mainland newspaper *Hürriyet* as its source. The proposals were presented to the UN Secretary-General, the Governments of Turkey and Greece and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Greek Cypriot side was reported in the Press to have turned them down. However, the proposals undoubtedly influenced future negotiations and certain features of them (such as the bicameral Legislature) re-appeared in subsequent documents.

#### VI,5 DENKTASH/KYPRIANOU, Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979

1 It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.

2 The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.

3 There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.

4 The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.

5 Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial

aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.

6 It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.

7 The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.

8 The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.

9 The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10 The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.

(included in UN doc S/13672)

#### VI,6 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim

#### TEXT OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S 'OPENING STATEMENT' OF 9 AUGUST 1980

I note that both parties have indicated their readiness to resume the intercommunal talks, which were recessed in consultation with the parties on 22 June, 1979, and to do so within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

Both parties have, in this regard, signified their intention to carry out the resumed talks in a continuing and sustained manner, to get down to concrete negotiations, discussing constructively, and giving full consideration to, all aspects of the Cyprus problem. In this connexion, I should like to outline the Secretary-General's understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which have taken place over the past several months:

(a) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979;

(b) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem;

(c) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;

(d) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

The practical implementation of the concepts in (b) and (c) above will be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the

constitutional and territorial aspects and will be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items of the agenda.

Concerning the matters to be discussed, the Secretary-General understands, on the basis of the 19 May agreement, that these will include the following subjects:

(a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(c) Constitutional aspects;

(d) Territorial aspects.

Concerning procedure, it is understood that the four items above should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage, committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors.

(Published as an annex to the UN Secretary-General's Report A/35/385 and S/14100 of 11 August 1980 to the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council)

VI,7 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, Dr Kurt Waldheim  
*The Waldheim Evaluation Paper, 18 November 1981*

*Editorial Note*

The full text is contained in UN document A/36/702. The following summary is taken from Z M Nejatigil, *Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 40-42

The objective of the evaluation was to provide a method for negotiation, an itinerary for discussion, this being the outcome of the comparative study of the constitutional proposals of both sides.

The evaluation mentions, on the one hand, 'points of coincidence', where the views of the two sides are expressed in the intercommunal talks, approximate to coincidence; and, on the other, 'points of equidistance' between these views. The 'points of equidistance' aspire to locate median positions, or to afford possible bridges between previously divergent stand-points.

Dr Waldheim made it clear in an introduction to his 'guidelines' that his evaluation was in no way final, or exhaustive. Some vacuums should be filled through negotiation.

The points of coincidence\* listed by the evaluation cover the following:

\* At the meeting of 18 November 1981, when the Waldheim ideas were officially tabled, the Greek Cypriot side expressed the view *inter alia* that there are some instances in the evaluations where 'points of coincidence' are listed, whereas the parties had not, as yet reached agreement on such issues. As examples of such instances, reference is made to the concept of administrative districts, their allocation between North and South, a federal district, the fundamental human rights provisions, the official languages, and the Independent Officers.

1 The establishment of a Federal Republic consisting of two provinces and a Federal District that will be the seat of government. The division of the Northern Province into two administrative districts and the Southern into four.

2 The exclusion of 'secession, integration or union of the Republic in whole or in part with any other state.'

3 'The state shall have an international personality and the federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all the territory.'

4 Single citizenship regulated by Federal law.

5 Agreement to be reached by the two Provinces for a 'neutral federal flag and national anthem. Each province to create its own flag using as far as possible elements of the federal flag.'

Dr Waldheim's evaluation envisaged the establishment of a Federal independent, sovereign, non-aligned Republic made up of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot 'provinces' and a 'Federal District' that would be the seat of government.

The evaluation stated that 'the Executive Authority of the Republic shall be exercised by a Federal Council composed of six members, one from each administrative district (2 from the Northern Province and 4 from the Southern Province).' These six members of the Federal Councils should be appointed. Dr Waldheim suggested that the method of election of the members of the Federal Council and the President as well as the Vice-President should be matters open to discussion during the intercommunal talks.

The Federal Government or Council would have six Ministerial portfolios:

- (1) Foreign affairs
- (2) Defence, citizenship, immigration etc.
- (3) Justice and higher education
- (4) Co-ordination of international trade and tourism, postal and telecommunication services, and international navigation.
- (5) Federal finance, central bank, currency, customs, weights, measures, and patents.
- (6) Co-ordination of environmental matters, natural resources and health, labour and social services.

Other powers of the Federal Council should include the promulgation of federal statutes and decisions and laws passed by both Chambers, allocating the federal budget and setting out the policies of the Federal Government.

The other ideas put forward by Dr Waldheim cover the following:

- 1) That the two provinces of the Republic 'shall draft their own Constitutions in conformity with the Federal Constitution.'
- 2) 'The Federal Legislative power shall comprise two chambers: The Chamber of Provinces, giving the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities equal representation of ten members each, and a Popular Chamber 'composed of Representatives of the people of Cyprus on a ratio of one member for each 10,000 of the total population.'

- 3) In addition, each province shall elect its own provincial chamber 'whose responsibilities shall include approval of the necessary provincial legislation.'
- 4) Each Province shall establish its own administration of justice and will control the provincial police, but will have no jurisdiction in federal matters.

The area of competence of each Province would cover matters other than those allocated to the six-member Federal Council.

As to the territorial aspect, the UN Secretary-General suggested a segregation on the basis of a 70/30 ratio, so that the area under Greek Cypriot jurisdiction would be at least 70% including the buffer zone which is the minimum for the resettlement of a substantial number of refugees. The Secretary-General suggested that a fund for development of the North should be established 'to deal with the socio-economic consequences of the territorial adjustment and, at the same time, would represent an important element of the basis for a vigorous economy and ensure a balanced development in the Republic'.

The Secretary-General suggested that the question of international guarantees in relation to the status of the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be discussed at the appropriate level after agreement on all other aspects had been reached.

#### VI,8 UNITED NATIONS: Resolutions on Cyprus since 1974

##### *Editorial Note*

Space does not permit the reproduction of the text of all the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. In any case they are often repetitious and some are hardly worth the paper they are written on, being so obviously biased in favour of one side in the Cyprus dispute. This also raises the question whether they are properly to be considered as 'basic documents' or as part of the 'long struggle' undertaken by the Greek Cypriot side with a view to securing international support for their cause. Comments on the substance of some of these resolutions are given in sub-section (iii) below, which deals with the so-called 'long struggle', and also in Part VII below entitled 'Equality of independence'.)

##### (iii) *'Long Struggle'*

#### VI,9 GROOM, John (Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent)

An important benchmark in the Cyprus conflict occurred in 1974 when, following the coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios and the subsequent Turkish military intervention, there was a territorial consolidation of the two communities. Much was changed thereby, but not the definition by the Greek Cypriot leadership and community of the situation in majority/minority terms. The Cyprus Government maintained its international status and used it to the full to campaign for the withdrawal of mainland Turkish forces. It sought a return to the status quo with some guarantees of the minority community's rights and a full restitution of the human rights and material assets of the refugees. Coercive diplomacy even if compelling



Intercommunal meeting in 1977 between President Makarios and Mr Rauf Denktash under the auspices of UN Secretary General Dr Waldheim



Intercommunal meeting in 1979 showing centre, Dr Waldheim, UN Secretary General, with President Kyrianiou on his right and Mr Rauf Denktash on his left.

(and it was not), was and remains, hardly likely to be a sound basis for the resolution of inter-communal differences and the legitimisation of a new political regime for the island.

By 1980 the Greek-Cypriot community's leaders in both government and opposition seemed to recognise the self-defeating nature of their policy. The Greek-Cypriot definition of the situation appeared to be changing - no longer was the relationship viewed as that of a majority and a minority but as one in which two communities existed, both of which would have to be satisfied before a viable political entity uniting them could be founded.

*Cyprus in Transition*, pp 128-30

VI,10 OBERLING, Pierre (Professor of History at Hunter College, Cuny, USA)

As time passed, Acting-President Klerides appeared increasingly willing to settle for a bi-zonal solution to the Cyprus problem. In a speech in Nicosia, on November 6, 1974 he admitted that Greek Cypriot thinking before the Turkish intervention had been based on 'false assumptions, terrible mistakes and illusions'. The main illusion, he pointed out, had been 'that we could treat the Turkish Cypriot community as a simple minority, without taking into account it was backed by Turkey with a population of 33 million'. He observed that he saw 'no prospect of the Turks accepting any settlement that does not include federation and some geographic basis for it'. He then concluded that 'accepting federation with Turkish Cypriots was the only realistic way of settling the island's political crisis'.\* But many Greek Cypriots still tenaciously clung to the illusions mentioned by Klerides. They believed that all that was needed to reestablish the island's pre-1974 status was Archbishop Makarios' special brand of political magic. Accordingly, Klerides was under growing popular pressure to step aside and let Makarios resume the presidency. Already on September 29, upwards to 30,000 Greek Cypriots had staged a pro-Makarios rally in Limassol. When Makarios finally returned to Cyprus on December 7, he was given an even more triumphant welcome than he had received in 1959, when he had been released from exile by the British, and he was at once installed in the newly rebuilt Presidential Palace at Nicosia. Upon supplanting Klerides, he remarked that his predecessor had 'demonstrated an overenthusiasm for making concessions' and declared that he would 'never accept a settlement involving transfer of population and amounting to the partition of the island'.\*\*

Glafkos Klerides, who had resumed his former position as Speaker of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, and President Denktash represented their respective governments at the talks until April 1976. But from the very start, Klerides' position was exceedingly precarious. He was appointed as his government's chief negotiator, or 'interlocutor', largely at the insistence of Premier Karamanlis of Greece and Secretary-General Waldheim, who respected his ability as a diplomat and regarded him as the

\* *The New York Times*, November 7 1974, p 18a

\*\* *Newsweek*, December 16 1974, p 46

most likely Greek Cypriot leader to reach an agreement with the Turkish Cypriot government. But Archbishop Makarios still clung too tenaciously to his dream of bringing back to life the Cyprus of 1964 to trust a man who was willing to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the new demographic and political realities. As a result, he repeatedly sabotaged Klerides' peacemaking efforts. Klerides also had to contend with the virulent opposition of most of the Greek Cypriot press, which advocated the adoption of a hard line in the talks.

In the third round of the Vienna talks there was a momentary glimmer of hope that a real breakthrough in the negotiations was about to take place: not only was a comprehensive population exchange agreement signed, but Denktash and Klerides seemed close to an understanding as regards bizonality and the establishment of a loose federation. They also agreed to hold private talks on the territorial aspects of the projected settlement before the fourth round of talks and to exchange maps indicating the extent of the proposed zones. But after the meeting Klerides was so savagely attacked by the Greek Cypriot press that he felt compelled to declare that, contrary to what had been bruited about, no agreement, in principle or otherwise, had been reached and that he had no territorial map to submit. Rebuked in turn by his own government, he did not even bother to meet with President Denktash, as promised, before the next round of talks.

*The Road to Bella Pais,*  
pp 188, 197-8 and 228

VI,11 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

During the period immediately after the Turkish peace operation, Makarios concentrated on disseminating anti-Turkish propaganda abroad. The governments of the USA and Great Britain, obviously uncomfortable about Makarios's presence in their countries, urged Turkey to agree to his return to the island. They seemed to believe that if Makarios was to be confronted with the realities in Cyprus, he might cease to be intransigent or even resign. Turkey raised no objection and Makarios returned to Cyprus on 7 December 1974.

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It soon became clear that Archbishop Makarios had not changed either his attitude or his tactics. During the 1963-74 period he had not been in a hurry to solve the Cyprus problem and he would not change even after all that had happened. He was still satisfied with the results of his own coup in 1963. He had established an exclusively Greek administration in Cyprus and passed it off as the 'government of Cyprus'. As he still held this important tool in his hands, he saw no reason for compromise. He established a National Council as a cover for his intransigence and finally he introduced the 'long struggle' slogan. If the Turks did not agree to his terms, he would lead the Greek Cypriots against the Turks in a new, marathon struggle.

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The bilateral talks on humanitarian issues which had started in August 1974 were suspended after the return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus in December 1974, pending clarification of Mr Clerides's authority and terms of reference. These questions were resolved by the first week in January 1975 and the talks were resumed on 14 January 1975. It was agreed to begin the talks with a discussion on the 'powers and functions of the central government in a federal state'.

But once again Makarios started exercising a negative influence by making provocative statements about the futility of the talks and the necessity for getting ready for a 'long struggle'. In view of this obvious insincerity on the Greek side, the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration was declared the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' on 13 February 1975. The principle of a federal solution had already been accepted and the Turkish Cypriots' action was merely to establish the Turkish wing of the envisaged Federal Republic of Cyprus. In spite of repeated assurances that this was not a 'unilateral declaration of independence', the Greek Cypriots walked out of the talks – not so much to register a protest against the declaration of the Turkish Federated State, as to make an impact on the forthcoming Security Council debate on Cyprus. But the resolution which came out of the Security Council called for the urgent resumption of the intercommunal talks on Cyprus.

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The steady progress being made in Vienna was troubling Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia. On the first anniversary of the 15 July coup he delivered a belligerent speech at a mass rally in Nicosia, calling for a 'long struggle for final victory'. After that, the local Greek press began attacking Mr Clerides's handling of the talks and particularly his agreement to the movement of populations.

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The fourth round of talks was held in New York from 8-10 September 1975, but Mr Clerides refused to continue the talks on the grounds that the Turkish side had not submitted concrete proposals on the territorial issue and the meeting was adjourned. It was obvious that Mr Clerides was acting on orders from Nicosia. However, after a delay of five months, the fifth round of talks was held in Vienna on 17 February 1976 as a result of an agreement reached between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1975.\* During this round there was extensive discussion on both the territorial and the constitutional issues. It was also agreed that an exchange of written proposals should take place through the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus within six weeks.

Mr Clerides agreed to submit the Greek proposals ten days before the Turkish Cypriots to give the Turkish side time to study the Greek proposals and submit, if necessary, counter-proposals. However, when the time came for the submission of proposals Mr Clerides tried to back out of his earlier agreement. He argued that he had agreed to the ten-day arrangement on his

\*See item VI,2 above

personal initiative without consulting the Greek Cypriot leadership in Nicosia. As a result of the ensuing squabble on the Greek side Mr Clerides resigned and Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, a Greek Cypriot deputy, was appointed in his place. This necessitated the appointment of a new interlocutor of equal standing on the Turkish side, but the talks remained in abeyance.

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The atmosphere of détente in intercommunal relations, created by the Denktash-Clerides meetings in January and February 1977, began to wane after Kyprianou's assumption of office and completely vanished when he summarily rejected the Turkish proposals in April 1978.

Kyprianou spent most of May and June 1978 personally campaigning for the continuation of the arms 'embargo' against Turkey. He snubbed everyone - including heads of governments and states - who advocated the lifting of the 'embargo' and counselled the resumption of the intercommunal talks. He called this 'aggressive diplomacy'. Kyprianou used the same 'diplomacy' at home: he castigated his critics as 'disruptive elements' and sacked his negotiator in the talks, Tassos Papadopoulos, for disagreeing with the interpretation of Archbishop Makarios's policy.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, pp 76-7, 80 and 100-1

#### VI,12 ALITHIA (Greek Cypriot newspaper)

Whenever there are positive developments in the Cyprus issue, dark and extremist forces immediately take action and try to create difficulties and impede progress. The same thing is happening again. Even before the Turkish proposals are submitted, the representatives of a certain political party are touring villages day and night to propagate for the rejection of the proposals and to instigate the people against any agreement.

It is high time we realised that this cannot go on. We are constantly playing with fire. One day we shall have our hands burnt and we shall lose all ability to manoeuvre. The time has come to change tactics. We must put a halt to the people who tour villages to deliver destructive speeches for partisan aims. We must put a categorical halt to the circulation of leaflets full of extremist slogans.

*Alithia*, 6 February 1978

#### VI,13 OBERLING, Pierre (see item VI,10 above)

Through all these trials Kyprianou has managed to preserve his reputation for probity. But he has often given the impression of being a weak, unstable leader who is not firmly in charge of his government. This has reduced his effectiveness as a negotiator, for the Turkish Cypriots are doubtful he would be able to live up to an agreement with them in the face of determined opposition by nationalists within his own administration. On the other hand, he has taken such a hard line in the talks that there has thus far been very little movement at the bargaining table.

When he succeeded Archbishop Makarios, Kyprianou said: 'I will

faithfully follow the policies of our late great leader and president in all fields'.\* But in his policy towards the Turkish Cypriots he has proved even more uncompromising. An ardent advocate of the 'long-term struggle' approach to solving the Cyprus problem, he has assured the Greek Cypriot refugees in the south that he will never 'sell them down the river' to achieve a quick settlement with the Turkish Cypriots. Accordingly, he has been pursuing what he calls an 'aggressive diplomacy' which has consisted mostly of a vigorous campaign to convince the governments of other nations to put pressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops from northern Cyprus and to isolate the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus commercially. He has shown little interest in the inter-communal talks, and during the early months of his presidency he refused to meet President Denktash on the grounds that it would imply recognition of his status as head of state. Whereas Klerides was probably more willing to make concessions to the Turkish Cypriots than most Greek Cypriots were willing to tolerate, Kyprianou has dismayed most of his fellow-countrymen by the rigidity of his views and his utter unwillingness to make any compromise.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 210-11

VI,14 DENKTASH, Rauf. (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

*Letter to the UN Secretary-General*  
18 September 1978

As you are aware, the Turkish Cypriot side has fulfilled its obligation in respect of the resumption of the intercommunal talks by submitting new proposals on both the constitutional as well as the territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem on 13 April 1978, which were described by you as 'concrete, substantial and voluminous'. These proposals were rejected by the Greek Cypriot side without any serious consideration and in a very indignant manner. I subsequently made a statement on 22 May 1978, reiterating the Turkish Cypriot side's belief in 'sustained, intensive good-faith negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities with a view to reaching a just, lasting and mutually satisfactory settlement on Cyprus. . . .' I also expressed my readiness to meet Mr Kyprianou personally 'anywhere, any time and to discuss the problem with him even without any agenda'. The Turkish Cypriot side still stands both by its proposals, which were later elaborated upon, and by my recent call to meet Mr Kyprianou with an open agenda.

The Turkish Cypriot side believes that the substance and the spirit of the United Nations resolutions is the settlement of the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks, and firmly stands by the agreements reached at the various stages of these talks – namely the population exchange agreement reached at the third round in Vienna on 2 August 1975, which paved the way for a bizonal federal settlement of the Cyprus problem, and the four-point framework agreement reached between myself and the late Archbishop

\* The New York Times, September 1, 1977, p 10c.

Makarios on 12 February 1977, in your presence, which envisages the establishment of an independent non-aligned, bicomunal, bizonal federal republic in Cyprus.

UN doc A/33/348 of 2 November 1978

- VI,15 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir OBE, QC (who served as Solicitor-General in the Government of Cyprus during the period of British rule; as Judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Republic of Cyprus; and as President of the Supreme Court of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, as Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and as Adviser to President Denktash in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus)

Although President Denktash made several offers to meet Mr Kyprianou, while they were both in New York, without any fixed agenda, these offers were all turned down by Mr Kyprianou who intimated that he was not prepared to discuss the Cyprus problem with President Denktash but wished to meet the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr Bülent Ecevit, and discuss the matter with him. Mr Ecevit's reply to Mr Kyprianou was the only reasonable one which could be expected, namely, that the Cyprus problem was a matter between the two Cypriot communities and could only be solved through direct talks and negotiations between them. This was a point on which nearly the whole world was agreed – except Mr Kyprianou, who eventually also came round to that point of view some thirteen months later!

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 6

*Editorial Note*

The intercommunal negotiations were of course supposed to be 'on an equal footing'.

- VI,16 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

*Letter to the UN Secretary-General*  
24 September 1979

If there is still no final solution in Cyprus today despite the prevailing peaceful atmosphere, the responsibility for this does not rest with the Turkish Cypriot side. Your Excellency is well aware that following the 10-point framework agreement of 19 May 1979 held under your auspices, the intercommunal talks were resumed on 15 June 1979 in Nicosia. However, the Greek Cypriot side's negative attitude, manifested in their refusal in contravention of point 6 of the 19 May agreement, to lift the economic embargo imposed on the Turkish Cypriot Community since 1974; their refusal to admit, under point 2 of the same agreement, even the basic principles relating to the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus question, ie the question of bi-zonality of the federation to be formed and security of the Turkish Cypriots, both of which are basic and agreed features of the previous rounds of talks and agreements reached between the two

community leaders; and their lack of good will and genuine faith in the negotiating process, reflected in their public statements and attempts to internationalize the problem of Cyprus at the expense of the intercommunal talks, prevented the achievement of any progress at these talks. The statement of Mr Spiros Kyprianou on 20 August 1979 that the international campaign would be 'intensive, more intensive than ever before' (*Cyprus Mail* newspaper, 21 August 1979) is most revealing in this context. In fact, Mr Kyprianou had made a similar statement immediately after the birth of the 19 May agreement in which he denied even the existence of an economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriot Community, and declared that the international propaganda campaign to ostracize the Turkish Cypriot Community would continue, in spite of point 6 of the said agreement, which states that the two sides would 'abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions'.

UN doc A/34/620 of 8 November 1979

VI,17 GILMOUR, the Rt Hon Sir Ian, MP (then Lord Privy Seal)

Anybody who comes to Cyprus is very much struck by the tyranny of words that exists here and I think that if people pay less attention to words it might be easier. From what we heard from both sides there does not seem to be any substantive obstacle to the beginning of talks.

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I honestly do not think that the intercommunal relations are helped by great discussions and controversies over the meaning or the use of words.

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a lot of negotiations throughout the world are bedevilled by people getting involved in abstract discussions of principles. As a Conservative, indeed I have written a book about it. I am very much against abstractions of any sort. I believe that it is the primary duty of both communities in this country to reach agreement. That will be done by dealing with concrete issues, relating to the constitution, to territory and so forth and no doubt words have to come into it. But it is very important, I think, not to spend too much time and energy in debating the meaning of words.

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Since 1974, an enormous amount of effort has been expended in raking over the past and the United Nations General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions. In my opinion this has largely been a misdirection of effort, I question whether it has assisted in the search for a just settlement, or in alleviating the very real human suffering which the situation in the island continues to cause.

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Since 1974, an enormous amount of effort has been expended in raking over the past and the United Nations General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions, some of them touching on the questions raised in your letter. In my opinion this has largely been a misdirection of effort, I question whether it has assisted in the search for a just settlement, or in alleviating the very real human suffering which the situation in the island continues to cause.

... the future is more important than the past. Whilst words cannot affect the past, they do affect the future. An agreed interpretation of what happened in 1974 and since is most unlikely ever to be achieved; but this should not impede the search for agreement on a satisfactory future relationship between the two communities. Argument about the former is sterile; negotiation about the latter is what is needed.

*'Friends of Cyprus' Report No 21, Summer 1980*

#### *Editorial Note*

These comments were made at a Press conference on 22 April 1980, when Sir Ian Gilmour was on an official visit to Cyprus, and in subsequent correspondence with the London-based 'Friends of Cyprus'. He had been pressed at the conference to say whether the Turkish military operations in 1974 were 'an invasion or not' (to which he had replied, not unreasonably, that: 'Invasion means different things to different people') and whether principles such as those included in the UN Charter are negotiable. His sensible, non-partisan replies were seized on by Greek Cypriots and their supporters as evidence of a pro-Turkish bias in British Government circles.

From the Turkish standpoint anyone familiar with the recent history of Cyprus will readily understand that the Turkish Cypriot leadership should be sensitive about the use of such words as 'invasion' to describe the Turkish military operation in 1974, or 'occupation' to describe the continuing Turkish military presence in north Cyprus. As Sir Ian Gilmour said, words do mean different things to different people. From their standpoint the Greek Cypriots regard the Turkish intervention in 1974 as an 'invasion' (even though many of them welcomed it at the time), and regard the continued Turkish military presence as an 'occupation'. But from the Turkish Cypriot standpoint the action taken by Turkey in 1974 was a life-saving and thoroughly justified necessity (quite apart from the arguments for its legitimacy within the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee); and the Turkish presence in Cyprus since 1974 has been the only effective peace-keeping operation Cyprus has seen and has given the Turkish Cypriots the only real security they have known since 1960. Ever since the Turkish intervention in 1974 the island has been remarkably free from the sort of intercommunal violence that had plagued it for the preceding twenty years.)

VI,18 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

When the US arms embargo was finally lifted in September 1978, Greece

and the Greek Cypriot leaders switched their attention to the UN as an instrument for bringing pressure to bear on Turkey. Kyprianou unleashed his 'aggressive diplomacy' in the UN and other international conferences by complaining about Turkey's failure to comply with the UN resolutions on Cyprus and declaring that he would seek a solution only through the UN. He then persuaded the Greek Cypriot political parties that the wisest policy was to turn to the UN General Assembly to secure a 'tough' resolution and to get it implemented by the Security Council through sanctions.

The Greek Cypriot political parties are divided by ideological differences, but they forget all their differences and co-operate in the face of the common enemy, the Turks, and pursue a common goal, Enosis. Even the Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) is committed to the Enosis policy by a standing resolution of its party congress. Therefore, it was not difficult for Kyprianou to secure the co-operation of the party leaders to seek UN help against the Turkish side. An all-party delegation, composed of party leaders, was dispatched to New York for lobbying in and outside the UN and public demonstrations were organised in Nicosia to impress foreign missions. The whole exercise was regarded as a commercial transaction by the Greek Cypriot leaders. They talked about securing a 'cheque' from the General Assembly and then getting it 'cashed' by the Security Council.

The UN General Assembly debated the Cyprus issue early in November 1978, in the absence of Turkish Cypriot representation. Because of certain procedural rules of convenience, the Turkish community is only allowed a cursory hearing in the Special Political Committee and denied a voice in the plenary session where the actual debate takes place. This arrangement, which is unfair to the Turks, is particularly advantageous to the Greek side because it can speak both for the Greek community and also for the so-called Cyprus government and even vote for its own case.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, pp 102-4

## VI,19 UNITED NATIONS Resolutions 1974-77

### *Introductory note*

International approval for holding intercommunal talks and for the Secretary-General to use his good offices towards settling the Cyprus dispute had been given in a succession of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions between 1964 and 1974. After the cease-fire in 1974 further resolutions were adopted year after year in New York. Some of the main points in this succession of pronouncements were these:

### *Security Council Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974*

called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to negotiate for the restoration of peace and constitutional government 'having regard to the International Agreements signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960'. Clearly that meant that the 1960 settlement was still in force and that the three Powers still retained the powers and duties assigned to them under the Treaty of Guarantee. The resolution thus contradicted the whole Greek Cypriot thesis that the 1960 settlement was in conflict with the UN Charter and invalid under international law and that it had been superseded as the basis for the independence of Cyprus and for constitutional legitimacy in the Island

by UN resolutions recognising the *fait accompli* of 'unfettered' Greek Cypriot independence and the claim of the Greek Cypriot administration to constitute the lawful 'Government of Cyprus'. By co-operating in giving effect to this resolution the Greek Cypriots appeared to be accepting tacitly these implications. Nevertheless in subsequent resolutions the Security Council reverted to its previous position of recognising the wholly Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus', however inconsistent that might be with maintaining that the 1960 settlement still held good.

*General Assembly Resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974*

declared that the Cyprus crisis 'constitutes a threat to international peace and security' and requested 'the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council'. In UN parlance that meant that the General Assembly was inviting the Security Council to take enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with 'action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. This implied a tendentious interpretation of the situation in the Island. The resolution went on to urge the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and 'the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs'. Since this was unqualified by any reference to action authorised under international agreements, it appeared to challenge the continued validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. The resolution opined that 'the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities' (which tended to endorse the Turkish Cypriot concept of a bi-communal republic). It commended negotiations 'on an equal footing' between the two communities 'with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights' (again tending to endorse the Turkish Cypriot claim to be equal partners in the independence of Cyprus and co-founders of the Republic), but leaving the door open for argument about measures to ensure that 'all the refugees should return to their homes' (endorsing the Greek Cypriot demand and repudiating the Turkish Cypriot argument that an exchange of population had occurred). It asserted that implementation of its present resolution would 'ensure to the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental rights to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity' (a dubious claim insofar as the resolution appeared to envisage a return to the state of affairs created after the Greek Cypriot seizure of power in 1964 rather than to that created by the 1960 settlement). Finally it requested the Secretary-General to continue his good offices.

*- Security Council Resolution 365 of 13 December 1974*

endorsed this General Assembly resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974. The members of the Council really ought to have known better by now.

*- Security Council Resolution 367 of 12 March 1975*

began by referring to 'the complaint submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus' (back again to its one-sided endorsement of the Greek Cypriot pretension to constitute the Government of Cyprus and to speak 'for Cyprus' against the wishes and interests of one of the two Cypriot peoples). It called for all states to respect the sovereignty etc. of Cyprus and requested them and 'the parties concerned' to refrain from prejudicial, partitionist and unionist action. It then regretted the Turkish Cypriots' 'unilateral decision' in declaring their Federated State in February 1975 as tending to compromise negotiations 'on an equal footing' (ignoring the question of how they could be 'on an equal footing' so long as one side was allowed to claim the

status of the 'Government' while the other was refused such status and an equal hearing by the international community; and ignoring also the indisputable fact that the wholly Greek Cypriot regime had also been created by a 'unilateral decision' in 1964). It affirmed that the declaration of the Turkish Federated State did not 'prejudge the final political settlement', which, as the Council then lamely conceded, was precisely what the Turkish Cypriots themselves had said when making their declaration. Finally it called for new efforts to assist the resumption of negotiations and requested the Secretary-General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good offices. Whether its own resolution had contributed to that end is debatable.

Resolutions in much the same vein were adopted in succeeding years until, in 1978 and 1979, the General Assembly heaped an Ossa of bias and inconsistency on the Pelion of all its previous ill-advised pronouncements (see VI,20 and VI,23 below). A point to note is that made by President Denktash in item VI,18 above: throughout the debates and discussions at the United Nations Greek Cypriot spokesmen appear as unambiguous advocates of exclusively Greek Cypriot views and interest, but are accorded the status of representatives of the whole of Cyprus and of its sole legitimate government. What is more, in the General Assembly they act as judges, as well as advocates, in their own case since it has been accepted that they should vote in the name of Cyprus, as a member state of the UN on resolutions before the Assembly.

The text of the General Assembly's resolution 33/15 of 9 November 1978 follows.

UNITED NATIONS General Assembly Resolution 33/15 of 9 November 1978

'The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent resolutions,

*Greatly concerned* over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, which continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Deeply regretting* that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have not yet been implemented,

*Expressing* deep concern over the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks.

*Deploring* the continued presence of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its territory is still occupied by foreign forces,

*Deploring* also all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus,

*Mindful* of the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1 *Reiterates* its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and calls once again for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;

2 *Demands* the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, and of the subsequent resolutions of the Assembly and the Council on Cyprus, which provide the valid basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;

3 *Demands* the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus;

- 4 *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities;
- 5 *Calls* for respect of the human rights of all Cypriots and the instituting of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety;
- 6 *Calls* for the urgent resumption in a meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of comprehensive and constructive proposals of the parties concerned with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;
- 7 *Calls* upon the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means and to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the performance of his task under the relevant resolution of the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus;
- 8 *Recommends* that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus;
- 9 *Decides* to include the item entitled 'Question of Cyprus' in the provisional agenda of its Thirty-Fourth Session and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report on all its aspects to the General Assembly at that session.

*Editorial Note (1)*

The vote was 110 in favour to 4 against with 22 abstentions. The opposing votes were cast by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 8, above, which was approved by 80 in favour, 7 against with 48 abstentions.

The day after the UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15 of 9 November 1978 (2) was adopted, certain suggestions (which were made by the United States, Britain and Canada and which came to be known as the 'Anglo-American-Canadian' proposals,)\* as a basis for a Cyprus settlement were submitted to the interested parties and the UN Secretary-General on 10 November 1978. These 'suggestions', though confidential, were leaked to the press and were given wide publicity at the time.

*Editorial Note (2)*

(i) In deploring 'unilateral decisions that change the demographic character of Cyprus', the Assembly was giving blanket endorsement to the Greek Cypriot allegation that Turkey was trying to alter the ratio of Greeks to Turks in the population of the Island by settling large numbers of mainland Turks in the north of Cyprus. This failed to take account of the Turkish counter-arguments that the numbers involved were not nearly as large as the Greeks alleged; that many of the Turkish nationals came to Cyprus only temporarily to help in re-establishing the

\* see item VI,2 above

economy of the north after the upheaval of 1974; that many of those who did come to stay were of Turkish Cypriot origin, being members of Turkish Cypriot families who had emigrated to Turkey during the period of British rule (particularly in its closing years when Greek Cypriot violence had made life intolerable for many Turkish Cypriots) and during the oppressive years of Greek Cypriot domination after 1964; and that on their side the Greek Cypriots had unilaterally permitted mainland Greeks to come and settle in Cyprus.

(ii) The recommendation (in paragraph 8) that the Security Council should consider and adopt 'all appropriate measures under the Charter' was a clear and untimely reiteration of the Assembly's previous suggestion that the Security Council should consider enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. This was hardly compatible with a genuine desire to see the problem settled by negotiations freely conducted on an equal footing between the two communities.

VI,21 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

One of the negative elements in the resolution which appeared most likely to impede the resumption of the talks was the paragraph which recommended that the 'Security Council examines the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and considers and adopts, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter for implementation of the UN resolution on Cyprus'. The US delegate had pointed out during the debate that this recommendation was 'unacceptable' because it was misleading to suggest that Security Council action was called for.

A separate vote taken on the offending paragraph brought the majority vote registered on the whole of the resolution from 110 down to 80, and raised the number of abstentions from 22 to 48.

Turkey characterised the resolution as one-sided and deplored the failure of the UN General Assembly to take note of the important developments, such as the 'guidelines' agreed between myself and the late Archbishop Makarios. The Turkish Cypriot side also described the resolution as one-sided and declared that it would not be bound by a resolution taken in its absence. However, I announced my readiness to resume the talks immediately, if the Greek Cypriot side would now come to the negotiating table.

Although the General Assembly resolution called for the urgent resumption of the talks between the two communities on an equal footing, the Greek Cypriot side was in no mood for negotiation. It applied immediately for a Security Council meeting, so as to cash the 'cheque' it had just received from the General Assembly.

The Security Council met and debated the Greek Cypriot application but it did not consider any measure under the Charter for which the Greeks were pressing. The Secretary Council called upon the parties concerned to comply and co-operate in the implementation of the UN resolution within a specific time-frame - without specifying any time limit. It urged the representatives of the two communities to resume negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and asked him to report on the negotiations and on the progress towards the implementation of its

resolutions by 30 May 1979, or earlier, should developments warrant it.

The Security Council discussion on Cyprus was more to the point than the General Assembly debate. This was because of the Council's readiness to hear both sides of the Cyprus question. The Turkish Cypriot side was there to put its case and to challenge allegations made by the other side. In a lengthy address, I analysed the causes of the intercommunal conflict and its consequences and related in detail the terrible experiences of the Turkish community beginning with the EOKA terror campaign in 1955 right up to the summer of 1974.

*The Cyprus Triangle*, pp 104-6

VI,22 UNITED NATIONS Security Council resolution 440 of 27 November 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the letter dated 7 November 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations (S/12918),

Deeply concerned at the lack of progress in the solution of the Cyprus problem,

Taking note of the relevant General Assembly resolutions concerning Cyprus,

Mindful of the urgency of solving the Cyprus problem without further delay,

1 Reaffirms its resolution 365 (1974), 367 (1975) and subsequent resolutions, including resolution 410 (1977);

2 Calls upon the parties concerned to comply with and co-operate in the implementation of those resolutions within a specific timeframe;

3 Urges the representatives of the two communities to resume negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on an agreed basis, bearing in mind the aforementioned resolutions;

4 Requests the Secretary-General to report on the efforts made with regard to the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 and on the progress towards the implementation of its resolutions by 30 May 1979, or earlier if developments should warrant it;

5 Decides to remain seized of the matter and to review the situation in June 1979 in order to continue to promote a just solution to the Cyprus problem.

VI,23 UNITED NATIONS General Assembly resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979

*Editorial Note*

In 1979 the General Assembly exceeded even the lack balance and common sense which it had exhibited a year earlier in its resolution discussed at item VI,20 above.

In its resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979 it reiterated most of the provisions of its 1978 resolution. However, in the meantime the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 (item VI,5 above) had been reached between Presidents Denktash and Kyprianou, and the General Assembly could not ignore that. The new provisions

which were added to those already contained in the 1978 resolution were as follows.

*(Preamble)*

The General Assembly

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*Mindful* of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force,

*Recalling* the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus,

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*Welcoming* the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 (A/34/620), Annex V,

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*(Operative provisions)*

2 *Expresses* its support for the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979, concluded under the auspices of the Secretary-General:

3 *Affirms* the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources and calls upon all States to support and help the Government of Cyprus to exercise the above-mentioned rights:

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8 Calls for the urgent resumption in a meaningful, result-oriented and constructive manner of the negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on an equal footing on the basis of the Agreement of 19 May 1979, with a view to reaching as early as possible, a mutually acceptable agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights:

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12 *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly by 31 March 1980 on the progress achieved in the negotiation between the two communities on the basis of the Agreement of 19 May 1979:

13 *Authorizes* the President of the Thirty-fourth Session of the General Assembly, in the event that the Secretary-General reports lack of progress in the above-mentioned negotiations, to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee composed of no more than seven Member States:

14 *Requests* the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain contact with the Secretary-General in his task of facilitating the successful conclusion of the negotiations between the two communities:

15 *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to recommend steps for and promote the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on Cyprus:

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*Editorial Note*

(i) The reference to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force echoes the language of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 dealing with Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan in the June war. The intrusion of this phraseology was clearly tendentious, implying that the Turkish intervention in 1974 was an act of territorial conquest on a par with Israel's usurpation of Arab territories. It was no doubt designed to enlist Arab and anti-Zionist sympathy on behalf of the Greek Cypriots.

(ii) The holding of an international conference had been a persistent demand of the Greek Cypriots in their attempts to exclude the Guarantor Powers, to bring Soviet Russia into play in the negotiation of a settlement and to offset American pressure for a settlement acceptable to both sides, not just to the Greek Cypriots. It cut across the whole idea of seeking a settlement by negotiations between the two communities on an equal footing under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

(iii) The General Assembly's welcome and support for the Ten-Point Agreement between Denktash and Kyprianou meant that it accepted (as stipulated in Point 2) that 'the basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question'. How the General Assembly reconciled this with floating the idea of an international conference and with calling for the Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus' to exercise the right to 'full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources' defies understanding.

(iv) The proposal to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee offends against the Assembly's own call 'for the cessation of all foreign interference' in the affairs of Cyprus (in operative paragraph 1 of both the 1978 and the 1979 resolutions.)

## VI,24 ERTEKÜN Necati Münir (see item VI,15 above)

When history comes to pass judgement on the abundance of one-sided and unrealistic resolutions which have been adopted on Cyprus by the UN General Assembly over the past decades, Resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979 will probably stand out as being the most counter-productive, unrealistic and harmful resolution of them all for the reasons explained hereinafter.

Before proceeding to examine Resolution 34/30, it should be made quite clear at the very outset that all UN resolutions on Cyprus including the one under discussion (No. 34/30), which have been adopted after hearing only the Greek Cypriot side and without hearing the Turkish Cypriot side, the other party to the Cyprus dispute, in contravention of the 'audi alteram partem' rule of the rules of natural justice, cannot be considered as binding on the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot side has thus placed certain understandable reservations on the UN resolutions which are well known to the UN Secretary-General and to the Greek Cypriot side. As pointed out earlier, any reference to UN resolutions in Point 2 of the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 must, therefore, be understood by all concerned (and must also have been so understood by the Greek Cypriot leader and the UN Secretary-General on 19 May 1979) as being subject to such reservations.

A careful and objective examination of the provisions of Resolution 34/30 will show that not only are some of the provisions self-contradictory and are

not compatible with one another or with the summit agreements of 1977 and 1979, but some of the provisions themselves defeat or impede the very object of finding a just, lasting and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. It thus became quite clear why as many as 53 members of the UN did not find it possible to support the resolution and voted against, abstained from voting or did not participate in the voting on the Resolution.

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 88

VI,25 OBERLING, Pierre (see item VI,10 above)

. . . it is clear that in spite of Kyprianou's frequent assertions that time works to the advantage of his cause, the reverse is true. Already in 1976, the distinguished Greek Cypriot journalist, C. G. Lordos, writing in the daily *Alithia*, warned that to wait even three more years before reaching an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots would prove disastrous. He warned that, in the absence of an agreement, a 'specific development' would be 'the complete bedding down and consolidation of the present situation and the division of the island into two separate states'. He explained:

It would be naive to expect the Turks to yield us any authority over their own affairs after leading an independent life for five years. The only trump card we have got is the recognition of our State and the non-recognition of the 'Turkish Cypriot Administration'. But East Germany did not receive any recognition for years. Did it matter? . . . I believe that many a Muslim state that can influence the world because of its petrol resources is going to recognize the 'Turkish Cypriot State'. And, with the help and support of Turkey, in a few years' time either the 'Turkish Cypriot State' or a completely independent state within the confederation of Cyprus will be recognized. As for us, we shall probably draw the wrath of the world upon us for not having recognized this state.

We allege that Turkish Cypriots are an economic burden to Turkey and that she will not be able to bear it. This argument is illogical. It is like saying that Turkey, whose population is 40 million, will collapse if its population increases by another 120-150 thousand. But what will become of us in the meantime? The refugee problem will have been largely settled. Our children will grow up, make new friends and settle down away from their ancestral homes. As a result of this, the number of people wishing to return home, after a thirty-year struggle that has been going on since 1950, will be greatly reduced. International help will slow down and the de facto situation will become the status quo.\*

But if the 'long-term struggle' policy is doomed to failure, what is the best bargain which the Greek Cypriots could strike with the Turkish Cypriots in the immediate future? They would have to accept the basic conditions of the Turkish Cypriots, namely the creation of a bi-zonal and loosely-federated state.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, pp 228-9

\* *Alithia*, December 6, 1976.

## VI,26 WOOLLACOT, Martin

*Cyprus: Dealing for Dollars*

Greek Cyprus must rank as one of the most subsidized nations in the world. With a population of only half a million people, it receives something like \$54 million annually in grant aid from the United States, Greece, the United Nations, Britain, Germany and other countries, as well as an average \$12 million a year in soft loans. In addition, it benefits massively from the UN military presence – costs estimated at \$29 million a year, of which Canada pays a hefty share – and from the British bases.

Foreign aid and loans approach a fifth of all government revenues, and the over-all contribution to the economy, including the military spending, may be of the same order. This provides a solid, if rarely acknowledged, base for the dynamic Greek Cypriot economy. But since much of the money directly derives from the division of the island, it also creates, as one diplomat put it, 'a vested interest in keeping things as they are'. The booming Greek Cypriot economy, partly fuelled by such foreign injections, gives the Greek Cypriots no economic incentive for a settlement and tends to reinforce those hard-liners who prefer the strategy of the 'long struggle', which is really a strategy for the economic defeat of the Turkish zone.

*Maclean's Magazine*, June 25, 1979, p 29

## VI,27 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (Attorney-General of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus)

The fact of the continued recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the formal Government of Cyprus is seriously prejudicing the Turkish Cypriots' position in the political as well as economic fields. Turkish Cypriots are not allowed direct access to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, so that only the Greek Cypriot point of view is being heard there; the Central Bank of Cyprus is in the Greek Sector, so that no benefits from foreign currency loans or grants reach the Turkish side; the new airport built by the Turkish Cypriots at Ercan is not accepted by ICAO as an international airport, because it is not approved by the 'Government of Cyprus'; Famagusta is declared an 'illegal' port by the 'Government of Cyprus' and foreign skippers who use it are imprisoned and fined if they subsequently enter a port in the Greek Cypriot zone. The Greek Cypriot authorities, with the aim of damaging the economy of the North have taken steps to hinder communications and trade with the North through the air and seaports and pressure has been brought to bear on those who intend to call at these ports or who intend to trade with the northern part of Cyprus.

'Setting the Record Straight on Cyprus',  
Special News Bulletin, August 8, 1979, p 2.  
(A case in point was the elimination by the  
Syrian government of the ferry service from  
Famagousta to Latakia, in January 1979,  
under pressure from the Kyprianou regime.)

## VI,28 OBERLING, Pierre (see item VI,10 above)

Kyprianou's economic blockade, by putting a premium on self-sufficiency, has also strengthened the determination of the Turkish Cypriots to keep most of the territory seized during the Second Peace Operation of 1974.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, p 228

(iv) *Population Exchange**Editorial Note*

The proposals agreed between Dentash and Clerides at Vienna in the third round of talks (31 July to 2 August 1975, see item VI,1 above) clearly envisaged an exchange of population between the north and south of Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios appeared to have accepted that there could be no question of a return *en masse* of the Greek Cypriots displaced from the north either during the actual fighting of 1974 or by subsequent emigration. Nevertheless his successors on the Greek Cypriot side seem to have reverted to the earlier demand that all the displaced Greek Cypriots must be given the right to return regardless of the effect this might have on the capacity of the region to sustain its present Turkish population. Since the present Greek Cypriot leadership also grossly exaggerates the total number of displaced Greek Cypriots, this has become a major stumbling block in the negotiations. President Kyprianou was reported in the Greek Cypriot press as stating officially and decisively on 25 November 1986 that in the Greek Cypriot view the Population Agreement (item VI,1 above) did not exist and said: 'We do not recognize this agreement'.

## VI,29 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see item V,15 above)

As part of this propaganda campaign (sc. to gain the sympathy of international public opinion for the Greek Cypriot refugees alone, ignoring the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots displaced in 1964 and subsequently) they have grossly exaggerated the number of displaced Greek Cypriots, which they claim to be as high as 200,000 and have continuously demanded the return of these people to their homes as a precondition to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, inspite of subsequent agreements for a solution based on a bi-zonal Federal Republic.

As regards the actual number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons, it has been established that the figure is far below 200,000. Some reports in the Greek Cypriot press have their numbers as only 56,300 in October 1975. While Mr Criton Tornaritis, the Attorney-General of the Greek Cypriot Administration, indicated in his pamphlet entitled the 'Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus' that the entire population of the North could not possibly have exceeded 129,000 prior to July 1979.

Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons, and although the Greek Cypriot side has been very inconsistent on the matter, a census of evacuated Greek Villages and houses has shown that the figure is in the vicinity of 105,000.

That the number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons is grossly exaggerated, is also evident from the fact that foreign food aid granted to the Greek side has given rise to stockpiling. The Greek press has more than once

reported that the food is being sold on the market at half price (Greek newspaper *Mesimvrini* and *Mahi* dated 5 November 1974 and 13 May 1975 respectively).

Impartial estimates confirm that the number of Greek displaced persons is around 105,000. This is approximately equal to that of the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons – 65,000 who were displaced after the events of July 1964 and 25,000 who have been refugees since the Greek Cypriot onslaught of December 1963 during which 103 Turkish villages were completely or partially destroyed.

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In view of the bitter experience of eleven years of oppression in the hands of the Greek Cypriots, there is not a single Turkish Cypriot displaced person who is willing to return to the south and to go through the same ordeal once again. On the other hand the demand for the return of all Greek Cypriot displaced persons is inconsistent with the agreement for the exchange of populations concluded at the third round of the Vienna talks in 1975, and also incompatible with the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-national Federal Republic as envisaged in the Denktash-Makarios guidelines of February 1977. Needless to say it will be possible for some Greek Cypriots to return once a final solution to the Cyprus problem is reached and the present boundary line is adjusted. But the fact that many Greek Cypriots have accepted the establishment of a bi-zonal Republic was acknowledged by even Archbishop Makarios. In a statement made to Eric Silver of the *Guardian*, which was also published in the *Cyprus Mail* of 23 March 1977, the late Archbishop Makarios had made it clear that the return of all the Greek Cypriot refugees was out of the question and that to the best of his expectations only about one-tenth might want to return.

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
pp 102-4

#### VI,30 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

The Greek side exploited the refugee issue, first by grossly exaggerating the number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons and also by deliberately delaying their rehabilitation.

After the final ceasefire in August 1974, the Greek Cypriot authorities were reported to have declared the number of displaced Greeks to the UN High Commissioner of Refugees as 160,000. This figure included thousands of Greek Cypriots who had moved out of the main towns and villages to hill resorts or to Greek areas during the coup and the peace operation, but who had returned home after the ceasefire. The propaganda figure put out by the Greek Cypriot leaders is around 200,000. However a service note on 'Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus', circulated by the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General, Mr Criton Tornarides in 1975, puts the total number of Greek Cypriots who were domiciled in the liberated areas in the north at 128,563. Nevertheless the Greek side has never attempted to show

how 200,000 Greeks could be displaced from an area where only 128,563 Greeks were living.

*The Cyprus Triangle, p 98*

‘Population Exchange Agreement cannot be Denied’ says President Denktash.

‘Kyprianou’s denial of any population exchange agreement is, in itself, a refusal to accept that any Cyprus problem exists at all’ President Denktash declared on Saturday, in reply to the spokesman of the Greek Cypriot administration’s rebuttal of the agreement. ‘If they go on like this, they will suffer the consequences. Our people will not be influenced by this, which would mean uprooting and resettling 65,000 Turks again. Our agreement is the very foundation of a bi-zonal solution for the two communities accepted by both Clerides and Makarios. When, in 1979, Kyprianou met me, he did not repudiate the population agreement. If he had done so, no final solution could possibly be envisaged. At our meeting, the population exchange was so fundamentally understood that it did not need to be discussed. Kyprianou did not attempt to argue about it or reject it’, President Denktas said and added:

Two factors are vital for the realisation of a bizonal federation:

- a) The population exchange agreement, and
- b) The background of eleven years of Greek attacks and repression, preceded by EOKA violence and unlawfulness.

Instead of striving for the unobtainable and flaunting heroics, Kyprianou should concentrate on the bi-zonal federation as agreed. Preaching pre-1974 formulas is like building castles in the air.

With the exchange of populations, a real basis was established for the future. Denying this does not help the Greek population. The real answer is genuine acceptance of a natural outcome of what happened to the Turks between 1963 and 1974, when they were held as political hostages, killed, and denied elementary rights.

To-day’s rejection of the population exchange, which the UN itself applied, can only arouse suspicions of any future agreement with this people.

Turkish Cypriots, leaving behind eleven years of cruelty and death, crossed to the North to secure their liberty and are determined to live in the boundaries of the state they established.

But arising from this exchange, we will naturally negotiate the respective compensation due to both sides.

Weekly Bulletin *KIBRIS*, 24 March 1981

(v) *Bi-zonality*

*Editorial Note*

From the outset of the inter-communal talks, when they were resumed after the fighting stopped in 1974, it was agreed that there should be discussion of ‘the powers

and functions of the central government in a federal state'. The concept of federation strongly implies regional separation. Two years later the Makarios/Denktaş Four Guidelines of 12 February 1977 (see item VI,3 above) spoke of 'the territory (NB *not* the territories) under the administration of each community'. President Denktaş has explained (see item VI,32 below) that the reason why the specific term 'bi-zonal' was not used in the Four Guidelines was simply that the Archbishop asked for 'the avoidance of words and terms which would leave him in an awkward situation before his community'. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot representatives in the talks, after the Archbishop's death in 1977 and Kyprianou's assumption of the Presidency in the south of Cyprus, often appeared to be disputing or evading the issue of bi-zonality. It was not until August 1980 that the UN Secretary-General's 'opening statement' seemed to have put the matter beyond doubt; and even then, in a public statement on the same day, President Kyprianou appeared to be repudiating the acceptance of bi-zonality by the Greek Cypriot side (see item VI,31 below) and a year later still appeared to be doing so (see item VI,34 below).

VI,31 KYPRIANOU, Spyros, (President of (Greek Cypriot) Cyprus)

It has been argued that since the opening statement (sc. the UN Secretary-General's statement of 9 August 1980) contains the word bi-zonal, we have committed ourselves with regard to this term. First of all, we have not undertaken any commitment and everything is open for discussion as stressed in the statement itself. But apart from this, the word bi-zonal refers in this case to the territorial aspect only. Since the principle of federation is accepted with regard to constitutional structure, it would be inconceivable to have a partition federation. . . . Therefore, it is not at all correct to say that we have accepted bizonality. We have not done so. This word is simply mentioned in the Secretary-General's statement concerning the territorial aspect which will be discussed. . . .

In a statement to the Press concerning the UN Secretary-General's opening statement on 9 August 1980 (the same day as that statement was made)

VI,32 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

Kyprianou's statement is a good document in our hands. It has now become tangibly clear who has been holding up the talks. . . .

President Denktaş also said that at the summit he had held with the late Archbishop Makarios the latter had accepted bizonality, but that Mr Kyprianou's attitude had been negative. The talks then, recalled Mr Denktaş, had been discontinued when Mr Kyprianou sought to deny this agreement. . . .

Statement to the press on 10 August 1980

VI,33 CLERIDES, Glafcos

Mr Clerides accused President Kyprianou of failing to follow Makarios's

policies on the national issue and asserted that because he had disagreed with Makarios's views in the National Council he did not seek to promote them.

#### Bizonality

He asserted that President Kyprianou had declined to discuss with the Turkish Cypriot side the concept of 'bi-zonality' and made its acceptance conditional on agreement on the principles of the guidelines.

On the question of bi-zonality Mr Clerides said that President Makarios at the March 1977 meeting of the cabinet and National Council had explained that any accommodation would be unpopular but the matters should be looked upon with a sense of responsibility and not of popularity, and called for taking decisions and shaping events instead of watching events passively.

At that meeting, Mr Clerides said, the late Archbishop defended a 'bi-zonal' settlement as opposed to a 'multi-zonal' settlement, and it was in this sense that he concurred with the presentation of proposals on a map.

*Cyprus Mail, 25 June 1980*

#### VI,34 KYPRIANOU, Spyros (President of (Greek Cypriot) Cyprus)

It has been argued that since the opening statement contains the word bi-zonal, we have committed ourselves with regard to this term. First of all, we have not undertaken any commitment and everything is open for discussion as stressed in the statement itself. But apart from this, the word bi-zonal refers in this case to the territorial aspects only. Since the principle of federation is accepted with regard to constitutional structure, it would be inconceivable to have a partition federation. Therefore, the only interpretation that can be given to 'bi-zonal' when referring to the territorial aspect is that it means two regions. In fact in the Turkish language the exact translation of the term is two regions. The term, of course, is not a successful one and we shall explain why at the negotiating table. No such term exists in any constitution of any federation. The term is not constitutional. If by this term the Turkish side aims at promoting a partitionist solution then naturally there will be no room for negotiation. Therefore, it is not at all correct to say that we have accepted bi-zonality. We have not done so. This word is simply mentioned in the Secretary-General's statement concerning the territorial aspect which will be discussed. In any case our interpretation of the term and our views on it are set out in my letter to the Secretary-General. Our position is clear: We are seeking a solution on the basis of the two high level agreements, a bi-regional solution and our suggestion is that there should be no conflict over terms during the negotiation and an effort should be made to see whether it is possible to reach agreement on the substance. If agreement is reached on the substance, then one could discuss terminologies but again the right terminology should be used. Therefore, everything can be set on the negotiating table on the basis of the Makarios-Denkash and the Kyprianou-Denkash agreements.

*Cyprus Mail, 21 April 1981*

*Editorial Note*

Mr Kyrianiou's reluctance to accept the term 'bi-zonal' and his insistence that it should refer only to the territorial aspect were not as inane as they might appear at first sight. The point was that he wished to renege on the earlier acceptance, not of 'bi-zonality', but of 'population exchange'. By insisting on the right of the displaced Greek Cypriots to return *en masse* he could block indefinitely Turkish acceptance of a settlement and shift the blame on to the Turkish side for the continuing deadlock. It also suited his book in terms of Greek Cypriot politics to pose as a resolute defender of the right of all the refugees to return (even though in fact this might mean cruelly fostering an illusion). But it was difficult to deny directly the Greek Cypriot acceptance of 'population exchange' in view of the specific terms of the Denktash/Clerides agreement of 2 August 1975 (see item VI,1 above). He therefore sought to reintroduce the issue in a roundabout way by assuming that bi-zonality implied denial of any right of return and then condemning it on those grounds. In the end the issue of bi-zonality was resolved by adopting the formula that the proposed Federal Republic should be 'bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect' (see item VI,50 below). Whether that made an iota of difference in practice to the refugees' prospects of return remains to be seen. The Turkish Cypriots dismiss the whole argument about bi-zonality as just another example of delaying tactics on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership.

In this connection it should be noted that the Anglo-American proposals of 10 November 1978 (see item VI,4 above) specifically envisaged that one of the two regions 'will be predominantly inhabited by Greek Cypriots, the other by Turkish Cypriots'. Such 'predominance' would seem to be inherent in the concept of separate Greek and Turkish zones, each under its own communal administration. And that would seem to rule out any massive return of Greek Cypriots to the Turkish region such as to upset the predominance of the Turkish inhabitants there.

## VI,35 FAULDS, Andrew MP

*Bizonality in Cyprus*

In principle there is nothing inherently wrong in bizonality as an answer to the problem of how two separate and antipathetic peoples should co-exist when they share a common homeland. Ideally it is no doubt better if they can manage to tolerate one another and live integrated together. But sometimes that is not possible. Peoples cannot be forced into tolerant co-habitation at close quarters with one another.

The real objection to bizonality is not in principle but in practice. If history has left intermingled two peoples who find themselves incapable of living together, their physical separation may be the only answer, short of having one dominate, and perhaps in time squeeze out, the other. But how to bring about their separation if they cannot do it by mutual consent? Then the cost in terms of human suffering has to be set against – and may well outweigh – whatever advantages are foreseen in separating them.

Once however separation has taken place, albeit at the cost of injustice and suffering, the nature of the argument changes. For better or worse the separation has happened and the question then is whether it can or should be reversed. The objection of practicability no longer applies against separation

and may indeed now lie against trying to reimpose integration. The best course may then be to accept the *fait accompli* of separation and to concentrate on trying to ensure that the form it takes is as fair as possible to both sides. That may become the only practicable course as time goes by.

Extract from a paper issued by the Friends of North Cyprus Parliamentary Group in November 1987

(vi) *Character of the federal government*

VI,36 MAKARIOS/DENKTASH Guidelines

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The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal-character of the State.

UN doc S/12323, paragraph 5 12 February 1977

VI,37 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (see item VI,27 above)

For Turkish Cypriots the basic issue is security. They cannot tolerate a 'strong' federal government until prolonged and happy experience with cohabitation under a weaker one has changed the climate in the island. Taking into consideration the differences of economic and social circumstances as well as the differences of outlook of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, the creation of a 'strong' central government at the outset, at the expense of the autonomy of the component units, could create the risk of emphasizing these differences and of encouraging the centrifugal forces. Moreover, a 'strong' central government would entail the prospect of domination over the Turkish Cypriot unit and of consequent friction between the two units of the federation.

The Turkish Cypriot view regarding a weak federation with a proviso that more powers may devolve upon the central government as confidence grows, is supported by the Swiss example. Under the Swiss constitution of 1874 the central government's powers were mainly those generally considered an initial necessity in a federation: foreign affairs, defence and foreign commerce. The Swiss constitution of 1874, which is still in force today, granted additional powers to the federation regarding the armed forces, currency, and commercial and industrial legislation. As confidence grew, more and more powers were transferred to the federation. From 1874 to 1975, 86 revisions of the federal constitution have been adopted, and at least a third of these revisions concerned the transfer of powers from the cantons to the federal government. This shows that the Swiss state was not artificially centralised, but built up from below.

*Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 49-50

## VI,38 GROOM, John (see item VI,9 above)

In the discussions that took place after 1980 too much emphasis was put on the constitution. Constitutions cannot command behaviour, they can only reflect it, otherwise they are empty vessels – propaganda weapons. In general, it is more fruitful to start with behaviour, building local ties of a practical nature, not with great issues of constitutional principle; the discussion of reality is more fruitful than debate over unreal conjectured situations. Moreover, it is salutary to remember that in heterogeneous societies a strong central government would actually intensify the struggle to control it with subsequent disaffection of the losers, as has occurred so tragically in Zimbabwe. It would therefore exacerbate communal conflict rather than mollify it.

*Cyprus in Transition*, p 133

## (vii) 'Concrete and substantial', the Denktash proposals, April 1978

## VI,39 OBERLING, Pierre (see item VI,10 above)

In January 1978, the Greek Cypriot government agreed to resume negotiations if the Turkish Cypriot side would produce a set of proposals which Secretary-General Waldheim would judge to be 'concrete and substantial'. On April 13, the Turkish Cypriot government issued a document outlining its negotiating position.

*The Road to Bella Pais*, p 211

## VI,40 DENKTASH PROPOSALS, April 1978

*Editorial Note*

The proposals were submitted to the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, on 13 April 1978 in Vienna. They were also explained to him orally during the following two days. They were long and detailed. The text of the proposals was published as an annex to the UN Secretary-General's Report S/12723 of May 1978 to the Security Council. The following short summary is taken from *Our Republic in Perspective* by Z. M. Nejatigil, the Attorney-General of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

The 1978 proposals of the Turkish Cypriot side envisaged the creation, by the free will and agreement of the two communities, of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state to be composed of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot federated states. Federal executive power of the proposed republic should be vested in the federal executive under the joint direction of the two Presidents of the federated states. Federal legislative power should be exercised by the legislative assemblies of the two federated states and the federal Assembly. All powers and functions not specifically given to the federal Executive should be vested in the federated states.

As for the territorial aspect, these proposals provided for readjusting the de facto boundary line between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot zones. The map attached to the proposals delineated the areas falling between the

'Forward Defence Lines' of the two sides which were to be included in the readjustment. The area between south of Marash (Varosha) and Dherinia was also included in the boundary readjustment scheme.

*Our Republic in Perspective*, p 30

*Editorial Note*

The Turkish Cypriot Proposals of 13 April 1978 are published in full as an Annex to the UN Secretary-General's Report S/12723 of 31 May 1978.

VI,41 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, Dr Kurt Waldheim

In pursuance of his mission of good offices, the Secretary-General met in Vienna on 13, 14 and 15 April 1978 with Professor Mümtaz Soysal and Mr Necati Münir Ertekün, Legal Adviser to the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor at the intercommunal talks. On behalf of His Excellency Mr Denktash, Mr Ertekün and Professor Soysal handed to the Secretary-General on 13 April a document setting forth the main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position. The Turkish Cypriot proposals deal with the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem in a concrete and substantial way.

Professor Soysal and Mr Ertekün explained their proposals to the Secretary-General in some detail.

At the second and third meetings on 14 and 15 April, a number of points were further clarified and there was a discussion on the procedure to be followed in preparation for a new round of intercommunal talks. The Secretary-General informed Professor Soysal and Mr Ertekün that it was his intention to study the Turkish Cypriot proposals carefully. He will be in touch with both sides concerning a resumption of the intercommunal talks.

Statement issued on 15 April, 1978

*Editorial Note*

The UN Secretary-General evidently found sufficient merit in the Turkish Cypriot proposals to justify and make worth while a special visit to Cyprus to hand over the proposals to the Greek Cypriot leader Mr Kyprianou, in person four days later on 19 April 1978.

I personally transmitted the Turkish Cypriot proposals to President Kyprianou in Nicosia on 19 April. He informed me that these proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks. In the course of our conversation and also publicly later the same day, Mr Kyprianou emphasized that since the philosophy and concept of the Turkish Cypriot proposals were 'totally unacceptable' to his side, neither their substance nor their basis was capable of being improved to the point of becoming negotiable. I also met His Excellency Mr Denktash who, for his part, stressed that his side's proposals provided the basis for re-establishing an intercommunal partnership which could pave the way to harmony by a process of evolution.

On 22 April 1978, the Greek Cypriot representative at the intercommunal talks, Mr Papadopoulos, reiterated in a letter to me that his side found the

Turkish Cypriot proposals 'utterly unacceptable and contrary to the letter and spirit of all United Nations resolutions on Cyprus' and that the documents submitted by the Turkish Cypriot side 'cannot possibly be considered to form the basis for resumption of any meaningful and substantive negotiations between the two sides'. To this letter Mr Papadopoulos appended a document containing his observations on the Turkish Cypriot proposals (S/12695).

Since my return from Nicosia, numerous statements have been issued by both sides commenting on the substance of the Turkish Cypriot proposals and on the question of a resumption of the negotiating process. Thus, on 2 May, Mr Örek, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community, stated that the proposals were a starting point for negotiations and that his community had thus fulfilled all the prerequisites for the resumption of intercommunal talks. He appealed to the Secretary-General to fix a date as early as possible for another round of talks. At a press conference on 11 May, the Prime Minister of Turkey similarly stated his view that following the submission of the Turkish Cypriot proposals the Secretary-General reconvene the intercommunal talks. Mr Ecevit also stressed that the proposals were negotiable in every respect, including in particular the question of the future political framework of Varosha and the size of the geographical arrangements envisaged in six areas along the buffer zone.

Following my return to Headquarters on 20 April, I undertook further consultations with all concerned. On 2 May the United Nations spokesman was authorized to issue the following statement:

The Turkish Cypriot proposals on Cyprus which had been handed to the Secretary-General in Vienna on 13 April 1978, were transmitted by the Secretary-General personally to President Kyprianou in Nicosia on 19 April. Mr Kyprianou informed the Secretary-General that these proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of intercommunal talks.

Evidently, there is a gap between the positions of the two parties as regards the basis for a resumption of the talks. In these circumstances the Secretary-General, in pursuance of his mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council under resolution 367 (1975), intends to continue his consultations in order to clarify positions of both sides in regard to a resumption of the negotiating process.

UN doc S/12723 of 31 May 1978

VI,42 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see item VI,15 above)

An examination of the comprehensive Turkish Cypriot proposals will readily confirm the UN Secretary-General's conclusion that the Turkish Cypriot proposals did indeed deal with the problem 'in a concrete and substantial way'. The Greek Cypriot side, nevertheless thought fit to reject these proposals out of hand even before they had the opportunity to examine and consider them in detail. It will be observed from paragraph 53 of the UN Secretary-General's above-mentioned Report that Mr Kyprianou informed the UN Secretary-General that 'these proposals were not acceptable as a

basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks' on the very same day (19 April 1978) on which they were transmitted to him personally by the UN Secretary-General in Nicosia! One reason, no doubt, why the Greek Cypriot side rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposals with such indecent haste, without even giving them the examination on their merits which such proposals warranted and not withstanding the fact that, as President Denktash had stressed to the UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim, during the same visit to Nicosia on 19 April 1978, the proposals were merely a starting point for negotiations and that they were negotiable, was the obsession and fear, which Greece and the Greek Cypriots had at the time, that any visible progress, such as even the agreement of the Greek Cypriots simply to examine and discuss the Turkish Cypriot proposals would 'endanger' (as the Greeks used to put it) the continuation of the American arms embargo on Turkey, the lifting of which was about to be considered in the US Congress at the time!

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 61

VI,43 ERTEKÜN, Necati Münir (see item VI,15 above)

After President Denktash met the UN Secretary-General in New York on 22 May 1978, President Denktash issued a statement advocating the immediate resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General and indicating that, as negotiations progressed, the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha would be able to begin returning to their homes and businesses under arrangements that would meet the legitimate security concerns of both communities. President Denktash also suggested again that the parties discuss the reopening of Nicosia International Airport for civilian traffic and for initial United Nations use.

*In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement,*  
p 64

VI,44 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, Dr Kurt Waldheim

On 20 July Mr Denktash released an 'open message to the Greek Cypriot leadership' calling for the resettlement of Varosha by its 35,000 Greek Cypriot inhabitants and resumption of intercommunal negotiations (A/33/187-S/12782). He stated that he was prepared to enter into discussions promptly to plan for the establishment of an interim administration for Varosha under the aegis of the United Nations, without prejudice to the existing or future status of the area, simultaneously with a resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of Makarios-Denktash guideline of 12 February 1977 (S/12323, para 5). The interim administration would supervise essential municipal services and police functions; the United Nations would provide technical assistance as necessary.

Mr Ecevit issued a statement in Ankara on the same day supporting Mr Denktash's proposals.

UN doc a/33/348 of 2 November 1978

*Editorial Note:*

This offer also was rejected by the Greek Cypriots on the implausible grounds that it would enable only 5,000 (not 35,000) Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes and that the Greeks returning would be subject to re-expulsion. It seems that the Greek Cypriot leaders were reluctant to accept any partial amelioration of the refugee problem because it might put the Turkish Cypriots in a better light internationally, blunt the force of Greek Cypriot demands regarding both refugees and territory and expose the leadership to the resentment of other refugees unable to return.

VI,45 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (see item VI,27 above)

*Editorial Note*

What in essence was the 'gap between the positions of the two parties' to which the UN Secretary-General referred in his statement of 2 May 1978? The following comment seems to sum it up.

At the root of all these differences lies the disagreement of the two ethnic peoples of Cyprus as to the sovereignty of the future Federation. Will the sovereignty of the future Federation derive from the sovereign peoples of the two communities previously organised in States of their own or will that sovereignty be derived from a single central Government? In other words, will the government of a future Federal Republic of Cyprus be the successor of the two communal administrations that now exist de facto on the island, or of the Greek Cypriot regime which is passing itself off as 'the Government of Cyprus'. It is submitted that there can be no genuine equality of status for the two communities in negotiating a settlement as co-founder of the Cyprus Republic, or as co-founders of the future Federal Republic, as long as the Greek Cypriot regime in Nicosia regards itself and is regarded internationally as the 'Government of Cyprus' and, ignoring the Cyprus realities, insists that sovereignty of the future Federal Republic of Cyprus will derive from itself.

*The Cyprus Conflict: A Lawyer's View*, p 140

(viii) *Further Turkish Cypriot proposals, August 1981*

VI,46 GOBBI, Hugo (then UN Special Representative in Cyprus)

The Turkish Cypriot side presented their comprehensive proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem, including a draft constitution and territorial proposals with maps, one defining the proposed boundary line between the two component units of the proposed Federal Republic and the other relating to Varosha in particular. The Turkish Cypriot proposals also deal with the question of security arrangements.

Statement issued in Nicosia on 5 August  
1981

## VI,47 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (see item VI,27 above)

The constitutional proposals, which were negotiable subject to the two summit agreements, were submitted in the form of a draft constitution.

The constitutional proposals included the following fundamental principles:

(a) The proposed federal republic shall be bi-communal and bi-zonal. However, the union of two federated states to form a federal state cannot result in the establishment of a unitary state. Moreover, each federated state must have its territory (land, sea and air space), people and government.

(b) Within this bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic the equal co-founder partnership status of the Turkish Cypriot community shall be maintained. The representation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the legislature and other public institutions should be on the basis of 50:50 ratio.

(c) The federal or central government shall not be vested with excessive powers vis-a-vis powers of the component federated states.

(d) Freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right of property shall be subject to certain restrictions to be regulated in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraph (3) of the Denktash-Makarios guidelines of 12 February 1977.

The Turkish Cypriot draft constitution listed the following as 'federal matters':

- 1 Foreign affairs
- 2 Federal financial affairs
- 3 Tourism and information
- 4 Posts and telecommunications
- 5 Federal health and veterinary services
- 6 Standards of weights and measures, patents, copyrights and trade marks.

All powers and functions not provided in the draft constitution as federal matters would rest with the federated states.

The draft constitution envisaged a bi-communal federal Parliament comprising of federal Senate and a federal House of Representatives. Both houses would be composed of equal number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members.

The executive power of the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be exercised by a federal Council composed of three Turkish Cypriot and three Greek Cypriot ministers.

On the territorial aspect, the Turkish side submitted two different maps, one defining the proposed boundary line between the two federated states (components of the Federal Republic), and one showing the Marash (Varosha) area in particular. These proposals would be valid only subject to final agreement being reached on the constitutional aspect and on the question of security arrangements. The Turkish side concluded that any further reduction in size of its proposed territory as defined on the attached map, would gravely undermine the concepts of economic viability, productivity, land ownership and security, which constituted the basis of the

Turkish Cypriot community's concrete proposals on the question of territory.

*Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 34 to 36

VI,48 CYPRUS MAIL

The Turkish Cypriot side yesterday presented its long awaited proposals for a Cyprus settlement, including a draft constitution and maps to illustrate its territorial proposals.

UN Special Representative Mr Hugo Gobbi, more happy now than a week ago, said he was rationally optimistic 'because something is moving' . . .

*Cyprus Mail*, 6 August 1981

*Kyprianou rejects proposals but calls for further talks*

President Kyprianou has declared that the recent Turkish proposals cannot form a basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem but indicated that the intercommunal talks would continue for further exploration of possibilities of progress towards an agreed settlement . . .

*Cyprus Mail*, 18 August 1981

. . . replying to questions, Mr Gobbi described his meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr Türkmen, during his last visit to Cyprus as 'very constructive' and added he believed Mr Türkmen favoured an 'in-depth' discussion of all aspects of the Cyprus problem and he has hopes for progress in the talks.

The Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Mr Onan, also confirmed that Mr Türkmen had said all issues are negotiable. 'They are certainly open for discussions', he said. . . .

*Cyprus Mail*, 27 August 1981

## 2 The De Cuellar Initiatives, 1984-6

(i) *First initiative, 1983-5*

VI,49 GROOM, John (see item VI,9 above)

Early in 1984 Mr Denktash made a number of suggestions for consideration by the Greek Cypriots, both in public and through the good offices of the United Nations. These concerned Varosha, the opening of Nicosia International Airport, the reactivation of the Committee of Missing Persons and a host of other suggestions in a variety of functional domains. Some of these proposals were old hat, and some reflected initial bargaining positions, but there was also much that was new and constructive and, therefore not per se worthy of instant dismissal.

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## Security Council

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### DRAFT AGREEMENT ON CYPRUS

The parties agree on the following matters which are to be viewed as an integrated whole:

#### The Parties:

(a) Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979;

(b) Indicate their determination to proceed, at the date referred to in paragraph 14 below, to the establishment of a federal republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect;

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C(ii) The territory of the Federal Republic shall comprise the two provinces or federated States.

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5.1 A working group will discuss the exercise of the freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property, including time frames, practical regulations and possible compensation arrangements, taking into account guideline 3 of the 1977 agreement.

6.1 Territorial adjustments, in addition to the areas already referred to in the 5 August 1981 Turkish Cypriot proposals, will be agreed upon, bearing in mind the criteria contained in the 1977 high-level agreement. These territorial adjustments will result in the Turkish Cypriot province or federated State comprising in the order of 29 per cent of the territory of the Federal Republic. Both sides agree to suggest special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides. These areas will remain under their respective civilian jurisdiction. A working group will consider the specific areas of the territorial adjustments as well as the specific areas and characteristics of the special status areas.

7.1 A timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot military troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees, will be agreed upon prior to the establishment of a transitional federal Government.

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9.1 The Varosha area and the six additional areas delineated in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981 will be placed under United Nations interim administration as part of the UNFICYP buffer zone for resettlement, by a date to be agreed upon at a future joint high-level meeting.

10.1 Both parties agree not to take any action tending to prejudice the process outlined in this agreement, both on the international scene and internally.

11.1 The Nicosia international airport will be reopened under interim United Nations administration with free access from both sides. The United Nations will conclude the arrangements to that effect by a date to be agreed upon at a future joint high-level meeting.

Mr Denktash continued to express his willingness to talk to Mr Kyprianou on a person-to-person basis as community representatives with no recognition implied. For Mr Kyprianou, however, there could be 'no talks before withdrawal of independence.' . . .

The UN Secretary-General has had for many years a 'mission of good offices' conferred upon him regarding Cyprus. In June 1984 Mr Perez de Cuellar and his colleagues rightly judged the moment propitious to arrange 'proximity talks' with and between the two Cypriot parties (thereby circumventing the Greek-Cypriot refusal to talk directly with Turkish Cypriots). The talks progressed well and at the end of the third round the Secretary-General was able to inform the Security Council on December 12, 1984 that he expected the interlocutors at the 'high-level' meeting arranged for January 17, 1985 would 'conclude an agreement containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution to the problem, aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus.\*

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With strong Turkish backing Mr Denktash made such substantial concessions that Mr Perez de Cuellar felt warranted in being optimistic in his report to the Security Council and that Mr Papandreou was led to declare on January 2, 1985 that the Turkish Cypriots had 'undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem'.\*\* Indeed Mr Papandreou appears to have encouraged the Greek Cypriots to be conciliatory. Prior to the final sessions of the proximity talks, after the Turkish-Cypriot side had given their full agreement to the Secretary-General's document Mr Kyprianou consulted his own and the Greek Government and then gave the green light to the Secretary-General. Mr Kyprianou is reported to have commented 'everything is fine; our side has obtained the best possible conditions.'\*\*\*

What, after the proximity talks, was the Secretary-General proposing to which he thought the parties had agreed and on which they could set the seal in 'an hour' when the 'high-level' meeting convened in January? It is generally said that the notion of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic was reaffirmed. The powers of the federal government were defined and the Upper House would have equal Greek-Cypriot and Turkish representation while the Lower House and the Executive would have a ratio of seven (Greek-Cypriot) to three (Turkish-Cypriot). The Presidency would not rotate between the two communities as had at one time been proposed, but the Foreign Minister would be a Turkish Cypriot. Constitutional guarantees would be given to both communities and an equal political status in the federal government. Of great significance was the Turkish-Cypriot agreement to a territorial adjustment to 29% (less than the magical 30% and only 1% more than the 28% for which Archbishop Makariso had been willing to settle). It was suggested that the Turkish Cypriots would relinquish control of large areas around Morphou, Varosha

\* para 51 of UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, UN doc. S/16858

\*\* Athens News Agency

\*\*\* Letter from Nicos Rolandis, former Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, in *Phileleftheros*, Cyprus, 25 January 1985

and a substantial zone between Famagusta and Nicosia. Moreover, foreign armed forces would be withdrawn from the island and international guarantees made. A transitional government would be established and funds set up to facilitate economic equilibrium between the two parts of the island and the resettlement of displaced persons. Nicosia airport would be re-opened to all and the UN would administer certain territories on an interim basis. The details would be settled in working groups. Nothing like this had been seen before and it justified the Secretary-General's jubilant tone to the Security Council.\*

*Cyprus in Transition*, pp 135 and 139-41

VI,50 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (see item VI,27 above)

### DENKTASH PROPOSALS

On 2 January 1984 Mr Denktash, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, announced a series of goodwill measures designed to settle some of the outstanding issues between the two communities. Including among these were proposals to turn over a defined sector of the city of Varosha and the Nicosia International airport to an interim United Nations supervision and administration. The Turkish side made it clear that holding of negotiations on these issues would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the two sides with regard to each other's political status.

As regards Varosha, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted to place under United Nations administration the sector to the east of Dherinia road and extending in the south up to the Greek Cypriot forward defence line of the Varosha area as defined in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981. The question of Greek Cypriot resettlement in the area defined should be considered as stipulated in point 5 of the 1959 Denktash-Kyprianou summit agreement simultaneously with the beginning of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, without awaiting the outcome of the discussions on other aspects of the Cyprus question.

On the question of the Nicosia international airport, the Turkish Cypriot side reiterated its proposal as to the re-opening of the airport to civilian traffic under an interim United Nations administration for the benefit of the two sides, without insisting that the airport be administered by the parties themselves on the basis of equality.

In order to finalize the humanitarian issue of missing Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the Turkish side proposed that the Committee on Missing Persons, set up in 1981, be re-activated in accordance with the 'terms of reference' agreed to between the two sides.

These proposals also included a framework of principles that should guide the relations of the two sides and the common ground on which their actions should be based in order to facilitate progress towards a final settlement of the problem.

\* As reported in *The Times*, 15 December 1984

The framework included a series of confidence-building measures. The two sides should refrain from hampering each other's interests in the fields of trade, tourism and communications; both sides should benefit equally from all economic assistance provided for Cyprus and an economic and technical commission should be set up to study the question of cooperation between the two sides in the areas of trade, tourism, municipal problems, water supply, etc. It was also proposed that the two sides should consider joint endeavours in the cultural field to promote a better understanding between the younger generations, in particular to promote the teaching of Turkish and Greek as a second language respectively, to cooperate in higher education and study the feasibility of setting up a joint university and organize scientific and cultural joint meetings. Furthermore, both sides should agree to refrain from all kinds of provocation and undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force; they should agree that their respective leaders meet under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General to discuss the process of steadily moving towards federal arrangements, and call upon Turkey and Greece to encourage and assist their efforts in search of a negotiated settlement on the basis of the 1977 Denktash-Makarios agreement, the 1979 Denktash-Kyprianou agreement, the 1980 'Opening Statement' of the UN Secretary-General and the 1981 UN 'Evaluation Document'.

The United States Administration welcomed these proposals as a 'movement' in the right direction.

On the same day the proposals were made, the Government of Turkey announced its intention to withdraw 1,500 of Turkish troops from Cyprus.

On 6 January the Greek Cypriot government dismissed the overtures of Mr Denktash as propaganda aimed at misleading international opinion.

*Our Republic in Perspective*, pp 116-7

#### VI,51 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar

##### AGENDA FOR THE THIRD ROUND OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROXIMITY TALKS ON CYPRUS

(preliminary draft for a joint high-level agreement)

Held at United Nations Headquarters  
in November 1984

The parties have agreed on the following matters which are to be viewed as an integrated whole:

##### The Parties

- a) Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979;
- b) Indicate their determination to proceed, at the date referred to in paragraph 14 below, to the establishment of a federal republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect;

c) Reaffirm their acceptance of those introductory constitutional provisions that were agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-82:

i) The Federal Republic of Cyprus shall have international personality; the federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all the territory.

ii) The people of the Federal Republic shall comprise the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community. There shall be a single citizenship of the Federal Republic of Cyprus regulated by federal law.

(Reference verbatim to the provisions agreed upon during the course of the intercommunal talks or to be annexed to this document. In both cases wording, as reproduced in the revision dated 18.5.82 will be used and checked with both parties.)

1 Powers and functions to be vested in the federal government of the Federal Republic shall comprise:

- a) Foreign affairs.
- b) Federal financial affairs (including federal budget, taxation, customs and excise duties).
- c) Monetary and banking affairs.
- d) Federal economic affairs (including trade and tourism).
- e) Posts and telecommunications.
- f) International transport.
- g) Natural resources (including water supply, environment).
- h) Federal health and veterinary affairs.
- i) Standard setting: weights and measures, patents, trademarks, copyrights.
- j) Federal judiciary.
- k) Appointment of Federal officers.
- l) Defence (to be discussed in connection with international guarantees); security (as it pertains to federal responsibility).

Additional powers and functions may be vested in the federal government by common agreement of both sides. Federal legislation may be executed either by authorities of the federal government or by way of co-ordination between the competent authorities of the federal government and the two (provinces or federated states).

2 The legislature of the federal republic is to be composed of two chambers, the lower chamber with a 70-30 representation and the upper chamber with a 50-50 representation. Federal legislation will be enacted with regard to the matters of federal competence referred to in 1 above. Appropriate constitutional safeguards will be incorporated in the federal constitution, including deadlock-resolving machinery and special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government (for example, on budgetary questions), as follows: . . .

3 The president and the vice-president will symbolize the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities. In addition, the executive will reflect the functional requirements of an effective federal government. To this end, the following structure will be adopted: . . .

4 A tripartite body with one non-Cypriot member having a vote will have the responsibility of ruling on disputes relating to the distribution of powers and functions between the federation and the (provinces or federated states) and on such other matters as may be assigned to it by the parties in accordance with the constitution.

5 As regards the freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property, a working group will be established to discuss the exercise of these rights, including time frames, practical regulations and possible compensation arrangements, taking into account guideline 3 of the 1977 agreement.

6 Territorial adjustments in addition to the areas already referred to in the 5 August 1981 Turkish Cypriot proposals will be agreed upon at the high-level meeting, bearing in mind the criteria contained in the 1977 high-level agreement. The size of that adjustment will be expressed in the high-level agreement in a measurable form and will also be reflected in the number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to be resettled. Those adjustments will correspond to . . .

7 A timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot military troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees, will be agreed upon prior to the establishment of the transitional federal government. In the meantime, military deconfrontation measures will be pursued by both sides, using the good offices and assistance of UNFICYP.

8 A fund for Development of the Turkish Cypriot (province or federated state) shall be established with a view to achieving an economic equilibrium between the two (provinces or federated states). A fund will also be established to facilitate the resettlement of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons and for the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons as a consequence of the implementation of paragraph 6. The Federal Government shall contribute to these funds. Foreign governments and international organizations shall be invited to contribute to the funds.

9 The Varosha area and the six additional areas delineated in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981 will be placed under United Nations interim administration by . . . as part of the UNFICYP buffer zone, for resettlement.

10 Moratorium on actions tending to prejudice the process outlined in this agreement, both on the international scene and internally.

11 The Nicosia international airport to be re-opened under interim United Nations administration with free access from both sides. United Nations arrangements to that effect will be concluded no later than . . . months after the day of the high-level meeting.

12 Adequate machinery for the handling of allegations of non-implementation of confidence-building measures will be agreed upon.

13 Working Group(s) may be set up in light of the political decisions agreed upon at the high-level meeting to elaborate the details of the agreements involved.

14 The required working groups having completed their work, the parties agree that the transitional federal government of the Federal Republic of Cyprus will be set up on . . .

VI,52 GROOM, John (see item VI,9 above)

When the 'high-level' meeting convened on January 17, 1985 in New York it was, for the Secretary-General and Mr Denktash, a matter of signing the Secretary-General's document and then getting on with the establishment and business of the working groups. Mr Denktash accepted the document in toto as an 'integrated whole'. Mr Kyprianou caused a sensation and dismay by disagreeing. As the Secretary-General put it,

Both sides started from the above-mentioned documentation. The Turkish-Cypriot side stated to the Secretary-General that 'it fully accepts the draft agreement'. The Greek-Cypriot side stated to the Secretary-General that 'in conformity with its clear understanding it accepts the documentation presented by the Secretary-General as a basis for negotiations in accordance with the integrated whole approach aiming at a comprehensive and overall solution to the Cyprus problem, and that it came to the high-level meeting in absolute good faith with the view to having constructive and meaningful negotiations.'

Once again the best hopes and efforts of the international community had not proved sufficient to bring the Cypriots fructuously together.

*Cyprus in Transition*, pp 142-3

VI,53 DENKTASH, Rauf President of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus

*Press Statement*

1 I had come to the summit meeting to conclude a very important agreement with the Greek Cypriot side.

2 The Secretary-General had the same expectation as reflected in his report of 12 December 1984 to the Security Council.

3 The draft agreement aimed at the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic in Cyprus.

4 This agreement had been worked out in the course of months of hard work since August 1984. The working points outlined by the Secretary-General to the two sides in Vienna in August were elaborated during the three rounds of proximity talks, into a draft agreement and submitted for conclusion at a joint high-level meeting.

5 The Vienna working points represented an indivisible whole and comprised political confidence-building measures; the establishment of a federal governmental structure taking into account the equal political status of both communities; and territorial arrangements.

6 The Turkish Cypriot side gave the Secretary-General full support during the proximity talks. At the conclusion of the second round, the Secretary-General announced that the next round beginning on 26 November 1984 would be the final one. He asked the parties to come to this final round *not with their bargaining positions, but with their final positions* in order to take major political decisions.

7 The Turkish Cypriot side complied with this request and indeed took crucial political decisions *by accepting in toto the draft agreement proposed by the Secretary-General*, together with an incorporated presentation and a verbal understanding.

8 It was obvious that the negotiating process came to an end upon the termination of the proximity talks on 12 December 1984. What remained to be done at the high-level meeting was to agree on three dates which had been left blank in the draft agreement, to decide on the setting up of working groups which would elaborate the details of the agreement, and *to endorse as an integrated whole the draft agreement*.

9 The report of the Secretary-General of 12 December 1984, as well as the objective reports in the world press testify to the bold and statesmanlike step taken by the Turkish Cypriot side. Even Mr Papandreou had to concede on 2 January 1985 that the Turkish Cypriot side had 'undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem'.

10 *The acceptance by the Turkish Cypriot side, at the very beginning of the third round of proximity talks, of the draft agreement was based on explicit assurances from the Secretary-General that this integrated whole was the final text to be concluded at the high-level meeting without re-negotiation or any reservations whatsoever.*

11 This draft agreement was an integrated whole. Consequently, the elements making up this agreement were not open to re-negotiation. This aspect of the draft agreement also precluded any reservations. In short, it was a document to be accepted *in toto* as the Turkish Cypriot side had done. *On this point the Turkish Cypriot side is in total agreement with the Secretary-General.*

Furthermore, this draft agreement was presented by the Secretary-General after it was negotiated by the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus, *for a period of five months*, as of the Vienna meeting on 6 August 1984 up to the end of the third round of proximity talks on 12 December 1984. It is clear that such an agreement could not be possibly re-negotiated in any case within two or three days. It is evident that this draft agreement was submitted by the Secretary-General to the high-level meeting for conclusion and certainly not for starting a new negotiating process the duration of which could not be foreseen.

12 The Turkish Cypriot side made the utmost sacrifices and went as far as it could go with regard to the federal, executive, legislative, and territorial arrangements in order to make an agreement possible.

13 At the high-level meeting, both the Secretary-General and the Turkish Cypriot side strongly and repeatedly urged Mr Kyprianou to accept the draft agreement. However, as of the very first meeting, *Mr Kyprianou raised fundamental objections to each and every paragraph of the draft agreement. He even went so far as to deny the existence of such an agreement. He questioned basic established concepts such as the equal political status of the two communities and bi-zonality* which were already included in August in Vienna working points. He objected to the agreed legislative, executive and territorial arrangements. He was not prepared to take decisions about dates and agree to the establishment of working groups. On the question of international

guarantees and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, Mr Kyprianou put forward demands and views which were diametrically opposed to the relevant provisions of the draft agreement proposed by the Secretary-General. He also opposed the establishment of a transitional federal government. In short, none of the substantive issues covered by the proposals of the Secretary-General were spared from the objections of Mr Kyprianou.

14 A settlement can only be achieved if the parties involved agree to make reciprocal concessions. By accepting the Secretary-General's proposals in full, the Turkish Cypriot side made great concessions from its prior position. The Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, has still not felt the need to retreat even an inch from the views it has been defending for years. I told the Greek Cypriot side that the Secretary-General's proposals gave us a historic opportunity and that it should not be missed. I asked them to abandon their rigid positions and not allow this great opportunity for a final settlement, which the Secretary-General had given us, to slip away.

15 To the very end, Mr Kyprianou continued to reject the existence of an agreement. At one point, he even attempted to deny any knowledge of the very text on which he had based his objections.

16 Mr Kyprianou chose to argue that he had misunderstood the whole exercise and proceeded to terminate the high-level meeting without accepting the draft agreement. This approach was obviously designed to keep the Turkish Cypriot side committed to the draft agreement, while the Greek Cypriot side would be free to press to extract further sacrifices from each and every element in this document.

17 Mr Kyprianou asserts that the Turkish Cypriot side rejected negotiations. I categorically refute this unfounded allegation.

*Certainly, there are points to be negotiated. However, these points must be negotiated in the working groups in conformity with the agreement according to the customary procedures, as proposed by the Secretary-General.*

It is the Greek Cypriot side which stood against negotiations by obstructing the way to the establishment of the working groups.

New York, 20 January 1985

(ii) *Second initiative, 1986*

VI, 54 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar

DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON CYPRUS

Presented by the Secretary-General on 29th March 1986

(Published as Annex II to the Records of the Security Council  
S/18102/Add.1 of 11th June 1986)

Recognizing with satisfaction that the initiative of the Secretary-General, which bore in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions and which began in August 1984 in Vienna and continued through the high-level proximity talks from September to December 1984 and the joint high-level

meeting of January 1985 held in New York, has now resulted in an important step towards a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem:

The parties agree on the following matters which are to be viewed as an integrated whole:

**1.1 The Parties:**

- a) Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979;
- b) Indicate their determination to proceed, at the date referred to in paragraph 15.1 below, to the establishment of a Federal Republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect;
- c) Reaffirm their acceptance of those introductory constitutional provisions that were agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-82:

i. The Federal Republic of Cyprus shall have international personality. The federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all the territory. The attributes of international personality shall be exercised by the federal government in accordance with the federal constitution. The provinces or federated states may act in their areas of competence in accordance with the federal constitution and in a manner that would not duplicate the powers and functions of the federal government as defined in the federal constitution.

ii. The people of the Turkish Federal Republic shall comprise the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community. There shall be a single citizenship of the Federal Republic of Cyprus regulated by federal law.

iii. The territory of the Federal Republic shall comprise the two provinces or federated states.

iv. The official languages of the Federal Republic shall be Greek and Turkish. The English language may also be used.

v. The Federal Republic shall have a neutral flag and anthem to be agreed. Each province or federated state may have its own flag using mainly elements of the federal flag. The federal flag shall be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of any other flag.

vi. The federal government shall observe the holidays of the Federal Republic. Each province or federated state shall observe the federal holidays as well as those established by it.

vii. The parties reaffirm all other points that were agreed upon during the course of the intercommunal talks as contained in 'revision' dated 18 May 1982 concerning general provisions, Part I, fundamental rights and liberties, Part II, as well as Part III and IV.

**2.1 The powers and functions to be vested in the federal government of the Federal Republic shall comprise:**

- a) Foreign affairs.
- b) Federal financial affairs (including federal budget, taxation, customs and exercise duties).
- c) Monetary and banking affairs.
- d) Federal economic affairs (including trade and tourism).
- e) Posts and telecommunications.
- f) International transport.

- g) Natural resources (including water supply, environment).
- h) Federal health and veterinary affairs.
- i) Standard setting: weights and measures, patents, trademarks, copyrights.
- j) Federal judiciary.
- k) Appointment of federal officers.
- l) Defence (to be discussed also in connection with the treaties of guarantee and of alliance); security (as it pertains to federal responsibility).

2.2 Additional powers and functions may be vested in the Federal Government by common agreement of both sides. Accordingly, the residual powers shall rest with the provinces or federated states. Federal legislation may be executed either by authorities of the Federal Government or by way of co-ordination between the competent authorities of the federal government and of the two provinces or federated states.

3.1 The legislature of the Federal Republic will be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70-30 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation, and an upper chamber with a 50-50 representation. Federal legislation will be enacted with regard to the matters of federal competence as referred to in paragraph 2.1 above. The adoption of legislation on major matters, as for instance on ten of the twelve functions referred to in paragraph 2.1 above, will require separate majorities in both chambers. The adoption of legislation on other matters will require majorities of the membership in each chamber.

3.2 Appropriate constitutional safeguards and deadlock resolving machinery including special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government (eg, on budgetary questions) will be incorporated in the federal constitution. In case of deadlock in the legislature, the proposed legislation may be submitted in the first instance to a conciliation committee of the legislature composed of three Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots, whose decision will be taken on the basis of majority vote including at least one Turkish Cypriot. If the deadlock persists, the president and vice-president of the Federal Republic will, upon request, appoint on an ad hoc basis one person each, selected for their knowledge of the subject involved, who, with the assistance of experts as needed including from outside the Federal Republic of Cyprus, will advise the legislature on ways the deadlock could be resolved. The matter may also be submitted to a referendum among the population of the community which opposed the draft legislation. Legislation adopted by the legislature may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community.

4.1 The Federal Republic will have a presidential system of government. The president and the vice-president will symbolize the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities. In addition, the executive will reflect the functional requirements of an effective federal government.

4.2 The President will be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president will be a

Turkish Cypriot. The President and the Vice President will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature and the Council of Ministers in areas to be agreed upon, it being understood that the scope will exceed that covered by the 1960 constitution. The president and the vice-president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the Council of Ministers for reconsideration.

4.3 The Council of Ministers will be composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7 to 3 ratio. One major ministry will be headed by a Turkish Cypriot, it being understood that the parties agreed to discuss that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be a Turkish Cypriot. The Council of Ministers will take decisions by weighted voting, that is a simple majority including at least one Turkish Cypriot minister. It is understood that the parties agree to discuss that weighted voting will apply to all matters of special concern to the Turkish Cypriot community to be agreed upon.

4.4 Appropriate constitutional safeguards and deadlock resolving machinery related to decisions by the Council of Ministers, including special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government, will be incorporated in the federal constitution. In case of deadlock, the president and vice-president of the Federal Republic will, upon request, appoint on an ad hoc basis one person each, selected for their knowledge of the subject involved who, with the assistance of experts as needed including from outside the Federal Republic of Cyprus, will advise the Council of Ministers on ways the deadlock could be resolved. The matter may also be submitted to a referendum among the population of the community which opposed the draft decision. A decision by the Council of Ministers may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community.

5.1 The Constitutional Court, when ruling on disputes relating to the distribution of powers and functions between the federal government and the provinces or federated states and on such other matters as may be assigned to it by the parties in accordance with the federal constitution, will be composed of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and one non-Cypriot voting member.

6.1 As regards freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property, a working group will discuss the exercise of the rights, including time frames, practical regulations and possible compensation arrangements, taking into account guideline 3 of the 1977 agreement.

7.1 Territorial adjustments, in addition to the areas already referred to in the 5 August 1981 Turkish Cypriot proposals will be agreed upon. These territorial adjustments will result in the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state comprising in the order of 29+ per cent of the territory of the Federal Republic. It is understood that when discussing the actual territorial adjustments the two sides will have in mind the 1977 high-level agreement including 'certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish

Cypriot community' and the questions related to resettlement. Both sides agree to suggest special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides. These areas will remain under their respective civilian jurisdictions.

8.1 A timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees, will be agreed upon prior to the establishment of a transitional federal government. In the meantime, military deconfrontation measures will be pursued by both sides, using the good offices and assistance of UNFICYP.

8.2 The two sides undertake to discuss these issues in good faith and to consider each other's concerns on them.

9.1 A Fund for Development of the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state shall be established with a view to achieving an economic equilibrium between the two provinces or federated states. A fund will also be established to facilitate the resettlement of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons, and for the Turkish Cypriots displaced as a consequence of the implementation of paragraph 7.1. The Federal government shall contribute to these funds. Foreign governments and international organizations shall be invited to contribute to the funds.

10.1 The Varosha area and the six additional areas delineated in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981 will be placed under United Nations interim administration as part of the UNFICYP buffer zone for resettlement by . . .

11.1 Both parties agree not to take any action tending to prejudice the process outlined in this agreement, both on the international scene and internally.

12.1 The Nicosia international airport will be reopened under interim United Nations administration with free access from both sides. The United Nations will conclude the arrangements to that effect by . . .

13.1 Adequate machinery for considering allegations of non-implementation of confidence building measures will be agreed upon. The Secretary-General will make appropriate recommendations to both sides in this regard.

14.1 The parties agree to establish working groups to work out the detailed arrangements on the matters referred to in this agreement, whose elements are inter-related and constitute an integrated whole. The working groups will carry out their work under the direction of joint high-level meetings. These joint high-level meetings will take place every three or four months, on the basis of an agenda prepared by the Secretary-General, to discuss the issues which remain to be negotiated under this agreement, to review the work and provide guidance to the working groups. The joint high-level meetings will be convened by the Secretary-General after adequate preparation.

14.2 Each working group will be composed of delegations from the two

sides and will be chaired by a representative of the Secretary-General. The working groups will begin their meetings at the United Nations premises in Nicosia on . . . Each working group will prepare a programme of work and will submit it for approval and guidance to the joint high-level meeting which will take place at the United Nations premises in Nicosia on . . .

14.3 The representative of the Secretary-General chairing each working group will every three months prepare an assessment of the progress made by the working group, which will be presented to the next joint high-level meeting together with the views of the Secretary-General.

15.1 The parties agree that, the required working groups have completed their work and having obtained the approval of the two sides, the transitional Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Cyprus will be set up on . . .

16.1 The Secretary-General will remain at the disposal of the parties to assist in the elaboration of this agreement and, if required, in its interpretation.

UN doc S/18102

VI,55 UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar

*Report to Security Council, June 1986*

7. In my covering letter to the two leaders (see Annex III) I stressed that acceptance of the draft framework agreement would allow, for the very first time, all the outstanding issues to be tackled in earnest as an integrated whole, and I assured the parties that I would spare no effort to maintain the momentum towards a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem and that the procedures contained in the text were designed towards that end. I concluded by expressing the hope that both sides would seize this opportunity to break through to a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem.

8. Because of the significance of the stage we had reached, I gave a copy of the draft framework agreement together with the substance of my covering letter to the President of the Security Council and I requested him to give a copy to the members of the Council. I also gave copies to the Permanent Representatives of Greece and Turkey. In addition, at the invitation of the President of the Council, I briefed its members at an informal meeting on 24 April on the status of my latest effort.

9. On 20 April 1986 I received a letter from President Kyprianou (see Annex IV). He stated that before the Greek Cypriot side could express its views on the draft framework agreement 'it was necessary that there be agreement on the basic issues of the Cyprus problem as a matter of priority', namely on 'withdrawal of the Turkish Forces of occupation and settlers, effective international guarantees, and the application of the three freedoms, that is freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property.' Towards that end he requested that I convene an international

conference to deal with the first two issues or, if this proved impossible, that I convene a high-level meeting to deal with all three issues.

10. On 21 April 1986 I received a letter from His Excellency Mr Denktash (see Annex V) in which he set out views and considerations in the light of which he informed me of the Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the draft framework agreement. In a further letter dated 27 April (see Annex VI) His Excellency Mr Denktash stated that he was prepared to sign the draft framework agreement as it was when the blank dates had been filled in. He further stated that he had examined President Kyprianou's letter of 20 April as published in the press and informed me that the Turkish Cypriot side could not accept any procedure other than that contained in the draft framework agreement.

11. In an oral message to President Kyprianou on 8 May 1986, I stated that I was fully aware of the fundamental importance of the questions of troop withdrawal, guarantees and the three freedoms and that I understood his concerns about them. I advised him that the two proposals contained in his letter of 20 April were not viable at the present time. In saying this, I was not commenting on the merits of the proposals but meant that they were not feasible as the Turkish Cypriot side had indicated that it would not accept any procedure other than that contained in the draft framework agreement. I emphasized, however, that the procedure in that document provided for these issues to be dealt with without delay at high-level meetings. I also informed him of the reply I had received from the Turkish Cypriot side and enquired whether the Greek Cypriot side was now in a position to express its views on the contents of the draft framework agreement.

12. In that message, as well as in a meeting I had with Foreign Minister Iacovou on 29 May, I reiterated that the procedures proposed in the draft framework agreement provided each side with every opportunity to ensure that the negotiations proceeded in a manner that took full account of their concerns and that the concept of an integrated whole meant that the parties' ultimate commitment to an overall solution would depend on the resolution of all issues to their mutual satisfaction. I also recalled that, in line with the draft framework agreement, a transitional government could only be established after an agreement on all issues had been achieved. I repeated that the issues of troop withdrawal, guarantees and the three freedoms would be included from the very outset in the agenda of joint high-level meetings which would begin when a favourable response had been received from both sides.

13. On 10 June 1986 I received a further letter from President Kyprianou (see Annex VII) in which he set out his assessment of the underlying issues of the Cyprus problem, described the fundamental importance for the Greek Cypriot side of the three issues set out in his letter of 20 April (see para 9), and commented on various aspects of the draft framework agreement. He concluded by proposing once again that I convene an international conference or high-level meeting to consider the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and settlers, the question of guarantees and the application of the three freedoms. He stated that when substantive decisions had been taken

for the resolution of these three major issues it should be possible to assess the results of the high-level meeting or the international conference and the content of the draft framework agreement.

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*Observations*

16. In carrying out the missions of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council, my objective has been to achieve an overall solution which would preserve the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the frequently expressed view of the Security Council. This would respond not only to the wishes of the people of Cyprus but also the requirements of international peace and security in the region as a whole. In the course of the initiative I have pursued since August 1984, I have sought to obtain the two sides' agreement to a framework within which an overall solution could be promptly and conclusively negotiated. To that end, I have tried to build the largest possible measure of agreement between the two sides and to devise procedures for resolving the outstanding issues. I have also had to bear in mind the distrust which sadly exists between the two sides and the fact that certain issues were felt to be of special importance by one side or the other.

17. In the light of these various factors, I proposed negotiating procedures which would give each side an ample opportunity in the negotiations that lie ahead to assure itself of the good intentions of the other. These procedures included the convening of high-level meetings whose agenda would include from the outset the questions of troop withdrawal, guarantees and the three freedoms. I also proposed the concept of an integrated whole, that is that neither side would be ultimately committed to an overall solution until all issues had been resolved to its satisfaction.

18. The approach described above was reflected in successive versions of the documentation which has been presented to the two sides since December 1984. By March 1986 I believed that the differences between the two sides could be bridged by a decisive effort. I therefore presented to them the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986. I remain convinced that, if accepted by each of the two sides, this document will provide the right framework for negotiating a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

19. I have been heartened both by the support my efforts have received from the Security Council, notably in the statement issued by the President of the Council on 20 September 1985 (S/17486), and by the frequent declarations by both sides of their desire to achieve a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. I regret that, since one side is not yet in a position to accept the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, the way is not yet open to proceed with the negotiations I have proposed for an overall solution. In these circumstances I am concerned by the dangers inherent in the present situation. The way forward will require careful reflection by all concerned.



## **Part VII**

### **Equality of Independence**

## Equality of Independence

### *Introductory Note*

The crux of the Cyprus problem as it now exists is the claim of the Turkish Cypriot people that they are no less entitled to independence than their Greek Cypriot compatriots. The Greek Cypriots continue to reject that claim, even though the Turkish Cypriots have made it abundantly clear that they are prepared to merge their independence with that of the Greek Cypriots in a bi-zonal federated Republic. The Turkish Cypriot claim rests on the thesis that the island of Cyprus is inhabited by two distinct peoples, each having its own language, culture, religion and affinity with its neighbouring Motherland and each possessing in principle the same fundamental political and human rights (even though in practice the Greek Cypriots, being the larger of the two peoples, may reasonably expect to exercise a larger share of responsibility than the Turkish Cypriots in running those public affairs which are of common interest to both – as indeed was the case with the 1960 settlement and as was envisaged in the two sets of proposals (both of which the Turkish Cypriots accepted) which the UN Secretary-General put forward in 1985 and 1986 – see items VI,51 and 54 above).

The Turkish Cypriots hold the view that their title to equality of independence with their Greek compatriots derives from the history of the Island and its present ethnic and demographic character. They point out that in 1956 the then ruler of Cyprus, Britain, endorsed their title to equal independence when it pledged that the Turkish Cypriots, no less than the Greek Cypriots, should be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status; and also that in 1960 Britain transferred sovereignty to both Cypriot peoples jointly, neither of whom can thus sustain a claim to exclusive sovereignty and independence in respect of the Island as a whole. This transfer of sovereignty jointly to the two Cypriot peoples was endorsed by Greece and Turkey and by the international community at large.

The Turkish Cypriots further argue that events in Cyprus since 1964 have, if anything, only strengthened their title to equality of independence. The Greek Cypriot attempt to assert an exclusive, unfettered right to independence in respect of the whole of Cyprus left the Turkish Cypriots with no choice but to assert a separate and equal right of independence for themselves either in the form of a large measure of autonomy in part or parts of a joint state or, if that failed, in an independent Turkish Cypriot state in a divided island (ie a 'two-state' solution). The folly of Greece and Greek Cypriot extremists in precipitating the events of 1974 has now added an almost complete physical separation of the two peoples to their previous separation in terms both of territory (the Turkish Cypriot enclaves where those uprooted from their homes by the Greek Cypriot onslaught in 1963 took refuge) and also in other respects. That has greatly simplified the whole problem. Separate,

independent Turkish and Greek Cypriot states in a divided Cyprus is what now exists *de facto* on the ground. The Turkish Cypriot Republic has the attributes normally required for recognition as an independent state, including an identifiable territory under its effective and autonomous control (even though the boundaries have yet to be finalised and may, in the event of an agreed settlement, be subject to adjustment). And yet the international community, and above all Britain, continues to acquiesce in the fallacious claim of the wholly Greek Cypriot regime to constitute the lawful 'Government of Cyprus' and continues to deny the Turkish Cypriots' claim to equality of independence. Having for so many years condoned the Greek Cypriot usurpation of power and monopolisation of independence, the Security Council followed Britain's lead in 1983 in condemning the Turkish Cypriots for declaring their independence. The Turkish Cypriots are not alone in finding this attitude unreasonable and unjust.

In short, the Turkish Cypriots would definitely prefer a re-unified state under a federal partnership, and they have repeatedly made this clear. But if the Greek Cypriots cannot bring themselves to accept such a partnership, then the only answer is a 'two-state' solution with a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot state co-existing side by side. That means that if the international community truly wants to see a federal compromise, it ought to cease treating the Greek Cypriot administration as 'the Government of Cyprus' and recognise – at least in principle – that the Turkish Cypriots have an equal right to independence. That is the only way to bring the Greek Cypriots to reason and to get them to negotiate seriously for a genuine federal partnership. As long as the world goes on recognising as the legitimate 'Government of Cyprus' the wholly Greek Cypriot administration which usurped power in 1964, it is keeping in place the main obstacle which now stands in the way of a settlement. As President Denktash said in the debate in the Security Council on 3 May 1984:

'Why should Greek Cypriots come to the table and talk with Turkish Cypriots when they are treated as rulers of the whole island?'

The international community has so far singularly failed to show that 'respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' which is enjoined upon it by the Charter of the United Nations:

VII,1 NEJATIGIL, Zaim, M. (Attorney General of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus)

The principle of equality is in all cases an important and fundamental element of federalism. Particularly in federations based on an agreement between different national and ethnic communities, this principle assumes a much greater and vital importance. The size of the population of each component part of a federation is immaterial as far as the fundamental basis of equal representation (at least in the upper house) is concerned. For example, the population of California is 50 times bigger than that of Alaska or that of Wyoming, but all these states enjoy equal representation in the powerful US Senate. The population of the canton of Zurich is 32 times larger than that of the canton of Uri, but all the Swiss Cantons have equal representation in the Council of States (Conseil des États).

At the root of all their differences lies the disagreement of the two ethnic peoples of Cyprus as to the sovereignty of the future federation. Will the

sovereignty of the future federation derive from the sovereign peoples of the two communities previously organised in states of their own or will that sovereignty be derived from a single central government? In other words, will the government of a future federal republic of Cyprus be the successor of the two communal administrations that now exist de facto on the island, or of the Greek Cypriot regime which is passing itself off as 'the Government of Cyprus'?

*Our Republic in Perspective* p 50

VII,2 WILSON, President Woodrow (then President of the United States)

Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

Address to a Joint Session of the United States Congress 11 February 1918

VII,3 UNITED NATIONS Charter

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

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2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, . . .

Signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco

VII,4 LENNOX-BOYD, Alan (then British Colonial Secretary)

When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided self-government is working satisfactory, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination.

When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.

Statement on Cyprus in the House of Commons, 19 December 1956

VII,5 MACMILLAN, Harold (then British Prime Minister)

. . . if in the long run our hopes are dashed and every effort fails; if we are

thrown back on other solutions which we all agree would be undesirable, then Her Majesty's Government will stand by their pledges. These, of course include among others that contained in the statement which my Right Hon Friend the Colonial Secretary made on 19 December 1956.

Statement on Cyprus in the House of Commons during the debate on the Macmillan Plan, 26 June 1958

VII,6 CYPRUS, Constitution of the Republic - 1960

Article 1

The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided.

Article 2

For the purposes of this Constitution -

(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek and who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church;

(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; . . .

Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus,  
signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960

VII,7 GENEVA DECLARATION by the Guarantor Powers under the Treaty of Guarantee (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom)

The (Foreign) Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community.

Declaration at the conclusion of the First  
Geneva Conference, 30 July 1974

VII,8 TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF CYPRUS, Establishment of (13 February 1975)

The Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, having met in a joint session in Nicosia this 13th day of February 1975, and having taken into consideration the fact,

That the Turkish Cypriot community has been continuously

obstructed by the Greek Cypriots from exercising its rights under the Constitution;

That the Turkish Cypriot community was forced to live for years under unbearable conditions, deprived of all their economic rights and means under threats and oppression, in areas where they had gathered for self-preservation and for ensuring their security of life and property and

That, as a result of the Greek Cypriot attempts and threats in the years 1963, 1967 and 1974, to end the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community, which is one of the founders of the Republic, was forced to resist such attempts at the expense of grave sacrifices,

Have come to the conclusion that there is no possibility of their living together with the Greek Cypriot co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus; and

Having come to the conclusion that the only way for bringing tranquillity, security and permanent peace to the island is for the two communities to live side by side in their respective region, developing their own internal structure; and

Having noted the fact that the Greek Cypriot community has not made any constructive response to the proposals for the establishment of an independent Federal Republic of Cyprus on the above reasonable basis; and

Having taken into consideration the necessity of putting the Turkish Cypriot community's social and economic life into a new healthy order; and

Having confirmed their belief and determination to oppose resolutely all attempts against the independence of Cyprus, and its partition or union with any other state; and

Believing in the necessity of the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus and expressing their determination not to allow the island to become subservient to any foreign interest; and

Mindful of the necessity of creating in their own region the legal basis of an order leading to the establishment of the future independent, Federal Republic of Cyprus; and

Reaffirming that their final objective is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a bi-zonal federation;

Have resolved that the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration should be restructured and organized on the basis of a secular federated state, until such time as the 1960 Constitution of the Republic, the basic articles of which were determined by international agreements in compliance with international law, is amended in a similar manner to become the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, and until the said Federal Republic is established.

With this object in view, a 50-member constituent assembly will be set up under the chairmanship of the president of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration.

(Published as Annex B to the UN Secretary-General's Report S/11624 of 18 February 1975 to the UN Security Council)

VII,9 UNITED NATIONS Security Council, Resolution 367 of 12 March 1975

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the complaint submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

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(2) Regrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a 'Federated Turkish State' as, inter alia, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, and expresses its concern over all unilateral actions by the parties which have compromised or may compromise the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions; - - -

*Editorial Note*

The contrast is striking and discreditable between this reaction by the Security Council to the Turkish Cypriots' action in establishing in legal form their state on part of the territory of Cyprus (and with a specific assurance that this was provisional and that their final objective was a re-united federal Republic) and the attitude that the Council had taken in 1964 towards the wholly Greek Cypriot state which the Greek Cypriots then attempted to create by violence and to impose as an irreversible *fait accompli*, asserting its sovereignty over the whole island. At that time, in its Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 (see item IV,2 above), the Security Council rewarded Greek Cypriot aggression by condoning their 'unilateral' seizure of power and by recognising their illegal regime as the legitimate 'Government of Cyprus'.

VII,10 DENKTASH, Rauf (then President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)

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The Turkish Cypriot community, reacting to all that was done to it during the years when ejected from the bi-national Government, brought about its own administration. It was called the Transitional Cyprus Turkish Administration. We had to govern ourselves; we could not live in a vacuum. In time this developed, and after the Turkish intervention - which was a godsend and saved Cyprus from utter calamity - the Turkish Cypriots claimed their right in the independence of Cyprus and tried to show this to the world, and to the Greek Cypriots by forming a State, which they named the Federated State of Cyprus. We hoped that within a few months the Greek Cypriots would join hands with us and bring about the Federal Greco-Turkish Republic of Cyprus. Four years have elapsed and the Greek Cypriots have preferred to go around collecting votes and resolutions from international forums in which the Turkish Cypriots are not represented.

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As regards the resolution which has just been adopted,\* I should like to underline that it makes reference to resolutions to which the Turkish Cypriot community had never been a party and on which it had not been heard. Those resolutions, therefore, were adopted in its absence. They have no bearing on the realities of the Cyprus situation and they contravene bilateral agreements which had been arrived at in the presence of the Secretary-General. Therefore, the implementation of those resolutions would mean undoing certain things which have been done and which have affected the lives of thousands of people, in compliance with other United Nations decisions, through the Secretary-General and through other officers. In that regard they are unrealistic and cannot be implemented. For example, the Turkish community cannot, just because a resolution says so, uproot itself for the fourth time in Cyprus and go back and become hostages in Greek Cypriot areas. That is utterly impossible and unrealistic and the Greek Cypriots should not deceive themselves that this can be done just because they have managed to have a one-sided resolution in their favour adopted at a time when we were not heard.

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Address to the Security Council during its  
debate on Cyprus, 27 November 1978

VII,11 PAPANDREOU, Andreas (Prime Minister of Greece)

Our Cyprus policy can be summarised as follows:

we can only negotiate for a unitary Cyprus. For us neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution. So, what do we propose? Our proposal is for the establishment of a unitary state. We can negotiate on this after the departure of the Turkish soldiers.

*Ethnos* (Athens daily) 24 November 1983

*Editorial Note*

This supports the argument of the Turkish Cypriot side that non-progress at the intercommunal talks was due to a lack of political will on the Greek Cypriot side for reaching a federal solution as envisaged by the high-level agreements and underlined by the UN Secretary-General in his opening statement of 1980 and the Waldheim evaluation paper of 1981 (see items VI,1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 above).

VII,12 GROOM, John (Professor in International Relations at the University of Kent)

Mr Papandreou decided to play a more active role on the Cyprus issue in part because PASOK has populist roots, and the continuation of Turkish military presence in Cyprus offends Greek national sensibilities, and in part because in other aspects of the Greco-Turkish relationship – such as the Aegean – Greece was in the comfortable position of wishing merely to maintain its position, whereas in Cyprus it wished to change it. When asked to specify the most important element of the Greek-Turkish differences

\* Security Council Resolution 440 of 27 November 1978 (see item VI,22 above)

both politicians and officials in Greece usually put Cyprus first before the Aegean. The greater Greek activity was exemplified by a visit to Cyprus by Mr Papandreou, the first ever by a Greek Prime Minister. To a certain extent Mr Kyprianou's Government was embarrassed by the greater Greek activity. Both AKEL, the Government's ally, and Mr Clerides's party were calling for greater and more conciliatory and imaginative efforts to come to terms with the Turkish Cypriots and together they represent a majority of Greek-Cypriot voters. Mr Kyprianou, however, was being pressured to take a harder line by the Greek Government and, in particular, to internationalise the issue.

*Cyprus in Transition*, p 136

VII,13 TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTH CYPRUS, Establishment of - 1983

**DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD, 15 November 1983**

On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed by the unanimous vote of the Legislative Assembly of the hitherto Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which is a democratic representative body of the Turkish people of Cyprus. The proclamation stressed that the Republic would adhere to all treaties and agreements binding on it, including the Treaty of Guarantee, would follow a policy of non-alignment, would remain faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter and would endeavour to facilitate the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots could co-operate in peace and harmony. The proclamation emphasized, *inter alia*, that the founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a manifestation of the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people of Cyprus. The declaration also stipulated that the newly created entity will not unite with any other state, except with the southern unit to form a federal republic of Cyprus.

Zaim M. Nejatigil, *Our Republic in Perspective*, p 77

VII,14 GROOM, John (see item VII,12 above)

After the Turkish-Cypriot declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 1983 the Greek Cypriots again managed to get a considerable degree of international support. The Security Council deplored, by thirteen to one against (Pakistan) with one abstention (Jordan), 'the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus' which it considered to be 'legally invalid' and called for its withdrawal. Other organisations followed suit with verbal condemnation but there was little by way of action. Practically all states have a vested interest in condemning secession, which they did on this occasion with ritualistic fervour, but few believed in the efficacy of sanctions against either Turkey or the new state. Such sanctions had been tried in the aftermath of 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus had proved to be dysfunctional. Yet this failed policy was the very one chosen again by the Cyprus Government.

Mr Kyprianou made frequent visits to Athens, London, New York and Washington in an effort to get the United States to put very strong pressure on Turkey, and through Turkey on the Turkish Cypriots, to withdraw their declaration. He also refused to talk to the Turkish Cypriots on a direct basis and Greece declined Britain's offer of a meeting of the guarantor powers to discuss developments in the island. Although the Greek Cypriots secured condemnations of the Turkish-Cypriot action, and the subsequent Turkish recognition of it, there was little else.

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 This declaration was striking in its timidity – as though they were tip-toeing out of the door leaving it carefully ajar so that they could quickly and easily come back in again. The declaration reads almost like a classic case of *reculer pour mieux sauter* in the direction of a pan-Cypriot polity. The Turkish-Cypriot community had, in the months before independence, clearly signalled its intentions. Mr Denktash was reported in the *Turkish News* of July 1983 as saying 'I have always maintained that going to Federation with the Greek Cypriots passes through the way of establishing our own State first, because the Greek Cypriots will not accept us as their equals.' Indeed, the constant theme of Turkish-Cypriot apologists was that an independent state was necessary to assert their status as co-founders of a future federal republic and to ensure that the sovereignty of the republic would be derived from the existing two states joining together as equals to form the future federal republic. Thus, for the Turkish Cypriots, independence solved their identity problem and assured a future basis for negotiation. Moreover, they did not consider that they had seceded but had been 'ousted from the 1960 bi-national republic' and had 'had no alternative but to establish their own State . . . step by step since 1963.'

*Cyprus in Transition*, pp 137 and 139

VII,15 UNITED NATIONS Security Council, Resolution 541 of 18 November 1983

On 18 November, the Council adopted resolution 541 (1983), in which it deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities for the 'purported secession' of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered that declaration as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal; called for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975); requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement of Cyprus; called upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices; called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus; called upon all states and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation; and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

Zaim M. Nejatigil, *Our Republic in Perspective*, p 106

*Editorial Note*

The resolution was passed by a vote of 13 in favour and 1 against (Pakistan), with 1 abstention (Jordan).

- VII,16 DENKTASH, Rauf, President of the Turkish Republic in North Cyprus  
it (the Security Council) considered China non-existent for 30 years and East Germany non-existent for 25 years. It does not matter; they are now here among us, and I greet them with respect.

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We are not seceding from the independent island of Cyprus, from the Republic of Cyprus, or will not do so if the chance is given to us to re-establish a bizonal system. But if the robbers of my rights continue to insist that they are the legitimate Government of Cyprus, we shall be as legitimate as they, as non-aligned as they, as sovereign as they in the northern State of Cyprus, but we shall keep the door wide open to re-establishing unity under a federal system.

on 18 November 1983

- VII,17 UNITED KINGDOM Permanent Representative at the United Nations  
We recognize only one Cypriot State, the Republic of Cyprus under the Government of President Kyprianou. The Turkish action is incompatible with the state of affairs brought about by the Treaties governing the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. My Government has treaty obligations in this respect which we share with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. It is not only our position in the context of the Treaties of 1960 which specially involves Britain in this problem. We are also concerned because of our long historical links with Cyprus, continuing into the present with our mutual membership of the Commonwealth and with the settlement in Britain of many Cypriots from both communities.

Speaking in the Security Council during the debate on Resolution 541 (see item VII,15 above)

*Editorial Note*

What price the Lennox-Boyd and Macmillan statements of 1956 and 1958 pledging that, when the time comes, 'it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status'?

A noticeable feature of these one-sided statements by spokesmen, Ministers and officials, of the British Government is that they simply assert that the Government of Cyprus is the Government of President Kyprianou. They do not address themselves to the merits of the case or attempt to answer the Turkish Cypriot arguments - perhaps because they are unanswerable. In recent years British Governments have shown a strange reluctance to 'think it possible they may be mistaken' about Cyprus. They got hold of the wrong end of the stick in 1963, and have clung to it ever since.

An exception to these bland but thoughtless assertions of the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot 'Government of Cyprus' is provided by remarks made by the then British Foreign Secretary, Dr David Owen, in the House of Commons on 22 December 1976. He said:

'What everyone wants on both sides is to see full democratic participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, with the two communities brought together. . . . We must bring the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities together and forge again a proper Government of Cyprus, capable of speaking for all the people . . .'

If only British Governments had taken this line and stuck to it, insisting on the need to re-establish a 'proper Government of Cyprus', they would have been on much safer ground, legally and morally.

The Turkish Cypriots also quote in support of their criticism of British policy a judgment given in the Court of Appeal in England in 1978. The case concerned a claim by Greek Cypriot companies owning certain hotels in northern Cyprus against a Turkish Cypriot travel agency and the representative in London of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The plaintiffs alleged conspiracy to commit trespass in their hotels which had been taken over by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and were being run by Turkish Cypriots. In his judgment Lord Denning said:

'There is an effective administration in northern Cyprus which has made laws governing the day to day lives of the people. According to these laws, the people who have occupied these hotels in Kyrenia are not trespassers. They are not occupying them unlawfully. They are occupying them by virtue of a lease granted to them under the laws or by virtue of requisitions made by the existing administration'.

(1978) 1 All ER 277, p 285)

#### VII,18 UNITED STATES, Government of

The political systems of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot administration are democratic and based on free elections, and they guarantee basic human rights to their populations in theory and practice.

State Department annual report (1986) on  
Human Rights Practices

#### VII,19 NEJATIGIL, Zaim M. (see item VII,1 above)

The above view (sc. that expressed by the UK Representative in the Security Council - item VII,17 above) is based on the assumption that the 'state of affairs' created by the Treaty of Establishment and guaranteed by the Treaty of Guarantee still exists. The author's view is that the treaties themselves are valid, but the 'state of affairs' which they envisaged, that is, the bi-communal Republic came to an end in December 1963 when the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner was ousted from the organs of the Republic, as a prelude to amending the 1960 Constitution by unconstitutional means and to establishing a purely Greek Cypriot administration.

Commenting on the British statement in the  
Security Council, *Our Republic in Perspective*,  
p 111

- VII,20 REDDAWAY, John (who served as Administrative Secretary in the Government of Cyprus from 1956 to 1960 under Sir John Harding and Sir Hugh Foot)

The position which Britain has taken in refusing to countenance the declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriots may have been intended to encourage more flexibility on the Turkish side in negotiations over territory and other aspects of a settlement. Whether it has served that purpose is questionable. But in principle at least Britain has been on tenable ground, both legally and morally, in protesting its adherence to the concept of a single state of Cyprus under one unitary government. Where it has been on more questionable ground is in proceeding from that position to assert that this one 'Government of Cyprus' is that operated exclusively by the Greek Cypriots in the southern part of the island. That is, to be sure, in line with most, though not all, international pronouncements on the subject. But it ignores the question whether there has in fact been any legitimate government at all in Cyprus since the 1960 Constitution was overthrown by the Greek Cypriot leadership in 1964. Consistency would seem to demand either that no such government has existed since then or that it has been replaced by two, equally legitimate or illegitimate, autonomous governments.

*Burdened with Cyprus - the British connection*  
p 185-6

- VII,21 COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The prospects for the Turkish minority in the island, in their own eyes and in those of many impartial observers, was that of permanent second class citizenship. In the words of Mr Denktash in his statement before the UN Security Council; 'In a hellenistic paradise no Turkish birds are asked to sing.'

*Baumel Report*, Doc 5165 of 13 January  
1984

- VII,22 UNITED NATIONS Security Council, Resolution 550 of 11 May 1984

The Security Council adopted resolution 550/84 on 11 May 1984 by 13 votes to one against (Pakistan), with one abstention (United States of America). Reaffirming its resolution 541/(1983) the Council condemned all 'secessionist actions', including the 'purported exchange of ambassadors' between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declared them 'illegal and invalid' and called for their immediate withdrawal. The resolution reiterated a call upon states 'not to recognize the purported State of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and called upon all states to respect the 'sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus'. It considered attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and considered any attempts to interfere with the status or deployment of the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations. By this resolution the Council also reaffirmed the mandate of good offices given to the Secretary-General and called upon all parties to

co-operate with him in his mission of good offices. It also decided to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking, in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541(1983) and the present resolution, 'urgent and appropriate measures'.

See UN doc S/PV 2539 for full text

*Editorial Note*

Operative paragraph 8 requested the Secretary-General to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution of the Cyprus problem 'in conformity with the principle of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution.' The drawback was that the resolution did not refer to the high-level agreements, the 1980 'opening statement' of the Secretary-General and the Waldheim 'evaluation document' which were fundamental to any search for a settlement.

VII,23 DENKTASH, Rauf President of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus

Why should Greek Cypriots come to the table and talk with Turkish Cypriots when they are treated as rulers of the whole island?

Speaking in the course of the debate in the Security Council on the draft resolution, 3 May 1984

VII,24 BOROWIEC, Andrew

US diplomats should stop massaging the ego of the Greek Cypriots as the legal government of the island.

*The Mediterranean Feud*, p 153

VII,25 DENKTASH, Rauf President of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus  
 . . . what Britain, and others guaranteed in Cyprus was a bi-national partnership Republic which no longer exists due to its deliberate destruction by the Greek Cypriot partner.

The Greek Cypriot partner is claiming the exclusive right to rule Cyprus as its legitimate government. Turkish Cypriots have no claim to rule the Greek Cypriots but we do have an undeniable political right to share power with them.

Turkish Cypriots are suffering an international economic boycott which the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have persuaded the world to impose. Airlines will not fly direct to North Cyprus, ships will not go direct to North Cyprus, we cannot telephone or telex direct and almost all the international aid and investment goes to the South.

I can assure you that the Turkish Cypriot people are as much committed to democracy and the freedom of the individual as the British people. We are well aware of Western security interests in our part of the world and we stand ready to discuss them at any time.

We have tried our best to reach a sensible agreement with the Greek Cypriots. But we are getting nowhere. We could not live in suspense for ever in an imposed stateless form so we declared our own Republic in the North

of Cyprus. However, I wish to make it clear that we still wish to see a federal solution for the future of our island. We are certainly not a breakaway state, and it was the Greek Cypriots who broke away from the partnership republic which we founded together in 1960.

Treat us on a basis of equality with the Greek Cypriots and give a direct motivation to the Greek Cypriot side for talking federalism with us. There are some people who think that to maintain the *status quo* is to support the Secretary-General's efforts, but nothing could be further from the truth, as the Greek Cypriots are not going to give up the unfair advantages which the *status quo* confers on them. There is now a need for the Western powers to endorse the Secretary-General's Draft Framework Agreement and to indicate that if the Greek Cypriots do not accept it, their unequal privileges will be withdrawn. There is no legal, moral, or political reason why this should not be done.

Speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 18 November 1986

VII,26 CLERIDES, Glafcos

Of course, the UN is not strong enough to exert pressure on either side. But with goodwill, constitutional experts could easily work out an acceptable formula. With the backing of the major powers, it could be imposed on the island.

March 1981 (quoted by Andrew Borowiec in *The Mediterranean Feud*, p 151)

VII,27 BROXBOURNE, Lord

In any reasonable assessment of the situation, clearly it is desirable to institute a federal government on the lines adumbrated by the draft agreement (see that proposed by the UN Secretary-General in 1986 – see item VI,53 above). But supposing the general supposition is in the event accepted by both sides but that there are nevertheless genuine points of difference on some of its provisions – a not unlikely situation in so complex and comprehensive a document, there need be no difficulty in resolving such differences within the context of an agreed acceptance of a federal constitution. Article 16 of the draft agreement provides for the assistance of the Secretary-General in the interpretation of the agreement if so required. Points of difference could be referred to him in an arbitral capacity or possibly in the wider and less formal jurisdiction of what Continental lawyers call an *amiable compositeur*: and his decision would bind the parties without jeopardising the federal constitution.

There is, however, one other, if unwelcome possibility: that in spite of the unremitting efforts of the Secretary-General there might be a refusal in the event to enter in an agreement for a federal constitution. As things stand, and as Mr Denktash has expressed his willingness to accept the draft agreement, such eventuality can only come about by the refusal of the Greek Cypriots, possibly encouraged by the Government in Athens. What then would be the

position? We could not properly envisage a continuance in those circumstances indefinitely of the *status quo*, with Greek Cyprus alone having international recognition and all the advantages deriving therefrom, although patently not representing the substantial minority of Turkish Cypriots. If a federal solution unhappily proves impossible, and, *a fortiori*, if it proves impossible because of Greek Cypriot intransigence, then the anomaly of exclusive recognition must be removed and Her Majesty's Government must recognise the Administration of Northern Cyprus.

I know of no reason in constitutional law or international law why such recognition should not be accorded. It is our British practice to accord recognition on a pragmatic basis. It is a *de facto* recognition of the exercise of sovereignty rather than a certificate of legitimacy or moral propriety. Indeed, were it otherwise, it would be difficult to envisage recognition of some régimes which in fact we recognise today. There is no doubt that Mr Denktash's government exercises *de facto* sovereignty. But, more than that, it does so by the expressed and unfettered will of the people and it would indeed be entitled to recognition even on more exacting standards than those which actually apply. Therefore, if the proposals for federation are relegated to the Greek Kalends – a singularly apposite metaphor perhaps in this context – then Her Majesty's Government must take the course which principle and reality alike require, and afford recognition.

But recognition without federation is a *pis aller*, a last resort, necessary only if federation unhappily proves unobtainable. A federation by mutual agreement with joint participation is surely the best solution. It is the goal to be pursued, with conciliation in place of conflict, and common striving in place of divisive strife. It is thus and thus alone that we can hope to realise for Cyprus that better future which its people so sorely need and the world so devoutly desires.

Speaking in a debate on Cyprus in the House of Lords on 17th December 1986.

## VII,28 HOUSE OF COMMONS

### *Early Day Motion no 761 of 17 March 1987 on Turkish Northern Cyprus*

That this House supports the United Nations Secretary-General in his efforts to promote a solution of the Cyprus problem which would involve the establishment of a federal bi-communal, bi-zonal Government in Cyprus; is unable to accept that the exclusively Greek Cypriot Administration now operating in the South of Cyprus is 'The Government of Cyprus', bearing in mind that this administration resulted from an illegal seizure of power in 1964 which violated the 1960 Constitution, that the administration is not representative of the people of Cyprus as a whole, that it is not in effective control over the whole territory of Cyprus and that it does not now exercise authority over the island's affairs in general; and further urges Her Majesty's Government without prejudice to any settlement that may be reached by negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to reaffirm the principle, which was an essential feature of statements of British policy on

Cyprus during the concluding years of British rule, that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, should in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status.

*Editorial Note*

An 'Early Day Motion' is not debated on the floor on the House. It is simply posted in the House and MPs subscribe their names to indicate their support for its content. In this case 37 MPs (26 Conservatives, 10 Labour and 1 Ulster Protestant) did so. The procedure is used to demonstrate to the Government of the day the extent of support in the House for a particular proposition.

VII,29 TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS, Government of

**JOINT RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY THE  
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF  
NORTHERN CYPRUS ON 30TH OCTOBER, 1987**

1 The Republic of Cyprus has been established in 1960 as a state based on the partnership of the Turkish Cypriot people and the Greek Cypriot people.

The partnership state was destroyed as a result of the oppression, terror and armed attack against the Turkish Cypriot people, perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot side, who did not wish to share the sovereignty with the Turkish Cypriot people and who were aiming at bringing the Turkish Cypriots under their domination and, by putting an end to the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, materializing the annexation of Cyprus to Greece (ENOSIS).

2 The coup d'état of 15 July 1974, directed from Greece, had been staged with the aim of annexing the island to Greece. Indeed, even Makarios, in the speech he had made at the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974, accused Greece of being an invader.

3 The peace operation undertaken by Turkey on 20 July 1974, in exercise of her rights and responsibilities emanating from international treaties, was the inevitable result of the coup d'état of 15 July 1974.

This operation of the Turkish armed forces blocked the way to ENOSIS (annexation of Cyprus to Greece), stopped the bloodshed in the island, prevented the total annihilation of the Turkish Cypriot people, provided the Turkish Cypriots with security of life and brought peace and tranquillity to the island.

4 It is because of the bitter experiences of the past that the effective guarantee of Turkey is sine qua non for the security of life of the Turkish Cypriot people.

5 The Turkish Cypriot people have always approached the efforts of the UN Secretary-General aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the Cyprus

question, within the framework of his Mission of Good Offices, in a positive attitude, the Turkish Cypriot side has reiterated at every opportunity its support for a solution on the basis of an independent, non-aligned, bi-national, bi-zonal Federal Republic based on the equal political status of the two peoples, as envisaged in the Summit Agreements of 1977 and 1979, and has accepted the UN Secretary-General's 'Draft Framework Agreement' of 29 March 1986, which envisages such a solution.

6 As also envisaged in the said document of the UN Secretary-General the Cyprus question is an integrated whole, the different aspects of which cannot be taken up in isolation from one another.

7 In order to find a just and lasting solution to the question, we call on the Greek Cypriot side to accept the document of 29 March 1986 without further delay.

8 We hereby declare that an administration elected solely by the Greek Cypriots and to which only Greek Cypriots can be elected, whose legislative, executive and judiciary organs as well as its administrative structure and security forces are composed solely of Greek Cypriots, does not have the authority to represent, or speak on behalf of, the Turkish Cypriot people.

9 We would like to stress that one-sided and unjust resolutions adopted in fora in which the Turkish Cypriot side does not have an equal right of say and representation will not make a positive contribution to the solution of the question but, on the contrary, will render the solution of the question more difficult, and that such resolutions, in any event, will not be binding on the Turkish Cypriot people.

10 As the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, we call upon the member states of the United Nations Organization not to give any credence to the Greek side's efforts to use the UN as a medium for their propaganda, and to reject these efforts which will prevent or undermine the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

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Lord Broxbourne speaking in a debate on  
Cyprus in the House of Lords on 17th  
December 1986.